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1 Going beyond demographics:
How social contexts shape
individual attitudes
1.1 Research question, setting & contribution
Immigration, asylum, and the free movement of persons have increasingly polarised
Europe in recent years. The European border policy has been vividly discussed and
many political debates within and across EU member states are characterised by a
divide along this line. For example, the right-wing conservative present German Min-
ister of the Interior Horst Seehofer went as far as calling immigration the mother of all
problems. (Deutsche Welle, 2018) The European immigration debate has especially
heated up since 2015 when the number of ﬁrst time asylum seekers who registered in
EU member states more than doubled compared to the year before, with more than
1.2 million in total (Eurostat, 2016). More than a third of these people applied for
asylum in Germany, making it the most popular destination in Europe and one of the
key players regarding Europe's border policy (Connor, 2016). Even before 2015, Ger-
many had been the second most popular country of destination for migrants (OECD,
2014), with immigration rates reaching a 20 year high in 2013 (Destatis, 2014).
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Signiﬁcant parts of European societies exhibit a fundamental opposition and hos-
tility towards immigrants. Among the most prominent examples are the protests of
the so-called Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA)
movement in Germany, which has attracted from a few dozens to several thousands of
participants in various German cities. Large shares of these protests are characterized
by latent to open racism and xenophobia (Vorländer et al., 2015). Similar protests
also took place in other European countries, for example in the Netherlands, Poland,
France, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Sweden, amongst others (Copley, 2016).
Furthermore, since 2015 there has been a sharp increase in anti-immigrant violence
such as personal injuries or arson attacks on refugee accommodations, especially in
Germany (Jäckle and König, 2017, also see Koopmans and Olzak, 2004).
The political climate in Europe became increasingly tense after several incidents
which inﬂuenced the public debates about immigration. This includes Islamist terror
attacks which shocked the public during this period (cf. Jungkunz et al., 2018; Silva,
2018; Smiley et al., 2017). Since most of the recent immigrants and asylum seekers
originate from predominantly Islamic countries in Africa and the Middle East (Con-
nor, 2016), discussions about national identity and about religious fundamentalism,
which is currently mostly associated with Islam, are also highly present (cf. Helbling
and Traunmüller, 2018). Other prominent examples are the sexual assaults and rob-
beries that happened at the festivities in various German cities on New Year's Eve
(NYE) 2015/2016 (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017 or chapter 4). These assaults
were connected with the recent inﬂow of refugees in public debates because the per-
petrators were mainly reported to have been male Arabs or North Africans (Deutsche
Welle, 2016). Even before the recent developments, immigration has repeatedly been
a prevalent topic in Europe, for example during the two Eastern Enlargements of the
European Union in 2004 and 2007 (cf. Boehnke et al., 2007 or section 2.5).
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It is not surprising that these developments were very present in the public polit-
ical debates in Europe in general and in Germany in particular.1 Politicians as well
as the media vividly, and often controversially, discussed the European and German
immigration and asylum policy. The dynamics of such discourses can directly aﬀect
far-right violence (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Moreover, the question of how to
deal with immigration and asylum has given rise to right-wing populist parties in
many EU-member states. These parties often reject current politics and the political
establishment altogether. They beneﬁt from exclusionary sentiments in the public be-
cause they are mostly associated with anti-immigration positions (Arzheimer, 2008).
The growing support for such anti-immigration and anti-European forces also poses
a threat to the ideas and the cohesion of the European Union in general.
Because of the fundamental importance of immigration and migrant integration
issues for the future of Europe, my aim in the present dissertation is to enhance our
understanding of the way social contexts inﬂuence the emergence of negative attitudes
towards immigration and immigrants in Europe and Germany. In contrast to many
empirical-quantitative studies in this ﬁeld, my focus is less on objective characteristics,
such as actual immigration rates or economic wealth, than on political discourses,
which in some cases might reﬂect actual circumstances but in others they might not.
I argue that much prior research has practically neglected the role national discourses
about immigration related issues play in the formation of public opinion. Models
based mainly on objective country-level conditions are thus not always best suited
to explain anti-immigration attitudes.2 This reasoning is supported by the fact that
many studies fail to ﬁnd statistically or substantively signiﬁcant correlations between
1For a depiction of the trajectories of diﬀerent aspects of the German immigration debate in recent
years see Figures 2.2 and 4.1 in the present dissertation.
2Empirical evidence suggests, however, that things look diﬀerent on more local and regional levels,
which more directly shape one's opportunity structure, for example, for inter-ethnic contact
(Sluiter et al., 2015; Newman et al., 2015).
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objective country-level indicators and attitudes (e. g., Hjerm, 2007; Sides and Citrin,
2007, also see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014: 231). A crucial goal of the present
dissertation is hence to examine whether diﬀerent measures of national discourses help
to explain attitudes. A subsequent question is to identify who is especially aﬀected
by certain discourses.
My main argument is that the feelings of threat leading to exclusionary attitudes
stem from national discourses about certain developments or salient events related to
immigration. Objective country-level migration rates, in contrast, are hardly per-
ceivable to the individual and thus, their inﬂuence as a source of out-group threat
perceptions has been overestimated in much of the existing literature. I will elaborate
this point in the remainder of this chapter before turning to the single studies consti-
tuting the present dissertation. I will outline theoretical mechanisms and summarise
the state of research on contextual explanations of attitudes related to immigration.
To this end, I begin with the most prominent explanation in sociological studies
concerning these attitudes: the group threat paradigm. Subsequently, I address the-
oretical and empirical shortcomings of the way a certain branch of research in this
ﬁeld applies this paradigm. Based on this critique, I develop a framework that, as
I argue, is better suited to explain how social contexts form individual attitudes to-
wards immigrants. In the Concluding remarks I synthesise and weave the ﬁndings
of my studies into the broader picture. Moreover, I also derive implications for fu-
ture research on the matter and point to potential advances which could build on my
ﬁndings, as well as providing some practical guidelines for political communication.
But ﬁrst I will discuss the key concepts underlying this dissertation.
4
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1.2 Deﬁnitions of central concepts
Explananda (outcomes): Attitudes
The concept of attitudes or opinions3 I use in this dissertation encompasses the evalu-
ation of and views about certain immigrant groups or immigration in general. Exam-
ining attitudes is of political and social importance. First, this is due to the central
role immigration plays in contemporary Europe, as I have outlined above. Second,
negative attitudes are likely to lead to actual discriminatory behaviour (e. g., Carlsson
and Eriksson, 2017) and, hence, ultimately to ethnic inequality and social tensions.
The particular operationalisation is important, however, as it determines what is ac-
tually measured and which relationships researchers are investigating. For example,
is it about the evaluation of national policies or certain ethnic groups or individuals
(Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 313)? While the outcome variable of chapter 2 is
the broader evaluation of immigration in general, chapters 3 and 4 investigate more
diﬀerentiated measures.
Accounting for the particularities of attitudes towards diﬀerent immigrant groups
takes up recent developments which, in contrast to previous research focussing on
universal generalisations of out-group derogation (e. g., Zick et al., 2008), account
for the fact that prejudices cannot be understood in abstracto, but instead they need
to be situated in social space which includes cultural-discursive contexts in which
intergroup relations are embedded. (Meuleman et al., 2018: 5, also see Hellwig and
Sinno, 2017; Meeusen and Jacobs, 2017; Meeusen et al., 2017). However, there is
evidence suggesting that even speciﬁc components of perceptions of threat related to
distant groups carry over to attitudes towards immigrants whom individuals encounter
in their local environment (Bouman et al., 2014).
3I will use both terms interchangeably in this dissertation.
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By combining broad and detailed measures of attitudes, my aim in the present
dissertation is to establish ﬁndings which are, on the one hand, generalisable and, on
the other, oﬀer an in-depth understanding. I will discuss the particular measures for
my outcome variables in the respective chapters in greater detail.
Explanantia (central explanatory factors): Discourses
By discourses, I mean the way public speakers, mass media, and national elites, such
as politicians, provide and shape information exceeding personal experiences, using
certain arguments and interpretations (cf. van Dijk, 1993: 8 ﬀ., also see section 1.3
below). Such discourses are speciﬁc to a social space and time (cf. Meuleman et al.,
2018), constituting a particular information environment (cf. Hainmueller and Hop-
kins, 2014: 243 f.). Hence, they have a contextual character. Discourse eﬀects, then,
are the intended or unintended consequences of these arguments put forward by pub-
lic actors and national elites for the individual members of the general public. In this
respect, I follow Blalock (1984) who deﬁnes contextual eﬀects in general as macro
processes that are presumed to have an impact on the individual actor over and above
the eﬀects of any individual-level variables that may be operating.4 Finally, I will use
the term salience for the prominence or importance of certain (parts of) discourses
for the public and/or the individual (Wlezien, 2005).
Macro-level discourses are latent constructs with many possible operationalisations.
In the present dissertation, I employ diﬀerent measures of discourses in each study.
Firstly, I investigate diﬀerent shapers of discourses although they often respond to
one another. Chapter 2 focuses on mass media, chapter 3 investigates political elites
and chapter 4 refers to both. Secondly, I also employ diﬀerent data sources. These
4Blalock (1984) in his article particularly refers to what is now most commonly known as multi-level
models. I employ this method in some, but not all, studies of the present dissertation.
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range from a self-conducted quantitative content analysis in chapter 2 to the use
of secondary, hand-coded data in chapter 3 to a qualitative discourse analysis in
chapter 4. I come back to discussing the beneﬁts and drawbacks of the diﬀerent
measures in section 5.3.
Connecting discourses and attitudes
The three empirical studies of the present dissertation investigate diﬀerent aspects of
discourses and have diﬀerent scopes.
Chapter 2 analyses eﬀects of salience of the immigration issue in the media over a
time span of 15 years, chapter 3 the role of political elite discourses in 19 countries,
and chapter 4 the eﬀect of a selected prominent event which had signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on immigration discourses throughout Europe, namely the assaults of New Year's Eve
2015/16 in Germany (for a more detailed overview and summaries of these studies
see section 1.4 below).
All three studies are based on the assumption that certain discourses shape threat
perceptions which, in turn, lead to negative attitudes. I will elaborate this theoretical
mechanism in the following.
1.3 Theoretical mechanism
The group threat paradigm
The lion's share of research about contextual eﬀects on immigration related attitudes
draws upon Herbert Blumer's paper from the late 1950s, in which he develops the idea
that ethnic prejudice is largely inﬂuenced by the social positions of the diﬀerent ethnic
groups constituting a society (Blumer, 1958). According to Blumer, ethnic prejudice
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is less the result of individual predispositions or traits but rather the outcome of the
way in which members of an ethnic group view their own group, especially in relation
to other ethnic groups. Opinions, sentiments, and ideologies are therefore not only the
cause but the result of the perceptions of a society's positional arrangements (Esposito
and Murphy, 1999). Negative attitudes and resentments among the members of the
'dominant' group in a society against the 'subordinate' ethnic out-group accordingly
stem from the perceptions that the subordinate group may threaten the privileges of
the dominant group. According to Blumer such threat perceptions are prerequisites
for the emergence of ethnic prejudice (Blumer, 1958: 4).
The group threat paradigm translates Blumer's ideas into empirical-quantitative
research settings. This translation was ﬁrst prominently put forward by Blalock
(1967)5 who investigated race relations in the US. It was also picked up by Quillian
(1995) and a plethora of studies which followed (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010
for an overview; for a critique of this development see Esposito and Murphy, 1999).
According to this interpretation, threat perceptions are the result of understanding
society as a zero-sum game, although not necessarily in a strictly economic sense. The
argument is that improvement of conditions for the subordinate group, or generally
eroding conditions, lead members of the dominant group to feel relatively worse oﬀ,
be it in terms of material goods or of political inﬂuence. From such a perspective,
immigrants threaten not only, for example, jobs but also a country's national identity,
norms and values.
Social scientists interested in the contextual determinants of anti-immigration at-
titudes draw upon Blumer's argument of threat as a core driver of ethnic hostility
and restrictive attitudes. Situations of threat are understood as the result of micro-
level features, such as individual unemployment, as well as of structural, macro-level
5An earlier version of a similar argument can already be found in Blalock (1957).
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characteristics, such as economic deprivation of one's environment or the ethnic com-
position of one's residential area, or the combination of both.
With the increasing availability of demographical, economic, and survey data, re-
searchers put this reasoning to the test (e. g., Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov
et al., 2004; Hjerm, 2007; Schneider, 2008, see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010).
Macro-level characteristics, individual perceptions & attitudes
There are studies ﬁnding empirical support for the hypotheses derived from the 're-
alistic' group threat paradigm discussed above, for example by reporting signiﬁcant
associations of the proportion of immigrants in a country and public opinion (e. g.,
Meuleman et al., 2009; Semyonov et al., 2006; Quillian, 1995). A cumulative body of
evidence, however, calls this interpretation into question (e. g., Hjerm, 2007; Sides and
Citrin, 2007; Semyonov et al., 2004). In fact, a meta-analysis conducted by Pottie-
Sherman and Wilkes (2017) reveals that of almost 500 correlations between ethnic
minority group size and attitudes provided in 55 studies, more than half were not
statistically signiﬁcant. Keeping in mind the general tendency to prioritise positive
results, which is inherent in the publishing process of empirical research, this is a strik-
ingly large proportion. Moreover, even the direction of signiﬁcant correlations varies
from study to study, casting further doubt on a clear causal eﬀect.6 Hainmueller and
Hopkins (2014) in their review article state that country-level real-world indicators,
measured as objective numbers, often fail to be reliable predictors of attitudes towards
immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014: 231). The authors even conclude that
6Admittedly, the authors partly explain the varying correlations among studies by the diﬀerent
operationalisations of the ethnic out-group(s) variables. But interestingly neither the modelling
strategy nor the choice of the unit of analysis were signiﬁcantly related to the eﬀect sizes (Pottie-
Sherman and Wilkes, 2017). Other researchers, however, argue that the level of measurement
is important, which relates to the so-called modiﬁable areal unit problem (e. g., Weber, 2015).
However, my argument mainly concerns the impact of immigration rates and characteristics on
the country level, where exposure and personal everyday experiences are less likely.
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the economic branch of the group threat paradigm which concerns competition on
the national labour market between natives and immigrants has repeatedly failed to
ﬁnd empirical support, making it something of a zombie theory. (Hainmueller and
Hopkins, 2014: 241) This is in line with several studies which explicitly investigate
the relationships between actual numbers, perceptions, and attitudes. For example,
Sides and Citrin (2007) as well as Hjerm (2007) analyse data of the ﬁrst wave of the
European Social Survey and both ﬁnd that neither national immigration rates, nor
aggregate perceptions of out-group size (in the case of Hjerm, 2007), nor a country's
economic condition are statistically signiﬁcantly associated with anti-immigration at-
titudes. Semyonov et al. (2004) report similar ﬁndings by examining data of the
German General Social Survey from 1996.
But the doubts regarding the impact of many objective country characteristics are
not only empirical ones. Rather, the theoretical mechanism connecting these macro-
level aspects and individual-level attitudes is on a shaky basis. Individual perception
is the crucial link between social environments and attitudes. It is a well-established
ﬁnding that individual perceptions of the ethnic composition in a country strongly
correlate with attitudes, also in the studies discussed above (Hjerm, 2007; Sides and
Citrin, 2007; Semyonov et al., 2004).7 And Kuntz et al. (2017) report highly similar
ﬁndings regarding the role of actual and perceived economic circumstances. However,
the crucial question is whether inhabitants perceive their social environment in the
way government statistics measure them. How, after all, should macro-level circum-
stances aﬀect one's view if her or his picture about these numbers is considerably
distorted?
7Although one should be cautious about the causal direction: Are natives more xenophobic because
they think there are too many immigrants around them or do they see immigrants everywhere
because they do not like them? To my knowledge, this is empirically still an open question.
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And indeed research has repeatedly shown that most people have highly biased
perceptions of the ethnic composition in their country of residence, or to quote from
a recent study on the nature of political misperceptions: empirical research in public
opinion yields a relatively simple answer to the question of how much people typi-
cally know about politics: not very much. (Flynn et al., 2017: 127) For example,
US-Americans of all races largely overestimate the share of diﬀerent ethnic minorities
in their country according to Wong's (2007) analysis of the General Social Survey.
This leads her to conclude that, for example, larger numbers of black people are not
the cause of greater anti-black prejudice among whites, because whites are unlikely
to actually perceive the group size of blacks (Wong, 2007, also see Alba et al., 2005).
Herda (2010) demonstrates similar misperceptions for European countries, analysing
the ﬁrst wave of the European Social Survey (also see Herda, 2013). Moreover, the
discrepancy between subjective perceptions and objective immigrant numbers tends
to be stronger for immigrant numbers measured at larger spatial units such as coun-
tries (Wong, 2007), perhaps because people have more direct and indirect contact and
encounters with people in their more local environment. In a similar vein, Blinder
(2015) ﬁnds that the perception of the immigrant population in Britain strongly di-
verges from what is implied by census data with a severe overestimation of the relative
share of permanent arrivals and asylum seekers while largely ignoring international
students. This reverses the actual ratios (Blinder, 2015: 88). The fact that misper-
ceptions about the composition of a country's immigrant population correlate not
only with demographic variables and media exposure but also with fears about losing
national identity suggests that such misperceptions are more than random ignorance
(Herda, 2015).
In sum, people not only have biased perceptions about the size of ethnic out-groups
in their country but also of who 'immigrants' actually are and where they are from. As
11
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argued above, these misperceptions of national contexts have crucial implications for
the use of census and government data as proxies for situations of perceived threat
in cross-national comparative research. Moreover, relying on aggregated country-
level demographics becomes even more problematic the larger and/or more segregated
countries are.
In spite of the empirical and theoretical shortcomings, much of the research on im-
migration related attitudes has mostly ignored another potential macro-level source of
threat perceptions: the national discourses on immigration related issues. In contrast
to objective numbers, their impact on public opinion has been largely underestimated
in this ﬁeld.
Integrating discourses into the group threat paradigm
On the one hand, it is evident that exclusionist attitudes are unequally distributed
across countries (e. g., Hjerm, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007, see also chapter 3) and
also ﬂuctuate over time (e. g., Legewie, 2013; Semyonov et al., 2006, or chapters 2
and 4). It seems reasonable to assume that such attitudes stem from perceptions of
threat. On the other hand, and as discussed above, many objective circumstances of
a country, such as immigration shares, are mostly misperceived by the general public
and often empirically fail to explain attitudes. This paradox raises the question
of what, then, causes the threat perceptions leading to the diﬀerent levels of anti-
immigration sentiments in diﬀerent social contexts.
The core argument underlying the present dissertation is that the images of devel-
opments and events which people harbour are crucial determinants of their attitudes.
Early last century, Walter Lippmann wrote: The world that we have to deal with
politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported,
and imagined. [. . . ] [Man] has invented ways of seeing what no naked eye could
12
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see, of hearing what no ear could hear, of weighing immense masses and inﬁnitesimal
ones, of counting and separating more items than he can individually remember. He
is learning to see with his mind vast portions of the world that he could never see,
touch, smell, hear, or remember. Gradually he makes for himself a trustworthy pic-
ture inside his head of the world beyond his reach. (Lippmann, 1921: 13, emphases
added) Public opinion on political issues, in other words, is a response to mental im-
ages of developments and events. The impossibility of perfectly perceiving the actual
environment leads to the creation of an imagined pseudo-environment reﬂecting par-
ticular aspects of the real world. Simpliﬁcation is necessary to process the potentially
inﬁnitely complex information. While Lippmann's argument is a philosophical one,
this phenomenon has also been empirically examined for decades by, for example,
cognitive psychology (e. g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
For the present investigation, the crucial point is that certain kinds of simplifying
images are more likely to lead to resentments and ethnic prejudice. I will return to
such group-speciﬁc attitudes after further elaboration of the outlined mechanism.
Among the main shapers of such an imagined pseudo-environment are mass media
and public elites. They are the central sources for the kind of information which
exceeds personal or everyday experiences. Moreover, they also deﬁne, interpret, frame,
and contextualise real-world developments and events. Such interpretations are the
basis of one's image about the world. Individuals create their views of the social and
political world from these images, or in Lippmann's terms: Inevitably our opinions
cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can
directly observe. They have, therefore, to be pieced together out of what others have
reported and what we can imagine. (Lippmann, 1921: 30)
Media and elites can thus shape attitudes towards immigrants by providing and
forming the information underlying national discourses, which translate into the pic-
13
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tures about an ethnic out-group that people have in their heads. This, in turn, aﬀects
how individuals evaluate the individuals belonging to this ethnic subgroup.
Furthermore, bringing public elites' rhetoric back into the group threat paradigm
also means picking up an important aspect Herbert Blumer formulated in his original
work on the social determinants of racial prejudice mentioned above. Blumer argues in
his paper that the emergence of a collective image of the abstract group is a major
prerequisite for ethnic prejudice (Blumer, 1958: 6). He further states that these
collective images of an out-group are shaped by the elites and speakers of a society's
dominant group in the public sphere. This aspect has largely been ignored by many
studies which aim at testing the group threat paradigm empirically. However, it is
crucial to Blumer's actual argumentation. For this reason, I want to bring this part of
the original version of the group threat theory back into focus. I combine sociology and
communication sciences by drawing upon the two classics and test their implications
in a modern fashion. To this end, I bring together Lippmann's idea of the 'picture
inside one's head' with Blumer's idea of public speakers deﬁnitions of the 'collective
image of the abstract group'. To address the impact of public speakers, chapter 2
deals with mass media and chapter 3 with political elites as shapers of collective
out-group images and, ultimately, of public opinion and xenophobic resentment.
But establishing that public speakers have the power to shape attitudes through
discourses does not answer how such discourses come about and, so far, also misses
why certain discourses are associated with more negative attitudes. In many cases
the images of ethnic groups which underlie a discourse do not appear out of the blue.
Rather, they are connected to certain real-world developments (also see Wimmer,
1997: 26 f.). A second important part of Blumer's argumentation helps to explain the
emergence of such discourses. In his paper, he emphasises the importance of what he
calls 'big events,' which are central for generating and deﬁning a threatening image
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of an ethnic out-group. Such events are seen as having major social importance. In
many cases they are underlying subsequent discourses. Deﬁning these events forms
the collective image of the involved ethnic out-group. When the out-group is discussed
as being threatening to the dominant group of a society, such events are particularly
potent in shaping images (Blumer, 1958: 6). In this interpretation, the perceptions
of certain ethnic groups as threatening do not (only) stem from their mere physical
presence but from the pictures majority members associate with this group. The
sexual assaults and robberies which took place in Germany on New Year's Eve 2015/16
are textbook examples of such events. Hence, I investigate the impact of these events
in chapter 4 of the present dissertation.
The idea of discursive deﬁnitions of threatening images of ethnic groups also cor-
responds to recent ﬁndings in the social scientiﬁc literature according to which indi-
viduals' opinions are not only driven by a generalised kind of prejudice but that they
are also target speciﬁc (Hellwig and Sinno, 2017; Meeusen et al., 2017; Meeusen and
Jacobs, 2017) and relate to particular temporal and spacial social contexts (Meule-
man et al., 2018). To account for such particularities of attitudes, chapters 3 and 4
investigate attitudes towards diﬀerent ethnic groups in particular contexts. Chapter
2, in contrast, takes a broader perspective and examines the universal eﬀect of media
reporting on immigration concerns across various discourses and public debates.8
As I have stated above, the present dissertation wants to bring together Lippmann's
idea of people harbouring a picture of the real world inside their heads with Blumer's
argument of deﬁnitions of threatening collective images of ethnic out-groups through
8Many studies in this ﬁeld contrast Blumer's group threat paradigm with Allport's contact paradigm
(Allport, 1979: 261 ﬀ.). They often test the competing hypotheses that the actual physical
presence of immigrants in a given context either increases (Blumer) or weakens (Allport) ethnic
prejudice. A similar argument about familiarisation can also be found regarding the presence
of immigrants in the media, i. e. so-called parasocial contact (Schiappa et al., 2005). However,
because the focus of the present dissertation is on discourses rather than repeated media exposure
to certain ethnic characters on TV shows I will not pursue this approach any further throughout
this work.
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public speakers drawing upon signiﬁcant events. These discourses related to certain
developments and events are the sources of information the members of the ethnic
majority group have to form their own picture of a certain ethnic group (Lippmann,
1921). And the more these discourses contribute to a threatening picture, the more
likely is a negative and adverse attitude for those belonging to the ethnic majority
(Blumer, 1958).
The underlying theoretical model consists of three main parts: I am interested in
how important events are picked up by national elites who then shape macro-level
discourses which, in turn, aﬀect individual perceptions and thereby attitudes.9 Epis-
temologically, this model is located in between the 'realistic threat' model I discussed
above and philosophical 'discourse theories.' It is distinct from the former because it
argues that threat perceptions often do not directly stem from actual circumstances
in a country but from their mediation through public speakers and mass media. It is,
however, also distinct from the latter because it still incorporates certain real-world
events and developments. Much of discourse theory puts discourses in the centre of
explanation as quasi-magical powers (Wimmer, 1997: 26) without being able to
explain how discourses themselves come about or under which conditions they pre-
vail (Wimmer, 1997). This is not my intention. While discourses certainly can be
completely disconnected from social reality, I argue that their role in most cases is a
mediating, yet potentially distorting, one.
Not all studies constituting this dissertation address all three aspects of this model
in the same fashion. Rather, each study has a somewhat diﬀerent focus and its own
methodology. In this way, I aim to provide new insights which are, in combination,
both broad (generalisable) and deep (accounting for particularities).
9Mind that this is not a strictly causal path which is universally applicable. Sometimes parts of
elite discourses are the event itself (e. g., Donald Trump's Tweets) and sometimes manifestations




While the phenomenon I am investigating, out-group attitudes as a part of inter-
group relations, is a sociological one, drawing upon research of mass communication
sciences can help to explain the eﬀects of national discourses. I argued above that the
social context informs a person's image of social and ethnic groups which, in turn,
translates to her or his formation of particular attitudes. The model of multi-level
agenda setting addresses the question how certain aspects in a discourse relate to
general as well as speciﬁc attitudes, depending on their prominence, or salience. This
model takes up Lippmann's reasoning that attitudes about complex political issues
emerge from the images of the world people have in their heads. It deals with the
transfer of salience from mass media to the audience, arguing that when mass media
emphasise a certain issue this has an impact on the priority that the general public
assigns to these issues (McCombs and Ghanem, 2001). Put more generally, elements
which are prominent in national discourses are regarded as important by individual
members of the public.
This transfer of salience, of what is seen as important or urgent, can happen at dif-
ferent levels of an issue. On the most general level, the media determines which issues
dominate the public agenda. This corresponds to the classical idea of agenda-setting
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972). A recent large-scale experimental study in the US, in
which the media messages of 48 real news outlets were systematically manipulated
over ﬁve years, conﬁrms that increased news broadcasting indeed leads to more dis-
cussions on Twitter about topics such as immigration and refugees (King et al., 2017).
Applied to the research question of this dissertation, this means that extensive report-
ing about immigration related topics the media increases the importance the public
attaches to the issue. Chapter 2 of this dissertation is devoted to agenda-setting on
this level.
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But immigration is a multi-faceted issue. And according to McCombs and Ghanem
(2001), the transfer of salience happens not only regarding the issues themselves but
also regarding the diﬀerent aspects that constitute each issue. So just like issues can
be put in a hierarchy on the ﬁrst level of agenda setting, the attributes within each
issue can be organised on higher levels according to their relative salience (McCombs
and Ghanem, 2001). In this way, public speakers and the media not only inﬂuence
what to think about, as stated by classical agenda setting-theory, but also how to
think about some subjects (McCombs and Ghanem, 2001: 69).10 Again applied to
the present research question, the salience of the immigration issue itself can change,
but also the salience of diﬀerent aspects within it. For example, the increased num-
ber of Muslims, resulting debates about religious fundamentalism (see Helbling and
Traunmüller, 2018; Koopmans, 2015; Diehl et al., 2009) and diﬀerent Islamist terror
attacks are likely to make Muslim immigration particularly important (cf. chapter 3).
Similarly, the debates after the assaults of New Year's Eve 2015/16, which were cen-
tred on the inﬂux of males from North-Africa or the Middle East, should especially
aﬀect the evaluation of these particular groups of immigrants (cf. chapter 4). By
giving more importance to certain aspects (e. g., safety), public speakers have an
impact not only on the general salience of immigration but also on the salience of
certain attributes of immigrants. Such national discourses should thus primarily have
an impact on attitudes towards these immigrant subgroups. Chapters 3 and 4 relate
to more diﬀerentiated eﬀects of discourses, which take place on higher levels of the
agenda-setting model discussed above.
In brief, the present dissertation starts with the ﬁrst level of agenda-setting by
investigating eﬀects of general salience in chapter 2. Chapter 3 examines attitudes
10Note the similarities to the concepts of priming and framing (e. g., Iyengar and Kinder, 2010).
McCombs and Ghanem (2001) admit that the idea of attribute agenda setting is explicitly meant
to integrate the theory to the framing approach (page 69).
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towards particular immigrant groups which were characterised by diﬀerent levels of
salience and threat perceptions. Finally, chapter 4 analyses how certain characteristics
of immigrants inﬂuence their evaluation by native Germans after the sexual assaults
of NYE 2015/16. Because some characteristics, such as gender and country of origin,
were clearly outstanding in the particular setting they should be more important for
the overall evaluation of immigrants. Hence, chapter 4 corresponds to salience on the
level of attributes.
1.4 Structure of the dissertation
In the following, I present extended summaries of each of the studies of this disser-
tation with the goal of explaining how each study contributes to the overall research
question. Furthermore, I want to clarify how the diﬀerent studies complement each
other, which relates to diﬀerent strengths and but also limitations associated with
diﬀerent methodology and data sources. Generally, the dissertation is structured in
a way that starts with the most general perspective and then gradually zooms in
and becomes increasingly more detailed. The ﬁnal chapter is a short conclusion and
discussion of the central ﬁndings.
Table 1.1 gives an overview of the key features of the three studies included in the
present dissertation, which are subsequently explained in more detail.
Overview of studies
In chapter 2, called Mass media and concerns about immigration in Germany in the
21st century: Individual-level evidence over 15 years, my colleague Stephan Dochow
and I examine the general impact increased media reporting (media salience) has on
concerns about immigration. Mass media are one of the key sources of information on
19






























































































































































































































































































































































































1.4 Structure of the dissertation
political issues. When the media report on immigration, they transfer a certain picture
of the world to people's heads (McCombs and Ghanem, 2001). As I have outlined
above, the ﬁrst level of the agenda setting model states that general salience of an
issue such as immigration in the media increases the importance individuals assign
to this issue. Moreover, the discussion of immigration makes the information related
to this issue more accessible in people's minds. In the terminology of psychology and
communication sciences, media salience primes the individual to the immigration
issue (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010: 63 ﬀ.).
The importance of mass media for attitudes toward ethnic minorities has already
been discussed by Gordon W. Allport in his famous book The Nature of Prejudice,
ﬁrst published in 1954 (Allport, 1979: 200 ﬀ.). However, due to the complexity of
operationalising and systematically quantifying large amounts of real media data,
empirical investigations outside artiﬁcial situations are still comparatively rare (but
see Van Klingeren et al., 2015; Schlueter and Davidov, 2013; Hopkins, 2010). To
the best of my knowledge, virtually all of the studies with such a scope employ a
measure of the media environment which varies only between survey waves. This
means that the measure has a constant value for all observations within each survey
wave. However, as demonstrated in Figure 2.2, the amount of media reporting on
immigration issues strongly ﬂuctuates on a daily basis. To account for this, we employ
a ﬁne-grained and precise measure of media salience which captures the actual amount
of salience for each respondent (see section Research design and statistical models
in chapter 2).
We rely on individual-level panel data and employ ﬁxed-eﬀects models which au-
tomatically account for all time-constant potential confounders, such as socialisation,
stable prejudice, social class, race, sex, culture, etc. Hence, we see our estimates as
closer to causality compared with previous research on the matter.
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Combining a self-conducted quantitative content analysis of German newspaper
and news magazine articles with the German Socio-Economic Panel and other data
sources, we build a very rich data set which includes 25,000 persons and 190,000
person-years.
My aim with this study is to provide a broad perspective which encompasses data
from German print newspapers and individual attitudes over 15 years. Investigat-
ing many individuals for such a relatively long time span has the beneﬁt of oﬀering
much information and statistical power. But perhaps even more important for my
purpose is that the media reporting taking place over one and a half decades covers
a heterogeneous set of discourses about various issues related to immigration. In the
present case, this includes topics such as terrorist attacks, EU enlargements, and the
recent inﬂow of refugees (cf. section 2.5). This large scope allows to investigate the
impact of media on immigration concerns which is not primarily driven by a single
kind of debate. The estimated eﬀect thus resembles an eﬀect of mass media which is
generalisable over various diﬀerent discourses and also, at least to a certain degree,
over time. It is hence ideally suited to investigate the proposition derived from the
agenda setting model on the ﬁrst level, namely that mere salience of the issue in the
media has an impact on attitudes.
The analyses exhibit a substantive and very robust positive eﬀect of media salience
on concerns about immigration. This eﬀect can be understood as the universal impact
of media salience, averaged over all diﬀerent kinds of discourses. This demonstrates
the general leverage of mass media. However, drastic negative framing may lead to
even stronger eﬀects.
The media salience eﬀect is especially strong for individuals living in areas with a
smaller proportion of ethnic minorities and for those with lower education, or con-
servative ideology. This stresses that the eﬀect of mass media, while encompassing
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diﬀerent discourses, clearly depends on the individual proneness of direct or indirect
recipients.
Chapter 3, which is called Propagating ethnic preferences? Political elite discourses
and Europeans' openness towards diﬀerent immigrant groups in the beginning of Eu-
rope's 'Immigration Crisis', adds to the general issue salience the importance of tone
of elite discourses. To this end, it takes a cross-national perspective and examines the
relationship between political elite discourses and public opinion towards immigrants
at the beginning of Europe's so-called Migration Crisis. It adds to chapter 2 by diﬀer-
entiating on both sides of the equation: ﬁrstly, I distinguish attitudes towards diﬀerent
groups of immigrants, such as Muslims or ethnically more or less distinct immigrants.
Muslim immigration was especially prominent in the public debates during the pe-
riod of analysis. This relates to xenophobic hostility towards people originating from
countries characterised by Islam (Copley, 2016) as well as to more nuanced debates
about the rejection of religious fundamentalism (cf. Helbling and Traunmüller, 2018).
The main point for this study is that the salience of problematic aspects of Islam
in many political discourses are likely to primarily shape attitudes towards Muslim
immigrants compared to others (cf. Meuleman et al., 2018). Secondly, I also distin-
guish the tone of political elite discourses in this study. It is reasonable to assume
that it is primarily the negative toning of discourses which causes negative attitudes
(Careja, 2015; Bohman, 2011; Hjerm, 2007) because such discourses are more likely
to contribute to a threatening image of, for example, Muslims. Whether, on the other
hand, positive discourses have an liberalising impact by establishing positive images
has empirically been an open question so far. My approach allows to examine whether
positive and negative tones at the political elite level cause diﬀerent attitudes towards
more or less prominent immigrant groups.
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To analyse these relationships, I combine data from the seventh wave of the Euro-
pean Social Survey (ESS7) with data taken from the Manifesto Research on Political
Representation (MARPOR), which quantiﬁes the manifestos on political parties based
on a pre-selected set of topics and tone, and other sources (see section 3.6 for more
details). The results reveal that objective national-level characteristics hardly corre-
late with any of the investigated attitudes. This also corresponds to a set of previous
studies (e. g. Hjerm, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Semyonov et al., 2004). In contrast,
negative discourses by political elites statistically signiﬁcantly relate to more nega-
tive attitudes, but primarily aﬀect attitudes towards Muslim and ethnically distinct
immigrants. This is in line with the theoretical argument because both groups were
rather prominent in the historical period being investigated. Thus, the emergence
of discourses emphasising ethnic diﬀerences are likely to contribute to threatening
pictures of certain ethnic out-groups (Blumer, 1958). This picture is inﬂuenced by
the historical period of investigation (Meuleman et al., 2018). But the results also
reveal that positive discourses by political elites are universally associated with less
negative attitudes towards all of the investigated immigrant groups. An explanation
for this ﬁnding is that discourses promoting tolerance and openness apply to various
ethnic out-groups. Moreover, as in chapter 2, it is evident that discourse eﬀects de-
pend on individual receptiveness. As expected, the eﬀect of political elite discourses is
stronger for those who are more politically inclined. Moreover, the eﬀect of individual
ideology, interestingly, becomes more pronounced in contexts where elites are either
more negative or more positive towards immigration related issues.
Whereas the study in chapter 2 aims at providing a more universal eﬀect over a large
and heterogeneous set of discourses by investigating their ﬂuctuations over temporal
contexts, the idea of the eﬀects reported in chapter 3 is to test for generalisability over
diﬀerent discourses by analysing diﬀerent spatial contexts and, thus, diﬀerent political
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and social cultures. Moreover, chapter 3 takes a more nuanced approach compared
to chapter 2 by moving the focus from a general eﬀect of salience on attitudes to-
wards immigration in general to the more particularistic eﬀects of discourses' tone
on attitudes towards diﬀerent groups of immigrants. However, it is cross-sectional
for two reasons: ﬁrstly, speciﬁc eﬀects refer to a particular setting (Meuleman et al.,
2018) and, secondly, one of the crucial dependent variables (attitude towards Muslim
immigrants) is included only in the seventh wave of the ESS and other items relate
far less to speciﬁc out-groups.
Finally, Refugees unwelcome? Changes in the public acceptance of immigrants
and refugees in Germany in the course of Europe's 'Immigration Crisis', which is
chapter 4 of the present dissertation, zooms in closest on the relationship between
national discourses and attitudes. It tests the agenda setting model's propositions
on the attribute level, that is that salience of certain aspects within the immigration
issue aﬀects attitudes towards those holding these attributes. It presents a case study
on the changes in the public acceptance of diﬀerent kinds of immigrants during the
so-called Migration Crisis. As discussed above, several Islamist terror attacks and in
particular the sexual assaults and robberies during the festivities of New Year's Eve
2015/16 made immigration in general highly salient, especially with regard to male
and Muslim migrants and refugees from North Africa and the Middle East (Deutsche
Welle, 2016). These are, thus, the attributes which were salient within the general
immigration topic during this time.
To examine how these developments, and especially their discussion by public elites,
inﬂuence public opinion about immigrants, my colleague Alexander W. Schmidt-
Catran and I conducted a multi-factorial survey experiment on the same respondents
over two waves, the ﬁrst taking place at the beginning of the increasing migration
inﬂow and the second after the assaults of New Year's Eve 2015/16, where men who
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were reported as having Arab and African appearance conducted several assaults of
robbery and sexual harassment in diﬀerent cities in Germany. In brief, this means that
the same individuals evaluated the same set of hypothetical immigrants, who system-
atically varied on certain attributes such as country of origin, reason for migration,
and religious denomination (see section 4.5 of this dissertation for more details of
the design). This unique within-variation based procedure allows us to estimate the
diﬀerences in the eﬀects of each immigrant attribute between the survey waves in a
causal fashion.
The most striking ﬁnding of the study is that respondents were not only very posi-
tive toward refugees at the beginning of the so-called Migration Crisis, but that their
acceptance actually increased during these developments. This points to strongly
internalised humanitarian values, which may have been the result of philanthropic
discourses surpassing threatening ones. On the other hand, the fact that the already
lower acceptance of immigrants from Arab or African countries further decreased be-
tween both survey waves demonstrates potential limitations of such values when those
entering Europe are not perceived as genuine refugees. Interestingly, the evaluation
of Muslim immigrants did not change between the two waves. This might be because
the assaults were no act of religious fundamentalism. Thus, people might actually
retain diﬀerentiated views after dramatic events.
A deeper analysis reveals that male respondents primarily discriminated among
immigrants according to their origin, while female respondents evaluated immigrants
more on gender than men did. Hence, discourse eﬀects, again, depend on the individ-
ual characteristics of recipients. In this case, it is likely to be caused by higher levels
of perceived threat to one's personal safety for women, because sexual assaults are
strongly dominated by male perpetrators (and, maybe, to collective safety or higher
levels of prejudice for men?).
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The design of the study in chapter 4 is ideally suited to linking the arguments
constituting the discourses of certain events to the attitudes towards those immigrant
groups which were at the core of these arguments. The study in chapter 4 thus
provides the most nuanced approach in the present dissertation. This has the beneﬁt
of giving a detailed picture of the relationship of discourses on public opinion towards
immigrants. An inevitable limitation of this procedure, however, is the question of
whether and how the eﬀects found in a case study are generalisable to other cases.
Mind that the studies in chapter 2 and chapter 3 are meant to tackle exactly this
question across time and space respectively.
To sum up, all three studies investigate the eﬀects of diﬀerent aspects of national
discourses about immigration related issues on attitudes towards this topic. But
they do so with very diﬀerent scopes. On the spectrum from universal to particular
relationships, the study in chapter 2 provides the most general eﬀect and the study of
chapter 4 yields the most speciﬁc one, chapter 3 being in the intermediate position.
Hence, my goal is to ﬁll the main gap of each study with material from the others.
Status of studies & contributions of co-authors
Study I:Mass media and concerns about immigration in Germany in the 21st century:
Individual-level evidence over 15 years is co-authored with Stephan Dochow and pub-
lished the European Sociological Review (online: https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcy019).
It is in the top 5% of all research outputs scored by Altmetric and scored higher than
96% of its peers.11 The contributions to this study can be speciﬁed as follows (al-
though both authors helped to develop all parts and contributed to the study equally):
Christian S. Czymara: initial idea; argument and theoretical framework; literature
review; Nexis data collection; discussion of results; revisions of all parts of the paper
11https://oxfordjournals.altmetric.com/details/44470307#score, checked 27 July 2018.
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Stephan Dochow: GSOEP data collection; ﬁnal models; discussion of results; revisions
of all parts of the paper
Study II: Propagating ethnic preferences? Political elite discourses and Europeans'
openness towards diﬀerent immigrant groups in the beginning of Europe's 'Immigra-
tion Crisis' is single-authored and currently a revise and resubmit at the International
Migration Review.
Study III: Refugees unwelcome? Changes in the public acceptance of immigrants
and refugees in Germany in the course of Europe's 'Immigration Crisis' is co-authored
with Alexander W. Schmidt-Catran and published in the European Sociological Re-
view (online: doi.org /10.1093/esr/jcx071. I presented previous versions at, amongst
others, the seventh conference of the European Survey Research Association in Lis-
bon, Portugal, taking place in July 2017 where it received an honourable mention for
the early career award and at the fourth Annual BAGSS Conference in September
2017 in Bamberg, Germany, where it won the best paper award. It has also received
an exceptional amount of attention since the publication in October 2017 according to
Altmetric: It is currently in the top 5% of all research outputs scored by Altmetric.12
The contributions to this study can be distinguished as follows:
Christian S. Czymara: conceptualising the research design; developing the question-
naire and programming the online survey; argument and theoretical framework; lit-
erature review; collecting, preparing, and analysis of the data; generating Figure 4.1;
revisions of all parts of the paper
Alexander W. Schmidt-Catran: conceptualising the research design; feedback and
revising the questionnaire/survey; ﬁnal models; revisions of all parts of the paper
12https://oxfordjournals.altmetric.com/details/27636896#score, checked 16 March 2018.
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2 Mass media and concerns about
immigration in Germany in the
21st century: Individual-level
evidence over 15 years
With Stephan Dochow (Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences)
Published in the European Sociological Review, issue 34, volume 4: pages 381  401,
available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcy019, reproduced by permission of
Oxford University Press
Abstract: Mass media has long been discussed as an essential determinant of the
threat perceptions leading to anti-immigration attitudes. The ﬁeld of empirical re-
search on such media eﬀects is still comparatively young, however, and lacks studies
examining precise measures of the media environment an individual is likely to be
actually exposed to. We employ a nuanced research design which analyses individual
diﬀerences in the yearly levels of both media salience and attitudes in panel data of
26,000 persons, who were at least interviewed twice, and a time span over 15 years,
from 2001 to 2015. We ﬁnd a substantive and stable positive eﬀect: comparing periods
of vivid discussions with times where the issue was hardly discussed in the German
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media results in an increase in the predicted probability of being very concerned by
about 13 percentage points. Deeper investigations reveal that the media eﬀect is
most potent for individuals living in areas with lower share of ethnic minorities and
for those with lower education or conservative ideology, stressing the importance of
individual receptiveness. In sum, our ﬁndings strengthen the line of reasoning stress-
ing the importance of discursive inﬂuences on public opinion and cast doubt on the
argument that threat perceptions stem primarily from the size of ethnic out-groups.
2.1 Introduction
Immigration is a re-occurring, hotly debated topic in most European countries. The
past 2 years are examples with lively debates on rising numbers of migrants and
refugees, immigrant integration, and terror attacks, accompanied by various, large-
scale anti-immigration protests. We investigate the ﬂuctuations of media reporting on
immigration and its impact on individual concerns about this issue on the example of
Germany, investigating very extensive and rich data. We combine about 26,000 news
articles from four major German newspapers and news magazines with panel data of
25,773 unique individuals in total and a time span of 15 years. Because we rely on
yearly measures over a long time span, our period of investigation covers individual
attitudinal reactions to various and diverse discursive triggers, enabling us to make
more generalisable inferences about the relationship between media reporting and
public opinion.
In search for contextual explanations of immigration attitudes, many sociological
studies in the tradition of the group threat-paradigm (Quillian, 1995) explain attitudes
towards ethnic minorities and immigration with objective demographics like the share
of immigrants in a country, arguing that the presence of a sizeable ethnic minority
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leads to competition for diﬀerent resources which, in turn, leads to negative sentiments
towards this out-group (for an overview, see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). However,
this reasoning has been challenged by scholars who found that threat perceptions
are only loosely connected to objective immigration rates (Semyonov et al., 2004;
Sides and Citrin, 2007; Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes, 2017). From this perspective, it
is not surprising that objective demographics often fail to be reliable predictors of
migration-related attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014: 231).
Therefore, it is important to empirically assess other contextual explanations for
the ﬂuctuation of threat perceptions, and ultimately of anti-immigration attitudes
(Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 318). A potent explanation is concerned with the
coverage of immigration-related issues in mass media (e. g., Blumer, 1958; Allport,
1979: 200 ﬀ.). In the lion's share of social science literature on the formation of
attitudes towards immigrants, however, the importance of mass media is often simply
assumed. But with the increasing availability of large-scale quantitative media and
survey data, the role of mass media has increasingly come into focus of empirical
research in recent years (e. g., Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009; Schlueter and
Davidov, 2013; Van Klingeren et al., 2015).
We contribute to this growing ﬁeld by employing a design which oﬀers a very
ﬁne-grained view on the relationship between mass media and individual attitudes.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to investigate how the same ethnic
majority individuals change their opinion when going through periods of diﬀering
levels of media attention on the immigration issue (media salience), ﬂuctuating on a
daily level. In contrast to previous research, our design also accounts for individual
unobserved heterogeneity which might bias the relationship between media presence
of immigration related news and concerns about immigration.
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Subsequently, we also investigate under which conditions eﬀects of frequent media
reporting are particularly potent. We distinguish two sets of moderators: (i) contex-
tual aspects, stressing the importance of the local opportunity structure for ﬁrst-hand
experiences (Voci and Hewstone, 2003) and (ii) personal characteristics, identifying
who is more prone to media eﬀects (cf. Ward and Masgoret, 2006).
Germany is a very interesting case to study because it has been among the most
popular destination countries in Europe since the turn of the millennium1 and, ac-
cordingly, has an increasingly diverse ethnic composition.2 The media attention on
immigration and integration, on the other hand, has ﬂuctuated considerably (Boom-
gaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009). This is related to certain events such as the reform
of the German immigration policy in 2005 (Bauder, 2008), several Islamist terror-
ist attacks in Europe (Legewie, 2013), and the emergence of the anti-immigration
PEGIDA protests in 2014. Moreover, Germany has been the most important country
of destination for refugees in Europe in the course of the so-called immigration crisis
(Connor, 2016). Violent acts performed by individuals reported as refugees (Czymara
and Schmidt-Catran, 2017) as well as performed against refugees (Jäckle and König,
2017) both lead to signiﬁcant levels of media attention and started extensive national
debates. Mass media will hence continue to play an important role in the formation
of public opinion on immigration in the in the foreseeable future.
1According to the International migrant stock 2015 database of the UN as well as the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Statistics, both retrieved 6 January 2018.
2https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/28347/umfrage/zuwanderung-nach-deutschland/
(retrieved 16 August 2017).
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2.2 Mass media as a source of perceived threat:
Theory and previous research
International migration, immigrant integration, and their social consequences are
complex, multifaceted phenomena, hardly assessable by single individuals. This gives
mass media considerable leeway in shaping individual opinion because they are one
of the main sources providing information exceeding personal experiences (Blumer,
1958; McLaren et al., 2018). Moreover, the media can potentially transform the un-
certainty surrounding immigration-related issues into threatening stereotypes (Esses
et al., 2013).3 Even without directly evoking negative stereotypes, increasing the vis-
ibility of immigration topics in public discourse heightens the attention given to such
topics and makes information related to migration accessible in people's minds. Issue
salience hence sets the terms by which the topic is evaluated, a process called priming
in communication sciences (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010: 63 ﬀ., also see Zaller, 1992).
Similarly, the agenda-setting approach argues that issue salience transfers from the
mass media's pictures of the world to those in our heads (McCombs and Ghanem,
2001: 67). In other words, what is prominent and important in the media becomes
prominent in the audience. This can be reinforced further when diﬀerent media out-
lets decide to copy what is newsworthy and what is not, also referred to as intermedia
agenda-setting (McCombs and Ghanem, 2001). Both priming and agenda-setting
should lead to an increased awareness of the immigration topic for natives, which can
raise anti-migration sentiments or feelings of anxiety in the individual.
3Mass media may aﬀect the political public negatively through primarily focusing on negative news
(Robinson, 1976). However, whether Western media indeed reported immigration-related news
more often in a negative tone (ter Wal et al., 2005) or in a rather balanced one (Lawlor, 2015) is
far from clear. Since our study covers a large time span, it is very likely to include very diﬀerent
debates, topics, and sentiments.
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Moreover, eﬀects of media reports are not limited to direct consumers. Rather,
mass media shape the information environment and the public discourses at large.
The information reported in certain outlets is not only picked up by other outlets but
also disseminates within the public through indirect channels such as interpersonal
communication (Schmitt-Beck, 2003, also see: Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009;
Schlueter and Davidov, 2013; Van Klingeren et al., 2015).
Previous research on various West and Central European countries found mixed
evidence regarding the relationship between mass media, actual demographic and
economic conditions, and diﬀerent aspects of (anti-)immigration attitudes. Schlueter
and Davidov (2013) show that negative news about immigration correlated with more
negative attitudes in Spain, and that this relationship was especially strong in con-
texts with low shares of migrants. In contrast, the comparison of The Netherlands
and Denmark conducted by Van Klingeren et al. (2015) suggests that diﬀerent ton-
ing of news seemed to have mattered only regarding positive news and only in The
Netherlands. Once the eﬀect of immigrant inﬂow is statistically controlled, however,
mere issue salience was associated with more negative attitudes in The Netherlands,
which have a relatively long history of immigration, while the same relationship was
somewhat smaller in Denmark, where immigration became relevant not until the late
1990s (Van Klingeren et al., 2015). Similarly, media salience correlated with the vote
intention for anti-immigrant parties in The Netherlands (Boomgaarden and Vliegen-
thart, 2007). On the other hand, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2009) ﬁnd that
salience itself was not connected to citizens' concerns in Germany, but that the fram-
ing of immigrant actors in news reports mattered. This is in line with the results of
Schemer (2012), who ﬁnds an increasing eﬀect of negative news portrayals of immi-
grants on stereotypic attitudes based on a two-wave panel study before and after a
political campaign about immigration in Switzerland.
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In sum, prior research suggests that the role of mass media remains rather ambiva-
lent and context-dependent. However, comparing results is somewhat complicated
due to diﬀering methodology, which is not only related to particular beneﬁts but also
to diﬀerent drawbacks: studies either measured subjective media consumption habits
without taking into account the actual content of mass media (e. g., Vergeer et al.,
2000), covered only short periods of time (Schemer, 2012), remained purely on the
aggregate macro-level (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007; 2009; McLaren et al.,
2018), or in experimental contexts (e. g., van Klingeren et al., 2017). Some recent
studies tackled these issues by combining data on media coverage with cross-sectional
individual-level data from surveys pooled over several years (Hopkins, 2010; Schlueter
and Davidov, 2013; Van Klingeren et al., 2015). This is an important step towards
ensuring external validity of media eﬀects outside artiﬁcial or short-term contexts.
These studies, however, observed diﬀerent individuals in diﬀerent survey waves and
modelled media characteristics as varying only between but not within waves. In
contrast, we investigate the same individuals each year and employ a ﬁne-grained,
day-speciﬁc measure of media salience. We thus aim to advance the state of research
on mass media eﬀects on individual perceptions and attitudes by employing a more
nuanced design than previous studies with similar scope (also see below).
Subsequently, we test the conditionality of the eﬀect of media salience. It seems
reasonable that the inﬂuence of media is more powerful under certain circumstances
and that not everyone is equally aﬀected by the media.
First, media information can fall on more fruitful ground if natives have less op-
portunity to collect information on immigrants based on own ﬁrst-hand experience.
This is the case for individuals living in areas where regular exposure or interpersonal
contact (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) with ethnic minorities is unlikely. In the case
of Germany, districts have been shown to be potent contexts in which individuals
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are likely to act regularly (e. g., Wagner et al., 2006). A high share of migrants
in these contexts is likely to lead to inter-ethnic exposure during daily routines like
work, shopping, and leisure time (Weber, 2015). Studies have shown that a high
share of migrants in these contexts is associated with less exclusionary attitudes to-
wards immigrants (Wagner et al., 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2010). We hence expect that
the media salience eﬀect is weaker for respondents living in districts where ethnic
minorities are relatively prominent, since there are more opportunities for ﬁrst-hand
information (Schlueter and Davidov, 2013, also see Zucker, 1978).4
Second, the impact of media reports also depends on individual receptiveness and
political sophistication (cf. Zaller, 1992). We test if the media salience eﬀect diﬀers
across individual party preference and education. Both characteristics have repeat-
edly shown to be strong predictors of immigration attitudes (for party preference in
the German case, see, e. g., Blinder et al., 2013; for education see, e. g., Hainmueller
and Hiscox, 2007). Party aﬃliation is directly connected to liberal and conservative
ideology on which grounds information is processed. Voters are more open for in-
formation that is in line with their existing beliefs because they aim to uphold their
long-term values (Bechtel et al., 2015).
Education correlates with political knowledge which, in turn, determines how open
individuals are towards political information (Zaller, 1992; Schemer, 2012). This is
because those who are less informed are likely to have less stable attitudes, are less
likely to have been exposed to similar political messages before, and have less informa-
tional resources to counter arguments (Bechtel et al., 2015: 687). These individuals
should hence be more prone to eﬀects of media reporting.
4Based on US data, Hopkins (2010) argues that media salience is more potent under strong changes
of the ethnic environment. However, given that the ethnic composition of districts in Germany





We expect that higher levels of media attention on immigration issues (media salience)
increase the accessibility of related information in people's minds and consequently
raises individual concerns about these issues (Zaller, 1992; Iyengar and Kinder, 2010).
Hypothesis 1 High visibility of immigration issues in the media triggers individual
concerns. (Salience-Hypothesis)
We furthermore expect that individuals in ethnically more diverse contexts perceive
news about immigration as less threatening due to regular exposure to ethnic out-
groups (Schlueter and Davidov, 2013).
Hypothesis 2 The negative eﬀect of media salience as postulated in Hypothesis 1
is stronger (weaker) for individuals who live in districts with a lower (higher)
shares of foreigners. (Information Substitution-Hypothesis)
We furthermore hypothesise that the eﬀect of media salience depends on personal
characteristics. First, preferences of certain parties signal a more liberal or a more
conservative ideological disposition, aﬀecting the receptiveness to certain political
information. Because of their political predisposition, natives who prefer more liberal
parties should be less receptive to negative discursive triggers than those who prefer
more conservative parties. In the German parliament, the Green and, arguably, the
Left Party are more liberal, the Social Democrats are centre-liberal, and the Free
Democrats as well as the Christian Democrats are centre-conservative.
Hypothesis 3 The negative eﬀect of media salience postulated in Hypothesis 1 is
weaker (stronger) for natives who identify with more liberal (conservative) par-
ties. (Party-Hypothesis)
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Finally, we hypothesise that natives with higher education are less vulnerable to media
eﬀects. This is because we assume that natives with higher education not only exhibit
a more diﬀerentiated world view in general (cf. Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007) but
that they are also more likely to take the ambivalence and complexity of most political
information into account. Assuming that education is a proxy for political knowledge,
it furthermore determines motivation and ability to evaluate political information
against previously stored information (Zaller, 1992; Schemer, 2012; Bechtel et al.,
2015).
Hypothesis 4 The negative eﬀect of media salience postulated in hypothesis 1 is
weaker (stronger) for natives with higher (lower) education. (Education- Hy-
pothesis)
2.4 Data
We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), an annual, household-based
long-term panel study (Wagner et al., 2007) for yearly information on individual char-
acteristics from 2001 to 2015. To focus on the ethnic majority, we drop respondents
with migration background.
Outcome: concerns about immigration
Respondents are asked to rate how much they are concerned about certain topics in
each year, including immigration to Germany on a three-point scale. We use a di-
chotomised version for our main analyses (0: 'not concerned' or 'somewhat concerned',
1: 'very concerned'; for similar procedure see, e. g., Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013;
Lancee and Schaeﬀer, 2015) and the ordinal variable for robustness checks. This item
is likely to capture a combination of two things: a negative evaluation of immigration
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and individual salience of immigration issue. According to Wlezien (2005), concern
measures capture the importance of issues as well as whether these issues are per-
ceived as problematic (also see Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013: 116; Pardos-Prado
et al., 2014: 855; Lancee and Schaeﬀer, 2015: 9). Hence, our dependent variable mea-
sures whether respondents express an opinion that is both negative and salient. Since
our main explanatory variable is capturing macro-level issue salience, the relationship
between our treatment and our outcome can theoretically be decomposed into the
associations between, ﬁrst, salience in the media and salience for (direct or indirect)
consumers and, second, into the eﬀect of media salience on negative opinions. While
the latter, in our view, is especially interesting, the GSOEP unfortunately does not
oﬀer the possibility to disentangle both concepts empirically. However, the outcome is
related to well-established predictors of negative attitudes towards immigration (see
Table 2.4 in the Supplementary appendix). Independent of the conceptual shortcom-
ing, we understand threat perceptions to be the theoretical mechanism relating media
salience and individual concerns, analogous to Lancee and Pardos-Prado (2013).
Treatment: media salience of immigration-related issues
We combine the GSOEP with data from a quantitative content analysis of German
newspapers and news magazines to measure the presence of issues related to immi-
gration at a given day. To this end, we use digital full texts of the two weekly news
magazines with the highest circulation in Germany: Der Spiegel and Stern, as well
as one of the most highly circulated daily, non-tabloid national newspapers: the con-
servative Die Welt and the left taz.die tageszeitung. In combination, these outlets
reach a large audience and have a balanced ideological position, likely to capture the
broader national information environment. The full texts were provided by Nexis.5
5https://www.nexis.com/
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We scanned the content of all newspaper articles in our period of investigation
with a search string based on a keyword list of immigration-related terms based on
re-occurring content from random newspaper articles and previous literature (e. g.,
Schlueter and Davidov, 2013; Van Klingeren et al., 2015). This search string identiﬁes
articles which simultaneously include (i) at least one of several terms directly referring
to immigration, (ii) the term 'Germany' or synonyms, and (iii) at least one of several
terms more broadly connected to immigration.6 We manually checked the validity
of the sample by investigating the content of randomly chosen articles. We deleted
duplicates, letters from readers, table of contents, and short news.
For our ﬁnal media salience measure, we ran an exploratory factor analysis with
four count variables indicating the number of articles in each of the four outlets in
the past 21 days7 with the single days as units of analysis and extracted the factor
values. These values measure media salience on speciﬁc days, higher values implying
higher media salience. The factor has an eigenvalue of 1.98. The factor loadings and
6The search string reads as follows (! are wildcards):
(!wander! OR !migration! OR !migrant! OR !flücht! OR !flucht!
OR !ausländer! OR !asyl!) AND (deutschland OR bundesrepublik
OR brd) AND (!integration! OR !abschieb! OR abgeschob! OR
!einbürgerung! OR aufenthaltsgenehm! OR ausländerkriminalität
OR (!kriminalität! w/5 (!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht!
OR !ausländer!)) OR (!kriminell! w/5 (!wander! OR !migrant!
OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!)) OR !fachkr! OR (!qualifi! w/3
(!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!)) OR (arbeit!
w/3 (!wander! OR !migration! OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!))
OR (!erwerbs! w/3 (!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht! OR
!ausländer!)) OR (!beruf! w/3 (!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht!
OR !ausländer!)) OR ((!terror! OR !anschlag!) w/5 !islam!)
OR zwangshochzeit OR zwangsheirat OR !parallelgesellschaft! OR
!kopftuch! OR ehrenmord OR hassprediger OR !burka! OR (!islam! OR
!muslim! w/5 (!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!))
OR mohammedkarikatur OR (mohammed w/3 karikatur!))
7While the time span of 21 days is somewhat arbitrary, it ensures that the topic was salient for
long enough to be a discussed topic but short enough to be remembered at the time the interview




uniqueness values (in brackets) of the media outlets are Die Welt: 0.78 (0.39), taz.
die tageszeitung: 0.73 (0.46), Der Spiegel: 0.68 (0.54), Stern: 0.61 (0.62).
Our period of investigation covers a heterogeneous set of debates. This means
that our approach aims at showing the universal eﬀect of salience rather than a
particularistic eﬀect of certain topics or tones. On the one hand, we do not want
to conceal that this partly relates to the complexities associated with building a
detailed, topic-related measure of media over a long time. But on the other hand, we
are convinced that investigating a universal eﬀect of mere presence of issues is highly
interesting itself because it tells something about the power of media independent of
certain idiosyncratic debates. Finding a general eﬀect of media salience on individual
concerns is actually more striking than ﬁnding an eﬀect of negative news only. At
worst, we underestimate the maximum eﬀect of mass media on public opinion.
Contextual variables
In the models interacting media salience and the local ethnic composition (Hypoth-
esis 2), we also include several local context variables on the district level (Kreise,
NUTS 3 level) provided by the German Federal Institute for Building, Urban Aﬀairs
and Spatial Research.8
Most importantly, we include the share of individuals without German citizenship
in a respondent's district to test whether the eﬀect of media salience varies with ethnic
exposure. With 402 diﬀerent districts, this is a ﬁne-grained yet eﬃcacious measure of
ethnic exposure (Wagner et al., 2006; Weber, 2015).
To control for economic conditions, we also add local unemployment rate, number
of training positions, number of students, average household income, and population
8Source: http://inkar.de/. Values for 2015 were forwarded from 2014. We also run models with
a time-stable share of foreigners to rule out that artiﬁcial ﬂuctuations aﬀect our results (e. g.,
through changes in measurement in certain districts).
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density to the models (all measured on the district level). We also include monthly
immigration inﬂow to account for possible demographic developments that could con-
found the relationship under study.9
Individual-level variables
We include individual time-varying controls to adjust for confounding inﬂuences which
are correlated with immigration concerns and possibly also inﬂuenced by macro-level
developments. For example, individual economic worries partly capture periods of
economic deprivation taking place at a certain time in Germany. These variables
encompass general interest in politics, age, employment status, satisfaction with own
household income, concerns about the own economic situation, and concerns about
the general economic situation in Germany. Table 2.2 in the Appendix contains
descriptive statistics and the coding for all variables included in our models.
Research design and statistical models
To capture individual exposure to media salience as precise as possible, we merge
the public media salience measure with the GSOEP data based on the day each
interview took place. Figure 2.1 illustrates our design based on two hypothetical
respondents being interviewed in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2012. The black dots represent
the interview date and the two areas illustrate that we aggregate the numbers of
articles from the four newspaper outlets 21 days before the interview for respondent
1 and respondent 2, respectively, in each year.
This operationalisation increases the likelihood that an individual has been exposed
to the assigned level of media salience at the day of the interview, either directly
9Data on monthly migration inﬂows from 2006 to 2015 stems from the German Statistical Oﬃce
through email contact. We imputed monthly inﬂows from before 2006 by dividing the available
yearly inﬂow by 12 for each year.
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through individual news consumption or indirectly though information diﬀusion via
other types of communication. As discussed above, prior research with similar scope
modelled media variables as stable characteristics within surveys waves (e. g., Hop-
kins, 2010; Schlueter and Davidov, 2013; Van Klingeren et al., 2015). Assuming the
same media environment for everyone within one wave can be critical, however, when
media salience strongly ﬂuctuates periodically in short-term intervals. Figure 2.2 in-
dicates that this is indeed the case in our data. It is hence reasonable to employ a
measure of media salience which varies between individuals who were interviewed at
diﬀerent days within the same survey wave (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Stylized research design
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The measure of media salience is most likely exogenous of respondent-speciﬁc char-
acteristics in our models for two reasons. First, it is highly unlikely that the national
level of media salience is inﬂuenced by individual-level characteristics that are also
related to concerns about immigration. This is because the day of the interview,
and thus the level of media salience a respondent is assigned to, is out of a respon-
dent's control. Even if respondents with certain characteristics time their interviews
diﬀerently than others, it is very unlikely that these characteristics aﬀect individual
concerns about immigration. Neither is it plausible that these respondents set the
dates for their interviews dependent on the amount of articles on immigration in the
media.10 Second, we statistically account for all constant person-speciﬁc confounding
inﬂuences by analysing within variation only, such as stable prejudice, social class,
race, sex, and culture.11 To this end, we estimate panel ﬁxed-eﬀects (FE) linear
probability models (LPMs) which eliminate time-constant unobserved heterogeneity
(Andreß et al., 2013).12
10If there is geographical variation in the timing of the interviews (for example between the regional
sampling points that underlie the stratiﬁed GSOEP sampling procedure), it is highly unlikely
that this geographical variation is related to the debate on immigration as captured by our media
salience measure.
11However, there may still be confounding factors on the aggregate level, that is, unmeasured period
eﬀects. See 'Is the eﬀect of media salience causal? Considerations on reverse causality and
unmeasured confounding' for a variety of strategies how we dealt with these issues.
12We use Stata 13.1's xtreg command for our RE and FE LPMs and xtlogit command the
RE logistic regression models. The use of robust standard errors did not change our results
in any substantive way. The analyses including district level variables were conducted with





Immigration issues in Germany: time trends & key events
The overall time trend in immigration-related news is shown in Figure 2.2 . The ﬁgure
illustrates the weekly total numbers of all articles and periods of 21 days after certain
immigration related key events (coloured dots).13
In the beginning of the millennium, various Islamist terror attacks happened, which
were unprecedented in terms of fatalities and impact for Western countries. This
includes 9/11 (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009), the Madrid bombings on 11
March 2004 (Legewie, 2013), and the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004
(Finseraas et al., 2011). Consequently, immigration and Islam were much debated
during this time, although with quite some ﬂuctuation, as Figure 2.2 indicates.
Moreover, politicians and the German public vividly discussed the new migration
law (Zuwanderungsgesetz, cf. Pardos-Prado et al., 2014: 858), which became eﬀective
in January 2005. According to Bauder (2008), considerations about the 'economic
utility' of immigration were a rather stable topic in the German immigration discourse
during the period from 2001 to 2005.
In September 2005 until the beginning of 2006, media attention increased due to
the Mohammed caricatures published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten and
the subsequent protests in many Islamic countries.
Further debates revolved around the two Eastern Enlargements of the European
Union (EU), the ﬁrst taking place in May 2004 (e. g., Boehnke et al., 2007) and the
second in January 2007. Both EU expansions were debated in the press, dealing with
13For certain events, the coloured dots are not very likely to mark the actual time of the main public
debate. For example, the Eastern Expansion of the EU was discussed before it legally became
eﬀective and the main debate on the Mohammed cartoons took place several months after their
original publication. Moreover, we do not use these weekly totals in our statistical analysis but
a measure on a daily basis.
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the potential consequences regarding immigration-related crime, and economic costs
and beneﬁts.
Figure 2.2: Total number of articles related to immigration per week, and immigration
related key events
Note: Coloured dots indicate a period of 21 days after each event.
A third outstanding peak is around 2006. Note that two Islamist terrorist attacks
do not seem to have led to major public debates on immigration, London in 2005 and
the series of attacks in France in 2012.
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Apart from economic and terror-related news, culturalistic discussions were repeat-
edly part of the immigration discourse in recent years. One trigger of these discussions
was the former Federal President Christian Wulﬀ's statement that 'The Islam belongs
to Germany' in 3 October 2010. Almost simultaneously, Thilo Sarrazin's bestseller
book 'Deutschland schaﬀt sich ab' ('Germany is abolishing itself') was released in 30
August 2010, in which highly controversial theses about the impact of immigration
on German society are put forward. Both events make sense of the steep increase in
2010. Finally, the peak in 2014 coincides with the ﬁrst PEGIDA demonstrations in
Dresden which were primarily targeted against immigration from Muslim countries.
From late summer 2015 on, Europe faced a strong increase in immigration and
asylum rates with more than twice as many ﬁrst-time asylum applications in the EU
compared to the year before, including a disproportionate high share of individuals
from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Connor, 2016). From all European countries,
Germany received more than a third of these asylum applications, making it by far
the most popular destination for these refugees (ibid.).
These turbulent times were accompanied by several acts of violence and terrorism.
One of the most prominent events was the sexual assaults in various German cities on
New Year's Eve 2015/2016, where victims described the perpetrators as men of Arab
or North African appearance, leading to a direct connection to the strong increase in
asylum rates (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017).
Other events include fatal Islamist terror attacks on the staﬀ of the satirical news-
paper Charlie Hebdo and on a Jewish supermarket (January 2015), the attacks on a
cultural centre and a Synagogue in Copenhagen (February 2015), the series of attacks
in Paris with 130 fatalities (November 2015), and the cancellation of a football match
in Germany due to a terror warning (November 2015). At the same time, violence
against refugees and refugee shelters erupted (Jäckle and König, 2017). It is hence
47
2 Mass media and concerns about immigration
hardly surprising that Figure 2 shows it strongest increase during the time between
2015 and 2016.
Hence, the information environment our media measure is meant to capture ﬂuc-
tuates strongly, encompassing a heterogeneous set of diﬀerent discourses and aspects
of the immigration issue.
Looking at the association between our media salience factor and individual immi-
gration concerns, we clearly see a similar trend, shown in Figure 2.3: the trajectories
of concerns about immigration (upper panel) and of our media salience factor (lower
panel) apparently show similar patterns. This means that respondents were more
likely to show higher concerns about immigration when they were interviewed on
days with high media salience.14 This lends initial support to the Issue Salience-
Hypothesis, although some debates (in terms of peaks in the time series) seem to be
more inﬂuential than others. In the following, we put this relationship more rigorously
to the test.
The upper panel of Figure 2.3 also shows the number of interviews per day. It clearly
decreases over the year, with very few interviews taking place during the end of each
year and in January. Hence, debates happening during these times are unfortunately
hardly covered in our analysis. The light grey dots in the lower panel of Figure 2.3
represent the raw media salience including days when no interviews took place to
capture actual trends in media salience.
14Note that there are seasonal ﬂuctuations with highest concerns in winter. This is in line with
research on the seasonality of depression and other negative moods (Harmatz et al., 2000) and




Figure 2.3: Locally weighted regression trends of concerns about immigration (up-
per panel) and media salience (lower panel), and distribution of GSOEP
interviews over time
Note: Trend in lower panel shows the full trend going through all data points, those
on which GSOEP interviews took place (and make up the sample of analysis) and
those where no GSOEP interview took place.
Media salience eﬀects on concerns about immigration
The association between media salience and worries about immigration in the FE
models is substantial. The coeﬃcient of media salience is 0.05 (Table 2.1), imply-
ing that a one unit increase of our media salience factor predicts an increase in the
probability of being very concerned by 5 percentage points.
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Respondents interviewed during periods when media salience was at its 95 per cent
quantile value (1.65) have a 12.76 percentage points higher average predicted prob-
ability of being very concerned about immigration than those who were interviewed
during times where immigration was not a salient issue (5 per cent quantile: −0.92).
In comparison, preferring the conservative Christian Democrats increases this prob-
ability by about 3 percentage points (relative to no party preference) and being very
concerned about one's own economic situation increases it by about 6 percentage
points (relative to not concerned). In addition, monthly immigration rates also have
a statistically signiﬁcant positive association with public concerns.
To give a better interpretability of the results from our ﬁrst model in Table 2.1, we
predict changes in concerns about immigration for changes in media salience related
to a selection of important events discussed above. For example, our media salience
factor increases by 2.57 units between 9/11 and 21 days after 9/11. This predicts an
increase in concerns about immigration of 12.81 percentage points according to our
model. Similarly, the Madrid terror attacks lead to an increase of 1.90 units in media
salience predicting an increase of 9.44 percentage points in concerns. The publication
of Sarazzins book 'Deutschland schaﬀt sich ab', a major event inﬂuencing German
wide debates on immigration, went along with an increase of media salience of 2.60
units which predicts an increase in concerns of 12.91 percentage points.
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Table 2.1: Panel Fixed-Eﬀects Linear Probability Models of eﬀect of media salience








Media salience, 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.052***
past 21 days (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Party preference (ref.: no preference)
CDU/CSU (Christian 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028***
Democrats) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SPD (Social -0.007+ -0.007+ -0.007+
Democrats) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Die Grünen -0.012+ -0.012+ -0.019**
(The Greens) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Die Linke -0.005 -0.006 -0.007
(The Left) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FDP (Free 0.019* 0.020* 0.019*
Democrats) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Others 0.015 0.015 0.014
and mixed (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Radical right 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.143***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Interest in politics (ref.: very strong)
Strong -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Not so strong -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Not at all -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Income satisfaction (ref.: low)
1 -0.012+ -0.012+ -0.012+
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
2 -0.015* -0.015* -0.015*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
3 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
high -0.020** -0.020** -0.021**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Concerns about German economy (ref.: not concerned)
Somewhat concerned 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037***
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Table 2.1 (continued)
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Very concerned 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.120***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Concerns about own economic situation (ref.: not concerned)
Somewhat concerned 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Very concerned 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age categories (ref.: <25) 0.000
25-34 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
35-49 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
50-64 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
>65 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Employment status (ref.: not working)
In training/apprentice -0.010 -0.009 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Registered unemployed -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Pensioner -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Working 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Month of interview (ref.: January)
Feb. 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mar. 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Apr. 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
May 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Jun. 0.015** 0.015* 0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Jul. 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)





Sep./Oct./Nov. -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Monthly 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
in-migration/1,000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(imputed before 2006)
Education × media salience (ref.: Elementary)
Secondary I 0.005
(0.003)
Secondary II (FHR) -0.008
(0.006)
Secondary II (Abitur) -0.020***
(0.004)



















Constant 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.191***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of
person-years 190,049 190,049 190,049
Number of persons 25,073 25,073 25,073
Min. no. person-years per person 2 2 2
Max. no. person-years per person 15 15 15
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-sided tests).
53
2 Mass media and concerns about immigration
Mind that the substantial association between media salience and worries may
partly reﬂect feedback mechanisms and unmeasured periodic shocks. Mass media
may partly respond to changes in attitudes, although scholars have argued that, on
average, journalist rarely directly take public opinion into account when evaluating
what qualiﬁes as 'news' (Patterson, 2008). We present various additional analyses in
an attempt to rule out these alternative explanations in Table 2.5 in the Supplemen-
tary appendix. These analyses include measures of aggregate worries, general time
trends, or restricting the analysis to certain years. In all cases, the eﬀect remains
statistically signiﬁcant, with a minimum eﬀect size of 0.01.
Who is prone to media-induced concerns?
To investigate the conditionality of the media salience eﬀect, we interact the variable
with the share of foreigners on the district level, controlling for all context characteris-
tics discussed above (see Table 2.3 in the Appendix). The emerging pattern depicted
in Figure 2.4 clearly supports our reasoning: the marginal eﬀect of media salience
(y-axis) gets substantially smaller as the percentage of foreigners in one's district in-
creases. This means the concern increasing eﬀect of media salience is most substantial
for inhabitants of areas with a relatively small to medium share of foreigners. Since
the ethnic composition of one's district is a rather stable characteristic in our data, the
interaction eﬀect is likely primarily due to the within-variation of the media salience
variable.
Our results support Information Substitution-Hypothesis, proposing that obtaining
information about immigrants from contextual sources prevents fears caused by in-
creasing media attention. One should note, however, that the eﬀect of media salience
is still statistically larger than 0 also for individuals living in districts with many for-
eigners. Hence, it seems that even for those who are used to immigrants in their day
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Figure 2.4: Marginal eﬀect of media salience on concerns about immigration condi-
tional on the local share of foreigners, with 95% conﬁdence interval (based
on models in Table 2.3 in the Appendix)
to day life, this ﬁrst-hand information does, on average, not completely substitute the
information coming from mass media.
We also hypothesised that the eﬀect of media salience diﬀers with individual charac-
teristics because media information is less important for those holding a more liberal
world view or having more political knowledge. The former should apply mainly to
natives with a preference for the Green or the Left Party, and the latter to those with
higher education.
And indeed, the eﬀect of media salience is substantially lower for natives who
favour more liberal parties, as Figure 2.5 indicates (also see Model 2 of Table 2.1).
Relative to individuals without party preference, the diﬀerences for those adhering to
the Social Democrats or the Left party are moderate, but preferring the Green Party
is clearly associated with a smaller eﬀect of media salience. In contrast, the media
eﬀect is strongest for those preferring the Christian Democrats. This is in line with
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our Party-Hypothesis and with previous ﬁndings indicating that voters converge to
the position of their preferred party when exposed to media information, independent
of the toning of this information (Bechtel et al., 2015).15
Figure 2.5: Marginal eﬀects of media salience on concerns about immigration condi-
tional on party preference, with 95% conﬁdence intervals (based on model
2 in Table 2.1)
Finally, the eﬀect of media salience on individual concerns primarily holds for re-
spondents with low or medium education, but it is close to 0 for those with higher
education, as can be seen in Figure 2.6 (or Model 3 in Table 2.1). This supports our
Education-Hypothesis.
15We refrain from making inferences about the interaction between radical right party preference
and media salience because the number of observations is too small. The category is hence not
included in Figure 2.5 (but it is included in the underlying model).
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Figure 2.6: Marginal eﬀects of media salience on concerns about immigration condi-
tional on education, with 95% conﬁdence intervals (based on model 3 in
Table 2.1)
Robustness checks
We intensively tested the robustness of our ﬁndings. First, we restricted the analysis
to years with similar distributions of media salience to check whether results are
driven by excessively high media salience in single years. Second, we restricted the
sample to oral interviews to ensure that the date of the interview is not biased due
to wrong dates for postal questionnaires. Third, we checked whether our results are
aﬀected by the construction of our media salience measure, generating other versions
based on 7, 14, or 28 days before each interview instead of 21. Fourth, we checked
whether replacing the factor with a weighted count variable changes the results (for
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'past 21 days'-treatment: dailies divided by 18, weeklies by 3). Fifth, we ran panel
random eﬀects- (RE) and FE-ordered logistic regression models to see whether the
regression link function aﬀects results (for results of RE logistic regression model
see Figure 2.7). Sixth, we included the moderate left Frankfurter Rundschau to the
media salience variable.16 Finally, we allowed for eﬀect heterogeneity of media salience
between years and calculated the average eﬀect over all years. In all cases, the results
are similar to the ones of our main analyses.
Figure 2.7: Predicted probabilities from a Random-Eﬀects ordered logistic regression.
Variables set at means
16We did not include this outlet in our ﬁnal analysis because data from the Frankfurter Rundschau
is only available from 2003 onwards and because its distribution is limited.
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2.6 Summary and discussion
Investigating a period of 15 years, we ﬁnd that public concerns about immigration in
Germany vary systematically with the amount of media attention on this issue. The
probability of being very concerned about immigration is about 13 percentage points
higher when immigration was vividly discussed before an interview compared to times
when the issue played a minor role in the press. Moreover, we have shown that media
attention varies considerably on a short-term basis. Hence, we suggest that it is very
well suited to explain ﬂuctuation in public opinion, adding theoretical and statistical
explanatory power beyond general immigration rates.
Deeper analyses reveal that individuals who live in districts with a higher share of
ethnic minorities are much less likely to be concerned in times of high media salience.
These ﬁndings are contrary to the realistic group threat-paradigm according to which
feelings of ethnic competition should increase in contexts with high or increasing
shares of out-group members, particularly when this out-group is made salient (see
Hopkins, 2010). These diﬀerent ﬁndings might be due to the comparatively stable
regional share of foreigners within districts in our data, pointing to the importance
of familiarisation with ethnic minorities.
Furthermore, the negative impact of media salience diminishes for natives with
higher education and those who prefer the Green Party. Hence, it seems that prior
knowledge and more stable attitudes as well as a liberal ideology can be eﬀective
barriers for such media eﬀects (cf. Bechtel et al., 2015).
We stated that we are interested in analysing a universal eﬀect of general issue
salience over a long time span covering various debates. While we stressed our moti-
vation behind this above, it is of course also associated with shortcomings, reﬂecting
a general dilemma between the identiﬁcation of generalisable, universal eﬀects and an
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in-depth understanding and identiﬁcation of eﬀects of particular discourses.
First, we did not diﬀerentiate the toning of our news measure. It is reasonable to
assume that negative news have a stronger negative eﬀect than neutral or positive
ones. However, recent research on media eﬀects suggest that reports in high-quality
print media are actually too balanced to classify as primarily negative or positive
(Lawlor, 2015). Hopkins (2010) even argues that one cannot draw conclusions about
whether the tone of coverage matters above and beyond the fact that there is coverage
at all (Hopkins, 2010: 58). Moreover, the fact that we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
and robust eﬀect using an undiﬀerentiated measure actually strengthens the general
importance of mass media as a determinant of individual concerns about immigration.
Put diﬀerently, ﬁnding an eﬀect of negative news on negative attitudes may also be
seen as more trivial.
Second, we also neither diﬀerentiate topics nor aspects of our attitudinal outcome.
Again, this is also due to data restrictions. But specifying which types of debates
(e. g., McLaren et al., 2018) aﬀect which kinds of attitudes (e. g., Czymara and
Schmidt-Catran, 2017) would certainly be a promising endeavour for future research.
Moreover, individuals diﬀer in their media consumption habits. Although we un-
derstand our media measure as a proxy of both direct individual exposure and the
indirect information environments, frequent consumption most probably increases
the media eﬀect. Unfortunately, there is no measure of individual media consumption
available in the GSOEP.
Finally, we investigated the impact of print media outlets only. First, this misses
the dominating medium for political news: TV. Second, with the growing supply of
(free) online news, sales of print media are decreasing steadily. Social media are of
increasing importance as platforms for political debates. How these developments
aﬀect public opinion and the political culture is hardly known yet, although there
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are pioneering studies (e. g., Bakshy et al., 2015). The increasing availability and
comprehensiveness of media data provides many promising opportunities for more
nuanced research regarding the impact of such media in the future.
We see our study as a step towards a more ﬁne-grained, yet generalisable under-
standing of mass media eﬀects on public opinion. We aimed at developing a nuanced
design that extends previous research by drawing on within individual variation and
ﬂuctuations in the media on a daily basis. Yet, our observational 'real-world' approach
complicates the identiﬁcation of the causal media eﬀect (see 'Is the eﬀect of media
salience causal? Considerations on reverse causality and unmeasured confounding'
in the Supplementary appendix). To obtain a picture of the impact of media, our
results are, thus, ideally complemented by (quasi-)experiments (e. g., Legewie, 2013;
van Klingeren et al., 2017).
While we believe that the general eﬀect of media salience is highly interesting, we
certainly do not deny the additional insights a more diﬀerentiated media measure
could bring. As manual coding with such a large number of articles is impossible, the
rapidly growing ﬁeld of text as data in the information sciences should be of great
help here, oﬀering methods like topic modelling or sentiment analysis (similar to, for
example, Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017). Such quantitative investigations of the
media discourses on immigration over such a long time span, however, would already
be a study on its own. Still, adding such information to our approach could lead to
further insights and, thus, deepen the understanding of the relationship between mass
media and public opinion formation.
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2.7 Appendix




Monthly in-migration/1,000 66.05 190,049
Categorical variables per cent
Concerned about immigration
Not/somewhat concerned 70.79% 134,527
Very concerned 29.21% 55,522
Party preference
No party preference 54.38% 103,351
CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats) 18.27% 34,730
SPD (Social Democrats) 16.05% 30,509
Die Grünen (The Greens) 4.80% 9,117
Die Linke (The Left) 3.09% 5,876
FDP (Free Democrats) 1.77% 3,355
Others and mixed 0.92% 1,755
Radical right 0.71% 1,356
Interest in politics
Very strong 7.64% 14,518
Strong 31.15% 59,209
Not so strong 48.52% 92,208







Concerns general economic development
Not concerned 10.96% 20,832
Somewhat concerned 54.31% 103,218
Very concerned 34.73% 65,999
Concerns own economic situation
Not concerned 27.70% 52,641
Somewhat concerned 51.73% 98,304











Not working 5.84% 11,103
In training/apprentice 5.70% 10,825






























































Media salience, past 21 days 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.049***
Share foreigners × media salience -0.001**
Share foreigners 2001 × media salience -0.001***
Share foreigners (categorical) (ref.: 02%  02%)
over 02%  06% 0.015
over 06%  10% 0.027*
over 10%  15% 0.033*
over 15%  35% 0.035*
Share foreigners (cat.) × media salience (ref.: 00%  02%)
over 02%  06% -0.005
over 06%  10% -0.001
over 10%  15% -0.012**
over 15%  35% -0.020***
Contextual controls
Unemployment rate 0.005*** 0.005***
Vocational training
positions -0.002*** -0.002***
Number of students -0.000 -0.000
Av. household
income 0.000*** 0.000**
Population density 0.000 0.000
Constant 0.127* 0.191*** 0.183***
Number of
person-years 166,399 166,399 166,399
Number of persons 22,487 22,487 22,487
Min. no. person-years per person 2 2 2
Max. no. person-years per person 15 15 15
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-sided tests).
Results from FE LPMs. All models control for the full set of individuals level
covariates (not shown), plus additional district level controls (unemployment rate,
training positions, number of students, average household income, population
density). Sample is restricted to those who had no changes in district over time to
rule out individual selection into contexts. Complete table available upon request.
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2.8 Supplementary appendix
What does our outcome measure?
In line with usual ﬁndings from the literature on attitudes towards immigration and
immigrants, our measure is highly associated with education, party preference, and
political ideology as Table 2.4 shows. This favours the argument that GSOEP re-
spondents interpret this item similar to other items on attitudes towards immigration
and relate the question to negative consequences of immigration.
Is the eﬀect of media salience causal? Considerations on
reverse causality and unmeasured confounding
Our design assumes no eﬀects of aggregate concerns in the population on media
salience and that the eﬀects of external events are mediated through mass media. If
we do not allow for these assumptions, however, causal inference is complicated by
two interrelated issues: feedback between aggregate concerns and media salience and
unmeasured period eﬀects.
Feedback mechanisms are present if the media increases aggregate public concerns,
which, in turn, fuels interest in migration related topics, which then prompts jour-
nalists to write even more about the topic. Aggregate concerns sometimes even may
precede media reports. If aggregate concerns also aﬀect individual concerns, e. g.
through social networks, they may confound our relationship of interest. In other
words, it is hard to separate the eﬀects of media salience and the aggregate mood
in the population on individual concerns if these factors themselves correlate. To
adjust for potential feedback mechanisms, we include a variable measuring the lagged
mean concerns of respondents, covering the period of 42 to 22 days before each inter-
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Table 2.4: Mean values of various correlates of migration attitudes for original three
valued ordinal item and the dichotomous operationalization
Correlates of migration attitudes Mean migration Mean migration
concerns ordinal concerns dichotomous
School degree
Elementary 2.188 0.360
Secondary I 2.090 0.317
Secondary II (FHR) 1.856 0.204
Secondary II (Abitur) 1.683 0.142
Other degree/no degree 2.089 0.342
In school 1.788 0.199
Total 2.031 0.292
Party preference
No party preference 2.077 0.310
CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats) 2.126 0.329
SPD (Social Democrats) 1.943 0.24
Die Grünen (The Greens) 1.456 0.07
Die Linke (The Left) 1.928 0.267
FDP (Free Democrats) 1.916 0.259
Others and mixed 1.952 0.288
Radical right 2.786 0.824
Total 2.031 0.292
Political left-right self-placement










10 (very right) 2.572 0.650
Total 2.058 0.313
67
2 Mass media and concerns about immigration
view in Model 1 in Table 2.5. The coeﬃcient of the LPM is clearly reduced but still
substantial at 0.02.
As an additional analysis, we restrict the sample to years with no large ﬂuctuations
in media salience. The assumption behind this analysis is that feedback mechanisms
between public opinion and media reports are mainly present in those debates which
result in peaks in salience. In those years where there were no peaks in media salience
we assume that there were no major reinforcing mechanisms of public opinion on
media salience, or at least they were quite small. In addition, this restriction ensures
that we compare years which are more similar in terms of media salience. The results
are shown in Table 2.6. We ﬁnd that such restrictions do not change our overall
conclusions.
The second causal issue is that external events are assumed to have no direct
additional inﬂuence on individual concerns given media salience and conditional on
the variables in our model. We think this assumption is reasonable because most of
the topics discussed among the public do not fall out of thin air due to some event
which is not visible in media reports. Rather the issues are present in people's minds
because the media reported about them in the ﬁrst place.
These period events might, however, confound the relationship if their eﬀects on
individual concerns are not primarily channelled through media reports but for ex-
ample through private communication or social networks. To account for periodic
idiosyncrasies of certain years, we completely net out all variance between years by
including year ﬁxed-eﬀects (Model 2) or include a restricted cubic spline speciﬁcation
of the date variable (Model 3). In both models, the eﬀect of media salience remains
statistically signiﬁcant, but the eﬀect size is substantively reduced when year ﬁxed
eﬀects are included in Model 2. Year dummies are commonly employed to adjust for
unmeasured macro-level trends. By deﬁnition, netting out all variance between years
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adjusts for everything that could possibly confound the relationship between media
salience and individual concerns that is related to each year. However, an alternative
interpretation of such modelling is that the year dummies capture similarities between
individuals within each year which are caused by media salience in this year. In that
case, the inclusion of year ﬁxed-eﬀects leads to over-control bias, which results in an
underestimation of the 'true' eﬀect of media salience because variation that is actually
caused by media salience is partialled out.
Generally, identifying the correct model for the media eﬀect over a range of tem-
poral contexts depends on the assumptions about the theoretical emergence of the
media eﬀect: is it the eﬀect of merely the media itself or does it also include the pub-
lic discussion surrounding it? What exactly one assumes to be part of such a media
eﬀect inﬂuences the strength of the association between media salience and individual
concerns. While we opted for the most general (and arguably easiest to interpret)
media eﬀect for our main analyses, we oﬀer some additional, more conservative, spec-
iﬁcations in the models presented here. In the end, we believe that what matters is
that even under strict conditions, the media salience eﬀect remains statistically and
substantively signiﬁcant.
Table 2.5: Possible adjustment strategies for feedback mechanisms and unmeasured
confounding through period eﬀects
Aggregate concerns Year dummies Date splines
Media salience, 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02***
past 21 days (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Party preference (ref.: no preference)
CDU/CSU (Christian 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Democrats) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SPD (Social -0.01+ -0.01 -0.01
Democrats) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Die Grünen -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(The Greens) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Die Linke 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(The Left) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FDP (Free 0.02* 0.03** 0.02*
Democrats) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Others 0.02 0.02+ 0.02+
and mixed (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Radical 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14***
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Table 2.5 (continued)
right (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest in politics (ref.: very strong)
Strong -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Not so strong -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Not at all -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income satisfaction (ref.: low)
1 -0.00 -0.01+ -0.01+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
3 -0.01* -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
high -0.01* -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Concerns about German economy (ref.: not concerned)
Somewhat 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04***
concerned (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Very 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11***
concerned (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Concerns about own economic situation (ref.: not concerned)
Somewhat 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
concerned (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Very 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
concerned (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age categories (ref.: <25)
25-34 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
35-49 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
50-64 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
>65 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Employment status (ref.: not working)
In training / -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
apprentice (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Registered -0.01 -0.01 -0.01




Pensioner 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Working 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Month of interview (ref.: January)
Feb. 0.02* -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Mar. 0.02** 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Apr. 0.03*** 0.01+ 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
May 0.05*** 0.01** 0.01+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Jun. 0.05*** 0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Jul. 0.04*** -0.00 -0.01+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Aug. 0.06*** 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sep./Oct./Nov. 0.05*** 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Monthly 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00***


















































Constant 0.00 0.18*** 0.99***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.21)
Number of
person-years 149945 190049 190049
Number of
persons 24747 25073 25073
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Aggregate concerns in model 1 of this table are calculated as mean concerns in
period 42 days to 21 days before interview with at least 15 observations (hence the
reduced sample size).
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-sided tests).
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Media salience, 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04***
past 21 days (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Party preference (ref.: no preference)
CDU/CSU (Christian 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02+ 0.03***
Democrats) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
SPD (Social -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01 -0.00 -0.02**
Democrats) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Die Grünen -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(The Greens) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Die Linke -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03*
(The Left) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
FDP (Free 0.02+ 0.02* 0.02 -0.02 0.01
Democrats) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Others 0.02 0.02 0.02+ 0.01 0.02
and mixed (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Radical 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16***
right (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Interest in politics (ref.: very strong)
Strong -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.01+
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Not so strong -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Not at all -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income satisfaction (ref.: low)
1 -0.01* -0.02* -0.01+ -0.02 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2 -0.02** -0.02* -0.01+ -0.02 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
3 -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02* -0.04* -0.02+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
high -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02* -0.03* -0.02+
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Table 2.6 (continued)
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Concerns about German economy (ref.: not concerned)
Somewhat 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04***
concerned (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Very 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.14***
concerned (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Concerns about own economic situation (ref.: not concerned)
Somewhat 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.02***
concerned (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Very 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***
concerned (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Age categories (ref.: <25)
25-34 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
35-49 -0.01 0.00 -0.02+ -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
50-64 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
>65 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Employment status (ref.: not working)
In training / -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
apprentice (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Registered -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01
unemployed (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Pensioner -0.01+ -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Working 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Month of interview (ref.: January)
Feb. 0.01*** 0.03*** -0.00 0.02+ 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mar. 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Apr. 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.02**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
May 0.02** 0.03*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Jun. 0.01 0.02** -0.00 0.03* 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)




(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Aug. 0.02* 0.03** 0.01 0.05** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Sep./Oct./Nov. -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Monthly 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00+ 0.00***
in-migration/1,000 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(imputed before
2006)
Constant 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.19***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Number of
person-years 179138 138896 113388 51790 100363
Number of
persons 25073 25060 24650 22537 24110
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-sided tests).
Table 2.7: Regression models of concerns about immigration
FE linear
probability model FE ordered logit RE ordered logit
Media salience, 0.050*** 0.428*** 0.432***
past 21 days (0.002) (0.009) (0.009)
Party preference (ref.: no preference)
CDU/CSU (Christian 0.027*** 0.236*** 0.294***
Democrats) (0.005) (0.029) (0.025)
SPD (Social -0.007 0.006 -0.136***
Democrats) (0.004) (0.028) (0.025)
Die Grünen -0.012* -0.205*** -0.919***
(The Greens) (0.006) (0.054) (0.048)
Die Linke -0.005 -0.013 -0.211***
(The Left) (0.009) (0.057) (0.056)
FDP (Free 0.019* 0.145* 0.043
Democrats) (0.009) (0.066) (0.063)
Others 0.015 0.072 -0.052
and mixed (0.010) (0.072) (0.069)
Radical 0.144*** 1.075*** 1.861***
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Table 2.7 (continued)
right (0.015) (0.128) (0.128)
Interest in politics (ref.: very strong)
Strong -0.020*** -0.099** -0.018
(0.005) (0.034) (0.031)
Not so strong -0.026*** -0.110** 0.120***
(0.006) (0.038) (0.034)
Not at all -0.025*** -0.152*** 0.153***
(0.007) (0.045) (0.041)
Income satisfaction (ref.: low)
1 -0.012+ -0.050 -0.096*
(0.007) (0.043) (0.044)
2 -0.015* -0.049 -0.099*
(0.007) (0.044) (0.044)
3 -0.021** -0.091* -0.184***
(0.007) (0.045) (0.046)
high -0.020** -0.077+ -0.215***
(0.008) (0.046) (0.047)
Concerns about German economy (ref.: not concerned)
Somewhat 0.037*** 0.612*** 0.819***
concerned (0.003) (0.026) (0.027)
Very 0.120*** 1.091*** 1.437***
concerned (0.004) (0.029) (0.032)
Concerns about own economic situation (ref.: not concerned)
Somewhat 0.019*** 0.270*** 0.368***
concerned (0.003) (0.019) (0.018)
Very 0.062*** 0.508*** 0.700***
concerned (0.004) (0.027) (0.026)
Age categories (ref.: <25)
25-34 -0.001 -0.155** -0.063
(0.008) (0.052) (0.045)
35-49 -0.009 -0.323*** 0.040
(0.010) (0.067) (0.047)
50-64 -0.014 -0.425*** 0.179***
(0.011) (0.076) (0.049)
>65 -0.014 -0.487*** 0.250***
(0.013) (0.086) (0.057)
Employment status (ref.: not working)
In training / -0.010 -0.027 -0.252***
apprentice (0.008) (0.057) (0.051)
Registered -0.009 -0.022 0.007




Pensioner -0.009 -0.027 0.139**
(0.008) (0.052) (0.043)
Working 0.001 0.046 -0.021
(0.006) (0.039) (0.033)
Month of interview (ref.: January)
Feb. 0.016*** 0.063* 0.012
(0.005) (0.026) (0.028)
Mar. 0.017*** 0.083** -0.006
(0.005) (0.027) (0.029)
Apr. 0.019*** 0.090** -0.008
(0.005) (0.030) (0.031)
May 0.022*** 0.100** -0.001
(0.006) (0.035) (0.036)
Jun. 0.015* 0.006 -0.091*
(0.007) (0.040) (0.041)
Jul. 0.002 -0.049 -0.152**
(0.007) (0.046) (0.046)
Aug. 0.022* 0.144* 0.010
(0.009) (0.057) (0.056)
Sep./Oct./Nov. -0.005 -0.035 -0.224**
(0.011) (0.080) (0.073)
Monthly 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.006***




























Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-sided tests).
Figure 2.8: Results for diﬀerent periods of measuring media salience before date of
interview
Note: We assessed whether changing the number of days before the individual
interviews took place changes our results. The results showed to be very similar for
periods of 7 days, 14 days, 21 days and 28 days before the interview.
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3 Propagating ethnic preferences?
Political elite discourses and
Europeans' openness towards
diﬀerent immigrant groups in
the beginning of Europe's
'Immigration Crisis'
Abstract: Immigration policies and migrant integration were among the most vividly
discussed issues in the parliaments of many EU-countries in recent years. Drawing
upon recent developments in social science research emphasising the importance of
certain intergroup contexts in particular social spaces, this paper investigates how
the toning of political elite discourses are connected to individual attitudes towards
Muslim immigrants and other migrant subgroups during this time, arguing that (i)
discursive aspects of national politics matter beyond 'objective' circumstances and (ii)
such relationships can primarily be found regarding those ethnic groups which were
in the centre of debates. Combining the ESS with party manifesto data and other
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sources, the ﬁndings suggest that, in contrast to most demographic and economic
aspects, negative elite discourses are primarily associated with negative attitudes to-
wards Muslim but not towards ethnically similar migrants. Positive discourses, on
the other hand, universally correlate with less negative attitudes towards various im-
migrant groups. Deeper analyses reveal that these relationships vary with certain
political characteristics of respondents. Most importantly, diﬀerences related to res-
idents' ideology become more pronounced in contexts where political elites are more
negative as well as in contexts where they are more positive about immigration related
issues. This points to potential boomerang eﬀects for programs of liberal politicians.
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, immigration, asylum and the free movement of persons have increas-
ingly become politicised topics in Western societies (Sides and Citrin, 2007) and the
impact of voters' political orientation on immigration attitudes has intensiﬁed (Se-
myonov et al., 2006). As a consequence, debates about immigration seem to polarise
the European public and signiﬁcant anti-immigration discourses and active protests
emerged. Recent manifestations of anti-immigration sentiments can be found in the
presidential elections in Austria in 2016 and France in 2017 as well as in the Dutch
general election in 2017. In all three cases, campaigns were to a large degree centred
around national and European immigration and integration policies, and there has
been a considerably strong right-wing populist candidate, devoting a large share of
her or his campaign to anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism, and national identity
arguments. And in all three cases, combined eﬀorts of other participating candidates
were necessary to prevent the right-wing populist candidates from winning, increas-
ingly dividing the respective electorate (cf. Harteveld et al., 2017).
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These recent examples suggest a strong correlation between public opinion and the
discourses articulated by political elites. And indeed, previous studies have found that
a more hostile political climate  shaped by political elites  is associated with more
negative general attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (e. g., Bohman, 2011;
Hjerm, 2007; Semyonov et al., 2008), with the public opinion on national identities
(Helbling et al., 2016) and moderates the relationship of immigration attitudes and
support for the welfare state (Schmidt and Spies, 2014). However, other studies report
no direct correlation between political elite discourses and immigration related atti-
tudes (Bohman and Hjerm, 2016; Careja, 2015). A possible explanation of discrepant
ﬁndings is that diﬀerent immigrant groups are associated with diﬀerent characteris-
tics and diﬀerent levels (or kinds) of threat (Meuleman et al., 2018; Czymara and
Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Hellwig and Sinno, 2017; Meeusen and Jacobs, 2017; Meeusen
et al., 2017). Perceptions of ethnic groups are crucial for attitude formation (Blumer,
1958) and these perceptions are highly context dependent. Thus, the association be-
tween political elite discourses and attitudes should be strongest regarding attitudes
towards those groups that are debated as being most threatening in a particular social
space (Meuleman et al., 2018). In the setting investigated in this study, this should
be the case for attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. This is because Muslim immi-
gration and integration were very visible in many public debates due to an increase
in the inﬂow of individuals from countries characterised by a predominantly Muslim
culture and several Islamist terror attacks throughout Europe (see below).
If discourses mainly relate to certain immigrant groups and less to others, intermin-
gling attitudes towards diﬀerent immigrant groups, as done by previous research, leads
to an underestimation of the actual relationship between political elite discourses and
public opinion. Moreover, the toning of political debates is crucial for the establish-
ment of boundaries between ethnic groups, an aspect previous quantitative research
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has neglected as well. How this relates to diﬀerent groups, then, also is an open
question. I aim at ﬁlling these gaps, as I elaborate further below.
Subsequently to investigating the relationship of political elite discourses and atti-
tudes, I test whether this relationship diﬀers with respect to certain political attributes
of respondents. It is reasonable to hypothesise variation in this association because
individuals are likely to diﬀer in their receptiveness to the arguments of political elites.
3.2 Political elite discourses, ethnic boundaries &
out-group-speciﬁc threat perceptions
The most prominent approach to explain how social and economic circumstances are
related to (negative) immigration attitudes is the group threat-paradigm, according to
which exclusionary attitudes stem from the real or perceived threats ethnic out-groups
pose to the majority group (Blumer, 1958).
In much of prior cross-national research situations of threat have primarily been
operationalised as large out-group sizes or poor economic conditions (for an overview
see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). However, other research has repeatedly shown
that natives, on average, have highly biased perceptions of their country's ethnic
composition (Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes, 2017; Semyonov et al., 2004) as well as of
the composition of the immigrant population (Blinder, 2015). Accordingly, objec-
tive circumstances often fail to be reliable predictors of attitudes (Hainmueller and
Hopkins, 2014: 231). On the other hand, individual (mis-)perceptions of a country's
share of immigrants (Hjerm, 2007; Semyonov et al., 2004; Sides and Citrin, 2007) or of
national economic conditions (Kuntz et al., 2017) seem to be core drivers of hostility
towards immigrants. At least, all of the studies cited above show that the connection
between individual perceptions and attitudes is much more evident compared to the
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impact of factual numbers.1 This implies that public debates about immigration are
often based on highly subjective arguments.
A central source of subjective arguments are political elites. In his classical paper,
Blumer argues that The collective image of the abstract group grows up not by
generalising from experiences gained in close, ﬁrst-hand contacts but through the
transcending characterisations that are made of the group as an entity. Thus, one
must seek the central stream of deﬁnition in those areas where the dominant group as
such is characterising the subordinate group as such. This occurs in the 'public arena'
wherein the spokesmen appear as representatives and agents of the dominant group.
(Blumer, 1958: 6, emphasises added) In line with Blumer's reasoning, much of recent
research shows that individuals diﬀerentiate between out-groups and that diﬀerent
groups are associated with diﬀerent attitudes (Meuleman et al., 2018; Czymara and
Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Hellwig and Sinno, 2017; Meeusen and Jacobs, 2017; Meeusen
et al., 2017). When reading Blumer's argument, debates of politicians on the political
stage are one of the most obvious examples that come to mind.
Political elites shape national discourses by providing and interpreting information
related to certain ethnic groups and articulating certain frames and arguments on the
basis of which ethnic groups are evaluated. Discourses, in this understanding, are
the sum of interpretations and articulations of political elites participating in certain
debates. As such, they are an important part of a country's political climate and have
a clearly contextual character. Members of the public may then either be directly
exposed to discourses, for example by political news consumption, or indirectly, for
example by interpersonal communication or social media (Schmitt-Beck, 2003).2
1Xenophobia can of course also distort the lenses through which one perceives her or his ethnic
environment.
2This corresponds to the idea of an information environment a country's residents are exposed to
(cf. Czymara and Dochow, 2018; Van Klingeren et al., 2015; Schlueter and Davidov, 2013).
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Modelling discourses as a contextual characteristic implies that, ﬁrst, discourses
are more than eﬀects of direct exposure to a certain articulation and, second, they
relate to the general public beyond the supporters of particular parties. On the other
hand, it is also plausible that, because most parties want to attract a maximum of
voters, national political elite discourses at large may follow trends of public opinion
in general or that both aspects mutually inﬂuence each other. In any case, the connec-
tion between both aspects should matter beyond objective economic or demographic
circumstances.
There are two main points that follow from this reasoning which I am to address
in this paper. First, discourses often relate to speciﬁc targets and, thus, individuals
should also distinguish between target groups when considering the information un-
derlying such debates (Meuleman et al., 2018; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017;
Meeusen and Jacobs, 2017). Put diﬀerently, political elite discourses cultivate views
on speciﬁc ethnic groups of a society. This should lead to stronger correlations be-
tween discourses and public opinion for attitudes towards those ethnic groups who are
in the focus of the public debates. As I will further elaborate below, in the context I
am investigating in this study, this should primarily relate to Muslim immigrants.
Second, the toning of political discourses seems crucial for the direction of as-
sociations. Ethnic boundaries are an important prerequisite for negative attitudes.
Political elite discourses can either reinforce such boundaries by addressing diﬀerences
between ethnic groups or mitigate them by emphasising similarities (Bohman, 2011).
Hence, negative attitudes should be more prevailing in an environment consisting of
many narratives problematising immigration whereas such attitudes should be signif-
icantly scarcer in countries characterised by a positive, open immigration discourse
(Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Meeusen and Jacobs, 2017).
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In a more exploratory manner, I also test for the interplay of both points. This
is, do inclusionary political elite discourses relate to diﬀerent groups of immigrants in
the same way as exclusionary political elite discourses?
3.3 Evidence of previous research & contribution
Some existing studies lend support to the argument that the political-ideological cli-
mate correlates with general restrictive attitudes. For example, cross-national studies
have shown that anti-immigrant sentiments are more present in places with relatively
strong extreme right parties (Semyonov et al., 2006; 2008, but see Bohman and Hjerm,
2016). However, as Careja (2015) correctly argues, this approach neglects the impor-
tance of those parties that actually make up the lion's share of national parliaments
in shaping national immigration discourses.
To address this shortcoming, other studies have drawn upon party manifesto data
to capture the overall political climate of countries in a standardised way (see the data
section below for a more detailed discussion). Hjerm (2007) ﬁnds that, in contrast
to any of the macro-level measures of demographic or economic circumstances, a
nationalistic political climate correlates with xenophobic attitudes in Europe. Taking
up this reasoning, Bohman's (2011) results suggest that it is especially the negative
rhetoric of centre right- and left-wing parties that are associated with anti-immigrant
attitudes, but neither those from the extreme right nor from the centre. Moreover,
the correlations seem to be particularly strong between attitudes of politically left
individuals and parties belonging to either the left or the centre (Bohman, 2011).
On the other hand, the study of Careja (2015) does not ﬁnd a direct association of
political elite discourses and attitudes but points to a moderating relationship. That
is, Individuals exhibiting an immigrant friendly disposition were even more positive
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about inter-ethnic marriage in countries with present anti-immigration discourses, but
not regarding the expulsion of unemployed immigrants. Hence, while there is some
support for the connection between the discursive political climate and public opinion
on immigration, this correlation is empirically not always as evident as theoretical
reasoning may suggest. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that since both
discourses and attitudes are diﬃcult to capture numerically, broader measures might
not be ideal to describe actual associations.
The present study adds to the existing literature by testing these relationships in a
very interesting setting, namely Europe in the emergence of the so-called Immigration
crisis (see below). Moreover, it aims at exceeding prevailing knowledge by employ-
ing a more nuanced design, which diﬀerentiates toning of discourses and attitudes
towards diﬀerent ethnic groups as well as the interplay of both aspects. This takes
into account recent developments in social science research that emphasises the im-
portance of certain intergroup contexts in particular social spaces (Meuleman et al.,
2018; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Hellwig and Sinno, 2017; Meeusen and
Jacobs, 2017; Meeusen et al., 2017).
3.4 The moderating role of individual openness to
political messages
Modelling political elite discourses as a contextual characteristic does not mean that
associations should be equally strong for everyone living in a certain context. Rather,
people diﬀer in their receptiveness of such political information because not everyone is
equally aware of the arguments constituting a country's political discourses or willing
to incorporate these messages into one's own world view.
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First, the relationship between national discourses and individual attitudes should
be particularly strong for those interested in politics. Existing evidence indicates that
those interested in politics are generally more positive towards immigration (Bohman,
2011; Rustenbach, 2010). More importantly for this study, the more a person is
politically interested, the more likely she or he is to encounter the arguments political
elites put forward in national discourses, for example through the consumption of
political news. Hence, the positive eﬀect of political interest should depend on the
political elite discourses in a country. Because politically interested individuals are
more likely to be aware of political discourses, they should be less (more) negative
about immigrants in countries characterised by a more inclusionary (exclusionary)
discursive political climate.
Second, existing beliefs and values of an individual should moderate the associa-
tion between political elite rhetoric and attitudes towards immigrants. Depending on
one's ideology, Careja (2015) argues that 'if the message is congruent with individuals'
existing orientations and opinions, then it is assimilated and used to reinforce them,
while a challenging message is rejected or disregarded' (Careja, 2015: 5). Since the
political right (left) is associated with less (more) liberal attitudes regarding immi-
gration (de Vries et al., 2013), this means that those adhering to the political right
(left) are likely to feel vindicated in contexts where political elites refer to immigration
and diversity more negatively (positively) and, hence, the polarisation between both
should be more pronounced in contexts where the immigration issue is more politi-
cised (where political elites refer to immigration related issues either more positive or
more negative).
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3.5 Hypotheses
Statements released by political parties shape the political climate by either reinforc-
ing or mitigating ethnic boundaries (Bohman, 2011). Thus, exclusionary political
elite discourse should be associated with more negative attitudes on the individual
level whereas inclusionary discourses should correlate with less negative attitudes.
Hypothesis 1 Exclusionary (inclusionary) political elite discourses are associated
with more (less) negative attitudes towards immigrants. (Discourses-Hypothesis)
Second, previous research has pointed out that diﬀerent groups of immigrants are
associated with diﬀerent stereotypes and, ultimately, with diﬀerent threat perceptions
(Meuleman et al., 2018; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Hellwig and Sinno,
2017; Meeusen and Jacobs, 2017; Meeusen et al., 2017). To more adequately capture
the strength of the association between political elite discourses and attitudes, it
is hence important to diﬀerentiate attitudes towards diﬀerent kinds of immigrants.
Because the integration of Muslim immigrants was very prominent in the debates
during the period of analysis (see below), the relationships hypothesised above should
be particularly related to attitudes towards Muslim immigrants.
Hypothesis 2 Political elite discourses are more strongly connected to attitudes to-
wards Muslim immigrants. (Group-Speciﬁc Discourses-Hypothesis)
Furthermore, the relationship between discourses and attitudes should vary with cer-
tain characteristics of respondents. First, it depends on individual political interest
(Bohman, 2011; Rustenbach, 2010). When politicians use many negative (positive)
arguments, politically interested citizens should also be more (less) negative towards
immigrants.
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Hypothesis 3a Those who are politically interested are less (more) open to immi-
grants relative to those not interested in politics in countries where political
elites are more exclusionary (inclusionary). (Political Interest-Hypothesis)
Finally, discourses should mainly resonate with those recipients for whom are congru-
ent with their ideology (Careja, 2015). If there is a symmetry, this should lead to the
polarisation between those on the political left and on the right for countries in which
political elites address the immigration issue independent of toning.
Hypothesis 3b The diﬀerence in attitudes between those adhering to the political
right and those on the political left is larger the more political elites in a country
are either negative or positive about immigration. (Ideological Polarisation-
Hypothesis)
3.6 Data and setting: the European Social Survey
& the European immigration discourse
Data on attitudes towards immigrants on the individual level come from the 7th wave
of the European Social Survey (ESS7). The ﬁeldwork period of the ESS7 ranged from
August 2014 to December 2015, about 75% of all ESS7 interviews were conducted by
the end of March 2015.3
Although the ESS7 interviews in most cases precede the so-called 'immigration cri-
sis,' immigration and integration were present topics in many countries. This partic-
ularly refers to Muslim immigration due to, ﬁrst, an increase of the European Muslim
population (Pew Research Center, 2017), and perhaps more importantly, the diﬀerent
Islamist terror attacks in Europe: the attack on the staﬀ of the satirical newspaper
3http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/deviations_7.html
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Charlie Hebdo and the related attack on a Jewish supermarket in January 2015, the
attacks on a cultural centre and a Synagogue in Copenhagen in February 2015, and
the series of attacks in the inner city of Paris with 130 fatalities in November 2015, as
well as the cancellation of a football match between Germany and the Netherlands in
Hanover due to terror threat also in November. These events made the political Islam
very prominent in European debates and, thus, the relationship between political elite
discourses and attitudes towards Muslims should be particularly strong.
For my analysis, I draw upon data from 19 countries, that is, from all countries
that participated in the ESS7 except for Lithuania for which there is not suﬃcient
information on control variables available and Israel for which Jewish identity and
the immigration of diaspora Jews (see below) is constitutive.
Outcomes: attitudes towards immigrants
I have argued that correlations between political elite discourses and attitudes towards
immigrants are likely to diﬀer across out-groups, being especially strong for attitudes
towards Muslim immigrants. Fortunately, the ESS7 is well suited for this question
because it provides various items measuring attitudes towards immigrants. In total,
I investigate four items measuring opposition towards allowing immigrants into one's
country.
The item concerning Muslim immigrants is introduced by the sentence please tell
me to what extent you think [country] should allow . . .  followed by . . .Muslims
from other countries to come and live in [country]? As a comparison group I use the
similar item referring to Jews. Because Jewish immigration and integration were less
prominent in public debates in Europe during the period of analysis, the associations
with political elite discourses should be weaker.
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To further corroborate my argument, I also analyse the following two items: To
what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic
group as most [country]'s people to come and live here? and How about people of a
diﬀerent race or ethnic group from most [country] people?, respectively (emphasises
added).4
While there may be an overlap in the concept of 'people from a diﬀerent race or
ethnic group' and Muslims, the ﬁrst is more abstract and also not as directly connected
to stereotypes or threatening events as the second. Hence, my argument centres
around the item concerning Muslim immigrants. Ethnically similar immigrants, in
contrast, should clearly not be the focus of any exclusionary political elite discourses
since such discourses by deﬁnition refer to immigration from distant cultures. The
association between political elite discourses and attitudes should thus be weaker in
this case.
Respondents were asked to rate all four items on a 4-point scale ranging from 1
('Allow many to come and live here') to 4 ('Allow none').5
Explanatory variables: political party discourses
Measures of the national political elite discourses on immigration related issues come
from the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) project (version
2017b).6 These data are based on quantitative content analyses of party manifestos
and capture the proportion of the electoral manifestos which is devoted to certain
pre-deﬁned topics (Klingemann et al., 2006), theoretically ranging from 0 percent
4Recent research on the measurement equivalence of these items suggests that they are comparable
across countries, allowing to draw valid conclusions (Davidov et al., 2018), with the exception of
France, Ireland and Slovenia. Excluding these countries from the analysis has little impact on
the estimated eﬀects of this study.
5This set also includes an item on 'Gypsies.' However, I did not include this item into the analysis
because debates about Sinti und Roma, arguably, are highly unequally distributed across Europe.
6https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/
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(issue not mentioned in a manifesto) to 100 percent (no other issues mentioned in a
manifesto). Since these measures of national political elite discourses are systemat-
ically conducted across diﬀerent countries, they are ideally suited for cross-national
comparisons.
Unfortunately, there is no explicit immigration item in the MARPOR data. I hence
employ two items dealing with the topics national way of life and multiculturalism
as proxies (see Bohman, 2011; Careja, 2015). For each of these two topics there
is a positive and a negative formulation. I operationalise a country's political elite
discourse with the following procedure: First, I take the four items from the MAR-
POR data for each party in a national election (multiculturalism: positive (per601)
& negative (per602), national way of life: positive (per607) & negative (per608)) and
weight these values with the respective party's vote share in the corresponding elec-
tion. This accounts for the fact that an argument is likely to be more visible in the
national discourse if it's coming from a successful party. In a next step, I generate
the country-speciﬁc means for each of these four weighted party discourse measures.
Finally, I combine these country mean values for all countries by summing them up
in the following way:7
• Exclusionary discourses = multiculturalism (negative) + national way of life
(positive)
• Inclusionary discourses = multiculturalism (positive) + national way of life (neg-
ative)
7The correlation between inclusionary and exclusionary party discourse is surprisingly moderate
(r=0.36). Hence, it seems not to be the case that some parties become more exclusionary or
inclusionary primarily as a reaction to opposing statements of rival parties.
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To capture the political elite discourses most directly preceding the measurement of
attitudes, I take the values from the elections closest or preceding the ESS7 ﬁeldwork
period.
Moderators & controls
Since I am interested in investigating how the association between elite discourse and
migration attitudes vary with individual receptiveness, I include two individual-level
moderators related to politics: political interest, measured on a 4-point scale (1: 'Very
interested' to 4: 'Not at all interested') and self-placement on the left right-scale (0:
'Left', 10: 'Right').
Following previous literature, I account for various confounding factors to avoid
spurious relationships. On the country level, I include control variables for the share
of the Muslim population (2010 estimates taken from Pew Research Center, 2011,
cross-validated with the data from the Association of Religion Data Archives), the
share of foreigners (2013) and the national unemployment rate (2014, both taken from
the OECD).
To account for confounding composition eﬀects, I control for religious denomination,
income satisfaction, education, employment status, age, and gender on the individual
level. Contrary to common practice, I follow the recommendation of Sarrasin et al.
(2015) and keep individuals with immigration background (When studying a highly
salient societal phenomenon such as immigration, it is crucial to try to include all
members of society and to avoid a priori unjustiﬁed exclusion Sarrasin et al., 2015:
273). However, I, of course, also control for immigration background and belong-
ing to an ethnic minority to account for potential diﬀerences between natives and
immigrants. Moreover, excluding immigrants does not change the results.
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Statistical model
Because of the hierarchical data structure, I employ hierarchical linear models (HLMs)
to test the hypotheses with individuals being nested in countries.8 This means that
I assume a quasi-metric character of the outcome variables, which is a rather strong
assumption for 4-point scale measures. However, the results are very stable regarding
diﬀerent link functions (results available upon request). Because the conclusions do
not depend on the link function, I opt for linear models for two reasons: First, they,
in contrast to logistic models, allow the comparison of coeﬃcients across diﬀerent
models (cf. Breen et al., 2018), which is crucial for this study. Second, linear models
yield far more intuitively interpretable eﬀect sizes.
All continuous explanatory variables are linearly transformed to range from 0 to 1
for easier interpretation. In this way, the estimated coeﬃcients represent the diﬀerence
between the observed minimum of each variable and the observed maximum. Hence,
these eﬀects can be understood as maximum eﬀect sizes, comparing each empirical
minimum and maximum. To allow the comparison of the standardised coeﬃcients, all
analyses are based on the same sample, using only those respondents who answered
all four outcome variables. This is necessary because standardisation is based on sam-
ple speciﬁc statistics (i. e., empirical minima and maxima). In total, the subsequent
analyses are all based on the same 29,652 individuals from 19 countries. I run sep-
arate models for each of the four outcomes and both explanatory variables to avoid
multicollinearity and to preserve degrees of freedom on the second level. Table 3.1
presents descriptive statistics of all the variables included in the analysis.
8I use the mixed command in Stata 13.1 to estimate the models. Final do-ﬁles for replication
will be made available on my Open Science Foundations proﬁle (https://osf.io/b3ugm/) after
publication.
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Table 3.1: Descriptives
Variable N Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Outcomes
Anti-Muslim 29,652 2.58 0.96 0 4
Anti-Jew 29,652 2.19 0.88 0 4
Anti-diﬀerent race 29,652 2.37 0.86 0 4
Anti-same race 29,652 2.10 0.81 0 4
Country level variables
Exclusionary discourse 29,652 0.38 0.28 0 1
Inclusionary discourse 29,652 0.34 0.28 0 1
Share foreigners 29,652 0.39 0.20 0 1
Share Muslims 29,652 0.45 0.33 0 1
Unemployment rate 29,652 0.23 0.20 0 1
Individual level variables
Left right-scale 29,652 0.50 0.22 0 1
Political interest (ref.: very)
Quite 29,652 0.41 0.49 0 1
Hardly 29,652 0.32 0.47 0 1
Not at all 29,652 0.14 0.34 0 1
Religious denomination (ref.: none)
Christian 29,652 0.49 0.50 0 1
Jew 29,652 0.00 0.03 0 1
Muslim 29,652 0.02 0.13 0 1
Other 29,652 0.01 0.08 0 1
Female 29,652 0.51 0.50 0 1
Age 29,652 0.39 0.20 0 1
Migration background 29,652 0.18 0.38 0 1
Immigrant friends (ref.: several)
A few 29,652 0.37 0.48 0 1
None 29,652 0.50 0.50 0 1
Looking for job 29,652 0.06 0.24 0 1
Education (ref.: high (tertiary))
Medium (avanced vocational) 29,652 0.14 0.35 0 1
Medium (upper secondary) 29,652 0.36 0.48 0 1
Low (lower Secondary or Less) 29,652 0.26 0.43 0 1
Income satisfaction (ref.: living comfortably)
Coping 29,652 0.46 0.50 0 1
Diﬃcult 29,652 0.14 0.35 0 1
Very diﬃcult 29,652 0.04 0.19 0 1
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3.7 Results
Political elite discourses on immigration and integration related issues generally vary
over the diﬀerent European countries, as Figure 3.1 shows. First, political elites of the
Scandinavian countries seem to be very positive and not very negative on such topics
while the opposite seems to be true for Hungary. Second, there are also diﬀerences in
the overall prominence of these issues in national political debates. For example, in
Portugal and Spain, these topics seem not to be discussed much in either a positive or
a negative manner. In contrast, immigration and integration seem to be much more
politicised on the level of political elites in Denmark and Austria, since both positive
and negative statements are highly visible in these countries.
Figure 3.1: Distributions of exclusionary & inclusionary political elite discourses in
European countries
How this relates to diﬀerences in public opinion on diﬀerent immigrant groups can
be seen in Figure 3.2, which presents the bivariate relationships between attitudes




Although there is dispersion in all cases, the grey regression lines indicate a positive
relationship between exclusionary discourse and attitudes towards both out-groups,
although the correlation is only moderate for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants
(r=0.24) and very weak for attitudes towards Jewish immigrants (r = 0.07). In
Hungary and Estonia, politicians seem, on average, to be very nationalistic and nega-
tive about multiculturalism which is accompanied by very negative attitudes towards
Muslim immigrants. However, according to this measure, politicians in the Czech
Republic seem to be less negative while the public opinion on Muslims is very exclu-
sionary. In Denmark and Austria, on the other hand, it seems that politicians are
rather negative but the general public is not.
Figure 3.2: Bivariate relationships between macro-discourses and average level of anti-
Muslim and Anti-Jewish immigrant attitudes, respectively
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Inclusionary discourse is clearly associated with less negative attitudes towards both
Muslim and Jewish immigrants (Muslim: r=-0.48, Jewish: r=-0.57). Political elites
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Portugal hardly release positive statements and
in these countries the public is also very negative, whereas the opposite is true for
Sweden, Denmark or Norway. In fact, there seems to be no clear outlier in the case
of inclusionary political elite discourses and attitudes in either case.
A ﬁrst preliminary conclusion is thus that exclusionary discourses, if anything,
primarily relate to salient minorities (Muslims), whereas an inclusionary political
environment seems to correlate with less negative attitudes towards various kinds of
ethnic out-groups.
To test whether these relationships hold once composition eﬀects and potential
macro-level confounders are controlled, I now turn to the multiple multilevel regression
models.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 contain the results of four analyses each, one for each of the
dependent attitude outcomes. The models in Table 3.2 investigate the eﬀects of
exclusionary party discourses, those in Table 3.3 the eﬀects of inclusionary party
discourses. The eﬀects of the control variables are in line with those found in previous
research (cf. Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010).











(EX.Muslim) (EX.Jew) (EX.diﬀ. race) (EX.same race)
Individual level
LR-scale 0.553*** 0.325*** 0.513*** 0.352***
Political interest (ref.: none)
very interested -0.360*** -0.415*** -0.340*** -0.351***
quite interested -0.275*** -0.297*** -0.281*** -0.267***




Religious denomination (ref.: none)
Christ 0.042*** -0.007 0.041*** -0.005
Jew 0.186 -0.419*** 0.290* 0.100
Muslim -0.324*** 0.109** -0.076* 0.042
Other 0.013 -0.043 -0.083 -0.033
Female -0.011 -0.031*** -0.040*** -0.031***
Age 0.666*** 0.210*** 0.457*** 0.260***
Migration background -0.016 -0.063*** -0.040*** -0.064***
Migrant friends (ref.: many)
few 0.164*** 0.117*** 0.143*** 0.102***
None 0.378*** 0.277*** 0.324*** 0.235***
Looking for work -0.022 -0.009 -0.004 -0.011
Education (ref.: high)
medium high 0.202*** 0.140*** 0.151*** 0.118***
medium low 0.319*** 0.274*** 0.261*** 0.225***
low 0.374*** 0.334*** 0.306*** 0.278***
Income satisfaction (ref.: comfortably)
Coping 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.087*** 0.107***
Diﬃcult 0.205*** 0.212*** 0.183*** 0.198***
Very diﬃcult 0.386*** 0.378*** 0.286*** 0.320***
Country level
Exclusionary discourse 0.322* 0.195 0.338* -0.009
Share foreigners -0.066 0.049 -0.063 -0.074
Share Muslims -0.594*** -0.371** -0.246 -0.134
Unemployment rate -0.013 0.254 0.007 0.062
Constant 1.831*** 1.742*** 1.671*** 1.720***
Variance components
Constant 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.026***
Residuals 0.646*** 0.606*** 0.556*** 0.530***
Statistics
N (countries) 19 19 19 19
n (respondents) 29,652 29,652 29,652 29,652
Log-likelihood -35,642.23 -34,690.07 -33,416 -32,730.68
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-sided tests). All continuous variables
are standardized to range from 0 to 1
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(IN.Muslim) (IN.Jew) (IN.diﬀ. race) (IN.same race)
Individual level
(highly similar to eﬀects reported in Table 3.2)
Country level
Inclusionary discourse -0.391** -0.363** -0.357* -0.341**
Share foreigners -0.155 -0.013 -0.153 -0.094
Share Muslims -0.570*** -0.344** -0.226 -0.100
Unemployment rate -0.353* -0.001 -0.329 -0.065
Constant 2.185*** 2.006*** 2.021*** 1.850***
Variance components
Constant 0,030*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 0 .018***
Residuals 0.646*** 0.606*** 0.556*** 0,530***
Statistics
N (countries) 19 19 19 19
n (respondents) 29,652 29,652 29,652 29,652
Log-likelihood -35,641.16 -34,687.56 -33,415.70 -32,727.02
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-sided tests). All continuous variables
are standardized to range from 0 to 1
I ﬁrst discuss associations for theoretically relevant individual-level variables. No-
tably, political characteristics play an important role for one's attitudes. Across all
models, individual left-right placement and political interest have strong and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant eﬀects (p < 0.001). Not surprisingly, respondents who adhere to the
political right are more negative towards all four ethnic out-groups. This eﬀect is the
second largest of all individual level variables, exceeded only by the age eﬀect. Com-
paring the most left respondents with the politically most right individuals results
in an increase of 0.55 points on the 4-point scale measuring anti-Muslim attitudes
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and a 0.51 point increase on the same scale measuring anti-ethnically distinct immi-
grant attitudes. This implies a diﬀerence of almost 60 percent of a standard deviation
regarding both attitudes towards Muslims (SD = 0.97) and attitudes towards eth-
nically distinct immigrants (SD = 0.87). This relationship is substantively weaker,
however, regarding attitudes towards Jewish immigrants (beta=0.33) and those who
are ethnically more similar (beta=0.35), with diﬀerences between politically most left
and most right respondents resulting in a standard deviation diﬀerence for Jewish im-
migrants (SD = 0.9) of a 37 percent of and a 43 percent standard deviation diﬀerence
for ethnically similar immigrants (SD = 0.83), respectively.
Second, in line with prior research, the more a respondent is politically interested
the less negative she or he is towards any of the investigated out-groups, net of,
among other things, education and ideology. Moreover, the diﬀerences in attitudes
between the diﬀerent levels of political interest, interestingly, vary little across the
four immigrant groups. Regarding all four ethnic out-groups, those very interested
in politics score 0.34 to 0.42 points less negative on the 4 point scales compared to
those not interested in politics at all, with those who are quite or hardly interested
in politics being in between these two categories.
Turning to the country-level variables, it appears that the discourse variables and
share of Muslims are the only macro-level predictors which systematically reach statis-
tical signiﬁcance, although the latter only correlates with attitudes towards Muslims
and towards Jews. Figure 3.3 depicts the main eﬀects of the discourse variables on
all four attitudinal outcomes, net of the control variables. It is evident that both the
content of messages and the object of evaluation are important: controlling for com-
position eﬀects and macro-level variables, exclusionary discourses are associated with
more negative attitudes towards Muslims as well as ethnically distinct immigrants,
and to a smaller degree also with negative attitudes towards Jewish immigrants but
103
3 Propagating ethnic preferences?
Figure 3.3: Coeﬃcients plot of main eﬀects of political elite discourse variables on four
attitudinal outcomes, net of controls
Note: Based on coeﬃcients in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 95 percent conﬁdence intervals,
one sided tests.
the latter eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from zero on the 5 percent level of signiﬁ-
cance. Moving from the observed minimum of exclusionary discourse to the maximum
is associated with an increase of negative attitudes towards Muslims of 0.32 points
on the 4-point scale and of attitudes towards ethnically distinct immigrants of 0.34
points. For attitudes towards Muslims this amounts to two thirds of a standard devi-
ations for this towards ethnically distinct immigrants to 38 percent. Compared with
other coeﬃcients, these are substantively strong eﬀect resembling roughly the eﬀects of
lower education or having no immigrants as friends. However, exclusionary discourses
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have virtually zero eﬀect on attitudes towards ethnically similar immigrants. Accord-
ingly, Likelihood-Ratio-Tests reveal that adding the exclusionary discourse variable
increases the model ﬁt for the models Ex.Muslim (p = 0.054) and Ex.diﬀerent race
(p = 0.047) on the 10 percent level of signiﬁcance but fail to increase the ﬁt of the
model Ex.Jew (p = 0.198) and clearly of the model Ex.same race (p = 0.947). Ex-
clusionary elite discourses, thus, seem to be rather target speciﬁc and, in this setting,
related especially to Muslim and ethnically distinct immigrants.
Inclusionary political elite discourse, on the other hand, has a statistically sig-
niﬁcant negative eﬀect on attitudes towards all four immigrant groups. Adding the
inclusionary discourse variable to the models increases the model ﬁt in all four cases as
the respective Likelihood-Ratio-Tests show (p < 0.05 in all four cases). Interestingly,
with coeﬃcients ranging between -0.39 and -0.34, the eﬀect of inclusionary discourse
is roughly the same size for all four outcomes and also similar to the eﬀects of ex-
clusionary discourse on attitudes towards Muslim or ethnically distinct immigrants.
Hence, in contrast to exclusionary discourses, inclusionary discourses seem to univer-
sally promote more openness, relating to all diﬀerent kinds of (potential) immigrants.
Referring to the hypotheses speciﬁed above, the empirical results lend support to the
Group-Speciﬁc Discourses-Hypothesis and to the Discourses-Hypothesis.
Because the latest available party manifesto data is not from the election directly
preceding the ESS but from the election before the last one in the cases of Belgium
and Norway, I re-estimated the models excluding these countries. Note that this
reduces the number of observation on the second level to only 17 cases. Excluding
these two countries hardly changes the estimated eﬀects. Moreover, the relationships
between the discourse variables and the outcomes reported above by and large do not
depend on diﬀerent model speciﬁcations regarding the inclusion or exclusion of the
macro-level variables.
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The subsequent research aim of this study is to investigate whether the associations
reported above are stronger for certain parts of the population. To this end, I add
two interactions to the model EX.muslim (Table 3.4). For the sake of clarity, I will
focus on the relationship between exclusionary and inclusionary party discourses and
anti-Muslim attitudes because these attitudes are of theoretical interest and the main
eﬀects of both discourse predictors were statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 3.4 depicts the marginal eﬀect of political interest on anti-Muslim attitudes
for diﬀerent levels of exclusionary (left panel) and inclusionary (right panel) political
elite discourse. The left panel shows that in countries where there are few exclusionary
macro-discourses, i. e. where exclusionary discourse is low, respondents with higher
levels of political interest exhibit about 0.41 points less negative attitudes towards
Muslims compared to those with no political interest (reference group). This is in line
with the theoretical expectations, as those who are politically very interested are more
likely to perceive that political elites devote little of their campaigns to exclusionary
arguments. Hence, these individuals are less likely to think about immigrant groups
in a negative way compared to those who are not interested in politics and who thus
less likely perceive that political elites are not very exclusionary. Moving to the right
on the x-axis, the diﬀerent levels of political interest converge, with a 0.1 unit decrease
in the diﬀerence between those very interested in politics and those not interested at
all in countries with high levels of exclusionary discourse. This means a 25 percent
drop in the diﬀerence between the politically very interested and those not interested
at all when comparing the empirical minimum with the maximum of exclusionary
elite discourse. In these contexts, politically interested individuals are more likely
to receive the negative statements of politicians. Politically interested residents are




Table 3.4: Interaction eﬀects on exclusionary attitudes towards Muslim immigrants
Exclusionary Inclusionary Exclusionary Inclusionary
Individual level
LR-scale 0.552*** 0.553*** 0.497*** 0.472***
Political interest (ref.: none)
very interested -0.409*** -0.329*** -0.360*** -0.357***
quite interested -0.314*** -0.233*** -0.276*** -0.274***
hardly interested -0.159** -0.110*** -0.140*** -0.139***
Control variables X X X X
Country level
Discourse 0.245 -0.265* 0.243 -0.517***
Control variables X X X X
Discourse × political interest (ref.: none)
very interested 0.245* -0.126*
quite interested 0.112* -0.156**
hardly interested 0.061 -0.124*
Discourse × LR scale 0.151* 0.244***
Constant 1.858*** 2.156*** 1.861*** 2.226***
Variance components
Constant 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.030***
Residuals 0.646*** 0 .646*** 0.646*** 0.646***
Statistics
N (countries) 19 19 19 19
n (respondents) 29,652 29,652 29,652 29,652
Log-likelihood -35,639.01 -35,637.90 -35640.30 -35635.61
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-sided tests). All continuous variables
are standardized to range from 0 to 1
107
3 Propagating ethnic preferences?
Figure 3.4: Marginal eﬀect of political interest on anti-Muslim immigrant attitudes,
conditional on discourse
Note: Reference: not interested at all, based on the model of Table 3.4 (columns 2
and 3). 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, one sided tests.
In line with theoretical considerations, roughly the same  but in opposite direction
 applies to the eﬀect of political interested conditional on inclusionary discourse, as
the right panel of Figure 3.4 shows. Here, comparing the empirical minimum value of
inclusionary discourse with the empirical maximum implies an increase in the marginal
eﬀect between those very interested in politics compared to those not interested at all
of about 30 percent. Both ﬁndings are in line with the Political Interest-Hypothesis.
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Turning to the interaction of the LR-scale and political discourses in Figure 3.5, a
similar picture emerges for exclusionary discourse (left panel): being politically more
right has a lower positive impact on having anti-Muslim attitudes if political elites
are less exclusionary than when politicians are more exclusionary.
Figure 3.5: Marginal eﬀect of ideology on anti-Muslim immigrant attitudes, condi-
tional on discourse
Note: Higher values imply stronger adherence to the political right ideology, based
on the model of Table 3.4 (columns 4 and 5). 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, one
sided tests.
The main eﬀect of left right-scale in the fourth column of Table 3.4 indicates that
those who are maximum right are 0.5 points more exclusionary towards Muslim im-
migrants on the 4-point scale compared to those who are maximum left (p < 0.001) if
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exclusionary discourse is at its empirical minimum. Moving from the empirical mini-
mum to the empirical maximum of exclusionary discourse, this diﬀerence between the
most right and the most left further increases by 0.15 units (p < 0.05).
The right panel of Figure 5 (or the ﬁfth column of Table 4) shows that the same
also applies for inclusionary discourse. Here, the diﬀerence between the empirical
minimum and the maximum value of inclusionary discourse increases the eﬀect of left
right-scale of 0.47 (p < 0.001) by more than a half (0.24 units, p < 0.001). Comparing
the left and the right panel of Figure 3.5 reveals that, interestingly, the additional
increase of the eﬀect of ideology on exclusionary attitudes towards Muslim immi-
grants is even greater for inclusionary discourse compared to exclusionary discourse.
I will return to this ﬁnding in the discussion. Both ﬁndings support the Ideological
Polarisation-Hypothesis.
3.8 Summary and discussion
Discourses and the rhetoric of political elites resonate with public opinion on ethnic
groups. I examined the relationship of the toning of political elite discourses and
attitudes towards diﬀerent immigrant subgroups. Based on Blumer's (1958) group
threat-paradigm and recent developments in research on attitudes towards immi-
grants (Meuleman et al., 2018; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Meeusen and
Jacobs, 2017), I have argued that political elites play a crucial role in shaping the
'public picture' of certain ethnic out-groups. This picture then translates to natives'
perceptions of these groups and, ultimately, aﬀects the individual openness towards
them. In this way, perceiving out-groups as threatening is aﬀected by the arguments
making up the discourses of political elites at a particular point in time.
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Because Muslim immigrants have received much attention in public discourses due
to several major Islamist terror attacks and other related events taking place during
the period of investigation, attitudes towards Muslim immigrants were in the centre
of the present analysis. In line with the theoretical expectations, the ﬁndings suggest
that political elite discourses clearly correlate with individual attitudes. In discur-
sively more exclusionary contexts the public is, on average, more negative towards
Muslim and ethnically distant immigrants but not towards ethnically similar ones.
Moreover, the public is less negative when elites are more inclusionary. Interest-
ingly, the empirical evidence suggests that the letter refers to all immigrant groups
universally. The associations between attitudes and exclusionary and inclusionary dis-
courses, respectively, are about the same size which contradicts the idea that negative
information has a stronger impact than positive information (Soroka, 2006).
I identiﬁed two important moderators of this relationship. The eﬀect of political
elite discourses especially relates to, ﬁrst, people who are politically interested. An
explanation is that these individuals are more likely to come across the arguments of
politicians when consuming political news or engaging in political discussions. Being
more aware of these arguments, the politically interested are more negative in coun-
tries where elites are more exclusionary and less negative in countries where elites are
more inclusionary.
Second, the political elite rhetoric seems to lead to a polarisation of the electorate.
The empirical evidence indicates that this holds independently of the toning of the
elite discourses. If they use more immigration hostile arguments, individuals adhering
to the political right can draw upon the nationalist political party statements which
justify and consolidate their existing opinion. The same applies to those adhering to
the political left in countries characterised by a more immigration friendly climate
on the level of political elites. Interestingly, this relationship is even stronger for
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inclusionary discourses compared to exclusionary discourses. A possible solution to
this puzzle is related to experimental evidence showing that anti-prejudice messages
can increase out-group derogation (Legault et al., 2011). An explanation can be
found in psychology's reactance theory according to which, individuals 'rebel' against
a perceived marginalisation of their views when exposed to opposing messages (Miron
and Brehm, 2006). Many debates about so-called political correctness indicate that
those on the political right fear a loss of freedom of expression. Hence, they may
perceive their freedom undermined when confronted with a multi-cultural friendly
political environment, resulting in a boomerang attitude change. (Miron and Brehm,
2006: 14) It might be that adherents of the political left are less aﬀected by such
boomerang eﬀects. While I can only speculate on this explanation in the current
study, it is certainly interesting for further research.
But, of course, this study has its limitations. A core interest was to investigate a
setting in which a certain ethnic group is prominent because in such a setting the
theoretical argument about group-speciﬁc relationships is most plausible (cf. Meule-
man et al., 2018). I have argued that, for this study, this is the case for Muslim
immigration because diﬀerent important events related to political Islam took place
in Europe during the period of investigation. While I am not aware of any cross-
national direct measure of the salience of Muslim immigration in political discourses,
assuming this salience seems reasonable. This has the drawback, however, that the
investigation is limited to a cross-sectional design because immigration and integra-
tion of Muslims were, arguably, less prominent issues during the ﬁeldwork periods of
previous waves of the ESS, which complicates the (theoretical) deﬁnition of the in-
tergroup context. This is crucial, however, for hypothesising about nuanced forms of
(perceived) threat which relate to speciﬁc ethnic groups (cf. Meuleman et al., 2018).
Even more importantly, previous waves of the ESS (and the next one) do not include
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the item on attitudes towards Muslim immigrants or a similar concrete group. But
with cross-sectional observational data the identiﬁcation of causality is complicated.
Theoretically, it is also plausible that political parties aim at maximising their
popularity and thus partly pick up the public opinion towards certain out-groups
in their argumentation. A relationship of mutual response seems most likely, where
both aspects are also aﬀected by certain potentially threatening external events (e.
g., Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Legewie, 2013). I hence avoided language
that is strongly related to causality.
Apart from these limitations, however, I tried to counter spurious correlations by
controlling several potential confounders on the micro- and the macro-level and test-
ing various model speciﬁcations. The statistical associations are largely independent
of the included controls. This being said, I believe that the present study gener-
ates important insights into the relationships between political elite discourses and
attitudes towards immigrants.
Another important point is the question whether the manifesto data is a valid mea-
sure of political elite discourses at all  and whether one can assume that these are
the discourses the people perceive. As other authors have argued before, the state-
ments of party manifestos proxy the positions of politicians belonging to the party and
politicians and their arguments often have high visibility in public debates (Helbling
et al., 2016: 752). Research on the cross-validation of the party manifesto data and
data derived from expert surveys also conclude that both approaches measure party
positions similarly (Marks et al., 2007; Netjes and Binnema, 2007), further lending
support to the validity of the MARPOR data. I follow previous studies arguing that
the national identity and multiculturalism categories I employ for this study capture
the overall stance of a party regarding immigration issues (Schmidt and Spies, 2014).
These ﬁndings have severe implications for political debates on immigrant integra-
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tion. From the perspective of liberal politicians, it is good news that an immigration
friendly climate in national parliaments relates to more universal openness on the in-
dividual level. This can facilitate the integration of diverse immigrant subgroups. On
the other hand, the opposite is also true regarding more immigration hostile coun-
tries and particularly attitudes towards Muslim and ethnically distant immigrants.
Moreover, evidence suggests that such an immigration friendly political environment
on the level of political elites leads to an increased polarisation among the electorate
between those adhering to the political left and those adhering to the political right.
So politically right voters  who are likely to be more critical towards immigrants in
the ﬁrst place (de Vries et al., 2013)  may become even more negative if political
elites are stressing the positive aspects of immigration and multiculturalism. This
implies that stressing the beneﬁts of immigration can also have a counterproductive
impact for liberal politicians.
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Abstract: Based on an innovative design, combining a multi-factorial survey exper-
iment with a longitudinal perspective, we examine changes in the public acceptance
of immigrants in Germany from the beginning of the so-called 'migration crisis' to
after the sexual assaults of New Year's Eve (NYE) 2015/2016. In contrast to previous
studies investigating similar research questions, our approach allows to diﬀerentiate
changes along various immigrant characteristics. Derived from discussions making up
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the German immigration discourse during this time, we expect reduced acceptance
especially of those immigrants who were explicitly connected to the salient events,
like Muslims and the oﬀenders of NYE. Most strikingly, we ﬁnd that refugees were
generally highly accepted and even more so in the second wave, whereas the accep-
tance of immigrants from Arab or African countries further decreased. Moreover,
female respondents' initial preference for male immigrants disappeared. Contrary to
our expectations, we ﬁnd no changes in the acceptance of Muslims. We conclude that
(i) public opinion research is well advised to match the particular political and social
context under investigation to a ﬁtting outcome variable to adequately capture the
dynamics of anti-immigrant sentiment and that (ii) the vividly discussed upper limits
for refugees seem to be contrary to public demands according to our data.
4.1 Introduction
In 2015, Europe experienced a strong increase in immigration and asylum rates, which
included a disproportionate high share of young male refugees, many originating from
Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Connor, 2016). For these immigrants and refugees, Ger-
many was the most popular destination (ibid.). During this time, several violent acts
took place which were directly or indirectly connected to Islam or immigration from
Africa and the Middle East, including the Islamist attack on the staﬀ of the satirical
newspaper Charlie Hebdo, the related attack on a Jewish supermarket (January), the
fatal attacks on a cultural centre and a Synagogue in Copenhagen in February, a series
of attacks in the inner city of Paris with 130 fatalities, as well as the cancelation of
a football match between Germany and the Netherlands in Hannover due to terror
threat in November. This series of fatal events was followed by dozens of incidents of
sexual assault and robbery at the festivities in several German cities on New Year's
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Eve (NYE) 2015/2016, where the perpetrators were described to the police as men
of 'Arab or North African appearance' (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Many German media
reports linked the sexual violence and robbery with the sexual harassment in crowds
known from the protests at Cairo's Tahrir Square at the time of the Egyptian revo-
lution (Lutz, 2016). After the event was uncovered, the story went viral and brought
into question the heretofore rather liberal German refugee policy (Spiegel Online,
2016).
Such (potentially) threatening events are often linked to the erosion of public ac-
ceptance of immigrants by politicians and the media. While this eﬀect is theoretically
plausible, the reasoning is often based on anecdotal evidence. Direct scientiﬁc inves-
tigations of the eﬀects of external events are rather rare. Furthermore, most of the
studies which dealt with this question assumed a universal eﬀect shaping attitudes to-
wards all immigrants equally (Hopkins, 2010; Finseraas and Listhaug, 2013; Legewie,
2013). It is reasonable, however, to call this assumption into question (cf. de Rooij
et al., 2015). This is because natives generally tend to evaluate diﬀerent groups of
immigrants in diﬀerent ways (Iyengar et al., 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015;
Bansak et al., 2016). Such diﬀerentiation may be even more important for the evalu-
ation of immigrants after an external shock because such events are typically directly
linked to stereotypes of speciﬁc ethnic groups, as in the case of the events on NYE
2015/2016. We argue that prior research underestimated the eﬀect of such events
because it mixed up attitudes towards various immigrant subgroups, even though
most of them were not associated with the respective event. Accordingly, the eﬀect
of, for example, Islamist terror attacks on general attitudes to immigration found in
previous research were modest compared with common expectations and, moreover,
statistically signiﬁcant in only some of the countries investigated (Finseraas et al.,
2011; Legewie, 2013) or even in none (Finseraas and Listhaug, 2013). An explana-
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tion of this surprising ﬁnding is that natives understand immigration not primarily
as 'Muslim immigration' and not because the events themselves are negligible. Our
study allows diﬀerentiating the change in attitudes towards immigrants along various
dimensions of immigrant characteristics.
We thus contribute to the literature by providing a more accurate eﬀect of important
events and thereby also a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of public
opinion towards immigrants in times of social tensions. This has important political
implications because, tragically, such events are not unlikely to happen in Europe
again in the future. Since public support of immigrants is a crucial prerequisite
to successful integration, politicians should react adequately to such events. For
example, bans or 'upper limits' for refugees, as repeatedly demanded by many public
speakers across Europe during our period of analysis, seem to contradict many natives'
preferences according to our data.
We base our analysis on an innovative design which combines a multi-factorial
survey experiment with a longitudinal perspective: respondents rated a set of hypo-
thetical immigrant proﬁles in the beginning of the so-called 'migrant crisis' and again
shortly after NYE 2015/2016. We ﬁnd not only that immigrants were generally rated
more negatively in the second wave but also that this negative eﬀect was almost twice
as large for migrants originating from the Middle East or Africa compared with those
from a European neighbour of Germany. Both areas were at the centre of the Ger-
man refugee debate in general and of the discussions regarding the assaults on NYE
in particular. In contrast, we ﬁnd that persecuted migrants ('refugees') were accepted
even more in the second wave, while changes in attitudes towards Muslim immigrants
were not signiﬁcant. Moreover, we show that female respondents' acceptance of male
immigrants diminished over time.
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4.2 The impact of external events on
migration-related attitudes: theory and
evidence
The determinants of migration-related attitudes have been intensively studied by
social scientists who have examined the eﬀects of individual attributes as well as con-
textual characteristics (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Much of the recent literature
indicates that sociotropic and identity-related concerns are more important than self-
interest (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). The lion's share of these studies refer to
Blumer's essay on group positions and collective threat perceptions, in which he ar-
gues that the dominant group of a society develops ethnic prejudices as a response
to concerns about losing privileges to subordinate racial groups. Blumer particularly
argues that 'big events' play a crucial role in developing a concept of the racial out-
group and are thus fundamental for the emergence of ethnic prejudice. He states:
It is the events seemingly loaded with great collective signiﬁcance that are the focal
points of the public discussion. The deﬁnition of these events is chieﬂy responsible for
the development of a racial image and of the sense of group position. When this public
discussion takes the form of a denunciation of the subordinate racial group, signifying
that it is unﬁt and a threat, the discussion becomes particularly potent in shaping the
sense of social position (Blumer, 1958: 6). From this sense of group position emerge
fears that immigrants alter the prevailing way of life or the foundation of national
identity (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 318). However, previous research has paid
only little attention to the eﬀects of such events. There are only a few studies inves-
tigating 'big events', often based on natural experiments. These studies exploit the
fact that, in some cases, certain tragic events coincide with the ﬁeld work period of
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large-scale survey programmes. For example, Legewie (2013) analyses the data from
the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002 and Eurobarometer 2004 and draws upon the
exogenous variation caused by the Islamist terror attacks in Bali on 12 October 2002
as well as the Madrid train bombings in March 2004. He ﬁnds signiﬁcant eﬀects in
two of nine countries for which the ﬁeldwork period coincided with the terror attack
in Bali. Analysis of the Madrid bombings reveal an especially strong eﬀect for Spain
itself, suggesting that events closer to home have a larger eﬀect (Legewie, 2013). In a
similar vein, Finseraas and Listhaug (2013), relying on the data of the fourth wave of
the ESS, ﬁnd that the Islamist terror attacks in Mumbai 2008 signiﬁcantly increased
fear of terrorism. According to their analysis, however, this fear does neither trans-
late into support for illiberal interrogation techniques nor to more restrictive policy
preferences. Moreover, Finseraas et al. (2011) analyse the second wave of the ESS
and ﬁnd that the brutal assassination of the Dutch ﬁlm maker Theo van Gogh by a
radical Islamist in 2004 led to more restrictive policy preferences, although the eﬀect
is comparatively small and not signiﬁcant for all countries, strikingly also not for the
Netherlands. Similarly, Smiley et al. (2017) ﬁnd that the immigration preferences
of the residents of Copenhagen area did not diﬀer between those who were surveyed
before and those surveyed after the shootings in Copenhagen 2015. However, Hopkins
(2010) reports that US Americans in counties which experienced a high inﬂow of mi-
grants were in fact more negative about immigrants after the 9/11 attacks (Hopkins,
2010: 51 f.).
In sum, the eﬀects of signiﬁcant events were surprisingly modest in most studies. An
explanation for this is that large survey programmes may not be able to suﬃciently
capture the central aspects of the public debates after such events. Most survey
programmes typically ask rather general questions about immigration which are not
tailored to speciﬁc events, since they are hardly predictable.
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Capturing these central aspects seems important, though, because, in Blumer's
terms, public speakers deﬁne events and develop racial images by highlighting certain
related aspects of ethnic out-group members, for example the aspects of origin or gen-
der after NYE (see below). By calling attention to these aspects (and ignoring others),
public speakers and the media shape which information is most easily accessible in
natives' minds which, in turn, aﬀects the criteria used for evaluating immigrants after
these events (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010: 63 ﬀ.).
For example, the ethnic riots in London in 2011 had an eﬀect on prejudice towards
Blacks and East European minorities, but not towards Muslims (de Rooij et al.,
2015). The authors of this study conclude that events that are linked more explicitly
to minority groups may increase [. . . ] prejudice by heightening perceived threats
(de Rooij et al., 2015: 381, emphasis added). This implies that the eﬀect of destabil-
ising events is likely to decrease natives' acceptance of certain minority groups more
than others. We take up this reasoning and put it to the test by making use of
intra-individual variation not only between two time points but also regarding the
acceptance of diﬀerent immigrant subgroups.
4.3 Germany's immigration and refugee discourse
before and after NYE 2015/16
In 2015, more than 1.3 million asylum seekers ﬁrst registered in European Union
member states, a number more than twice as large as in the year before. More than
a third of these refugees applied for asylum in Germany, making it the most popular
destination in Europe (Connor, 2016). Thus, Germany by then was one of the key
political players in the so-called European 'migrant crisis'. Accordingly, immigration
and the admission of refugees had been prominently discussed in Germany during our
121
4 Refugees unwelcome?
time of analysis. Figure 4.1 graphs this quantitatively, depicting the number of daily
articles about immigration in three prestigious German online media (Spiegel Online,
Welt Online, and Zeit Online), with several million unique visitors per month each.1 It
appears that media debates about immigration were relatively low in general during
the ﬁrst survey wave in April 2015.2 As the number of immigrants and refugees
steadily increased in late summer 2015, shown by the circles, immigration stories
about Africa and the Middle East and about Islam came more into focus.
This strong increase in asylum applications was accompanied by fundamental, and
partly violent, protests against the German immigration and asylum policy. The most
prominent example is the so-called Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of
the West (Occident) (PEGIDA) movement. Starting as a weekly protest march in
Dresden already in autumn 2014, diﬀerent branches of PEGIDA formed in various
cities in Germany, attracting from a few dozens to several thousands of participants
every week. A signiﬁcant proportion of the German civil society, however, was also
characterised by a high degree of openness and willingness to help the newcomers
(Knobbe et al., 2015). The German public was therefore strongly divided over the
country's immigration policy in general and the question of how to deal with diﬀerent
kinds of (potential) immigrants in particular. As Figure 4.1 indicates, the salience of
the immigration issue somewhat abated by the end of 2015. This changed abruptly
in the days after NYE 2015/2016 when the circumstances of the assaults were grad-
ually uncovered by the media. Now the attention on immigration from Arabic or
(North)African as well as Islam strongly increased. The political right often explicitly
framed refugees as being directly dangerous to the native population and harmful
to Western values in the aftermath of these events (Meisner and Wischmeyer, 2016;
1Cf. https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/165258/umfrage/reichweite-der-meistbesuch
ten-nachrichtenwebsites/
2Also mind that none of the events mentioned before took place immediately before the ﬁrst wave.
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Figure 4.1: Salience of diﬀerent aspects of the immigration issue in popular German
online media over time
Note: based on the number of daily articles from Spiegel Online, Welt Online and
Zeit Online (topics not mutually exclusive), source: Nexis (for search string see
supplementary appendix C: Search strings for Figure 4.1), grey circles are monthly
asylum applications (right axis), grey bars indicate survey waves.
Salient events and attacks: C. H.: Charlie Hebdo & Jewish supermarket (Jan. 15);
Copen.: cultural centre and Synagogue in Copenhagen (Feb. 15); Paris: Bataclan




Weiland, 2016). The assaults also boosted the opposition of the PEGIDA movement,
by emphasising the danger of 'Islamisation'. But the events were not only discussed
by the far right. For example, Germany's Federal Minister of the Interior at the time
referred to the 2015/2016 NYE as a 'turning point' in the German refugee debate, em-
phasising that newcomers must respect 'our' (so: German) values and culture (Spiegel
Online, 2016).3 Immigrants were hence prominently discussed as emanating symbolic
threats, harming what is seen as the established norms and values (Hainmueller and
Hopkins, 2014: 234 ﬀ.).
Finally, Figure 4.1 shows that the previously niche topic of immigration and sexual
violence suddenly became important after NYE, as this was exactly what these events
were about. This was also addressed by public speakers, especially from the far right,
who stressed the 'sexual danger' that the inﬂow of male migrants from Arab and
North African countries would cause (Weiland, 2016). For example, the far right
party Pro NRW slandered refugees as 'testosterone-ridden newcomers hunting down
young native women' (Meisner and Wischmeyer, 2016). Hence, immigrants were not
only discussed as being symbolically threatening but also as threats to the collective as
well as to the individual safety (de Rooij et al., 2015), the latter especially concerning
native women.
4.4 Hypotheses
Several important events took place between our two survey waves: the fatal attacks
in the inner city of Paris, the cancellation of a football match in Germany due to terror
threat (both in November 2015), and the assaults on NYE 2015/2016 in Germany.
This makes the isolation of the eﬀect of a single event impossible with our data.
3All statements translated by the authors.
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However, given that all events were part of the broader discourse of the 'migrant
crisis', we think that the eﬀects of the later events are generally not independent of
the previous ones. This is because these events all happened in relatively short time,
and they share a common core  they were all connected to the inﬂow of refugees by
many public speakers. Thus, we assume that the eﬀect of an event carries over and
gets, at least partly, reactivated with each new event. This means that the eﬀect of the
most recent event of our analysis may cumulatively include parts of the events before.
Since our survey was carried out in Germany, where the most recent prominent event
in this chronology happened (the assaults on NYE 2015/2016), we hypothesise that
general public acceptance of immigrants signiﬁcantly decreased in the second wave of
our survey because the events increased both safety and symbolic threat perceptions
(de Rooij et al., 2015).
Hypothesis 1 Immigrants are less accepted after NYE, irrespective of their charac-
teristics. (General Threat-Hypothesis)
As discussed, the NYE assaults were clearly linked to the inﬂow of male refugees
coming from North African and Arab  and predominantly Muslim  countries by
many public speakers. This may create, or reinforce, a 'racial image' (Blumer, 1958)
of particular out-groups. The potential economic burdens of migration, on the other
hand, were addressed to a much lesser extent after the events, and we therefore expect
the evaluation of economic characteristics to be unaﬀected by the events. Symbolic
and safety threats should therefore be primarily connected to those immigrant char-




Hypothesis 2 A negative change in public acceptance of immigrants after NYE
2015/2016 depends especially on three factors: their country of origin, being
Muslim, and being male. (Speciﬁc Threat-Hypothesis)
Deriving a hypothesis regarding changes in the acceptance of refugees between both
waves is less clear. On the one hand, many public speakers linked the events in
general, and the assaults of NYE in particular, directly to the inﬂow of refugees,
as discussed above. Moreover, evidence indicates that respondents who primarily
have asylum seekers in mind when thinking about 'immigrants' tend to be more
restrictionist (Blinder, 2015). On the other hand, several studies found that people
were more positive towards immigrants if the reasons of forced migration, such as
repression or persecution, were made explicit or emphasised (Newman et al., 2013;
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Bansak et al., 2016). With rising refugee rates, the
media also increasingly focused on the war in Syria, other humanitarian crises in the
refugees' countries of origin, and the dramatically large number of migrants who died
trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Such shocking information may also increase
natives' readiness to help.
Our study is the ﬁrst to test whether the perceived threat caused by external events
outperforms the humanitarian concerns which generally determine attitudes towards
persecuted immigrants. Since both eﬀects are plausible, we formulate two competing
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a Immigrants who want to enter Germany because they are ﬂeeing from
persecution are less accepted in the second than in the ﬁrst wave. (Refugee
Threat-Hypothesis)
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Hypothesis 3b Immigrants who want to enter Germany because they are ﬂeeing
from persecution are more accepted in the second than in the ﬁrst wave. (Hu-
manitarian Needs-Hypothesis)
Finally, as the most recent event under study was mainly about sexual assaults against
women, we also test whether the event aﬀected male and female respondents diﬀer-
ently, hypothesising that sexual threat perceptions are stronger for female than for
male respondents (cf. Navarrete et al., 2010). Female respondents should thus be
more concerned about individual safety threats compared to males.
Hypothesis 4 The negative change in the acceptance of immigrants who are male or
Muslim or from Arab or North African countries is stronger for female than for
male respondents. (Sexual Threat-Hypothesis)
In an innovative and unique design, we combine the analysis of external events (as
in Hopkins, 2010; Finseraas and Listhaug, 2013; Legewie, 2013) with the strengths
of multi-factorial survey experiments (as in Iyengar et al., 2013; Hainmueller and
Hopkins, 2015; Bansak et al., 2016) relying on intra-individual variation over time to
test these hypotheses.
4.5 Research design, data, and method
Our data come from a two-wave panel survey of a convenience online pool admin-
istered through the SoSci-Panel.4 Initially, 4,991 individuals were invited of which
1,352 participated in the ﬁrst wave and 738 again in wave 2. The drop-out rate hence
amounts to 45.41 per cent. We tested for selection into the second wave by using a
logistic regression, where drop-out after wave 1 was regressed on the mean rating of




each respondent across all immigrant proﬁles in wave 1 5 as well as on a large num-
ber of covariates.6 Neither a single variable nor the complete model was signiﬁcant
[Likelihood-Ratio-test (LR-test): χ2 (df = 12) = 18.45, P = 0.103]. Thus, there is no
evidence indicating that unit non-response was selective.
Outcome: acceptance of immigrants
Respondents were asked to rate their willingness to give various ﬁctive immigrant
proﬁles the right to live in Germany on a seven-point Likert scale.7
Figure 4.2 presents the distributions of the dependent variable separately for both
waves, showing that acceptance of immigrants somewhat declined between both waves,
from an average value of 5.12 in Wave 1 to 4.88 in Wave 2. Public opinion thus seems
to have shifted during this time, and we will dissect these changes in our analysis
below.
Treatments: immigrant characteristics
Each immigrant proﬁle consists of the six attributes: gender, country of origin, rea-
son for migrating, qualiﬁcation, language skills, and religious denomination. Table 4.1
presents all six characteristics with their values. Qualiﬁcation and language skills are,
at least partly, indicators of economic characteristics, while country of origin and reli-
5The mean ratings of our outcome (the right to live in Germany) in the pre-event survey was 5.12
for those who did not drop out after the ﬁrst wave and 5.24 for those who did. A simple mean
comparison already indicates that the diﬀerence between both groups is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 5 per cent level.
6The other covariates include gender, education, employment status, religious denomination, having
migrant friends, and coming from East Germany.
7Respondents were also asked to rate the immigrant proﬁles with respect to the right to work
and the right to receive social beneﬁts in Germany. In this paper, we analyse only respondents'
ratings of the right to live in Germany because ﬁrstly, results are generally quite similar for each
of the three ratings with respect to our event treatment and, secondly, given the interest in the
eﬀect of the assaults, we theoretically expect this to aﬀect primarily the general right to enter
the country and not particularly the rights to work or receive beneﬁts in Germany.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of dependent variable (in percent)
Note: vertical lines indicate mean values in the ﬁrst and second wave
gious denomination indicate cultural distance. The reason for migrating was included
to test whether respondents diﬀerentiated between those who came as refugees, i.e.
ﬂeeing from political persecution, and those who came for economic reasons. We
included three countries of origin: Lebanon, Kenya, and France. While the latter
is culturally similar to Germany, Lebanon, and Kenya represent one country from
the Middle East and one from Africa, two culturally more distant areas. These par-
ticular countries were chosen because they were not in the centre of public debates
and therefore not confounded with speciﬁc aspects like war. Furthermore, they have
religiously mixed populations, making the diﬀerent combinations of countries and re-
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Reason for immigration (1) Prospective job in Germany
(2) Better live, no prospective job
(3) Political persecution
Country of origin (1) France
(2) Lebanon
(3) Kenya
Qualiﬁcation (1) Low ('low qualiﬁcation')
(2) High ('university degree')
Language skills (1) Bad
(2) Good
Religious denomination (1) No religion
(2) Christ
(2) Muslim
ligious denominations plausible. For a detailed description of these proﬁles and their
attributes and values also see the supplementary appendix A: Construction of im-
migrant proﬁles as well as Czymara and Schmidt-Catran (2016). Respondents were
asked to rate the same set of 14 proﬁles in each wave, with randomised order. The
14 proﬁles contain a speciﬁc set of all possible combinations of attribute values. We
drew a sample from all possible combinations in such a way that the values of each
attribute tend to occur with the same frequency (balance) and to be uncorrelated
(orthogonality).8 This allows the estimation of the attributes' causal eﬀects under
the assumption that interaction eﬀects between them are negligible (Dülmer, 2007:
386).9 For two reasons our set is only approximately balanced and orthogonal: ﬁrst,
because it is practically impossible to divide all values for all attributes equally in
14 proﬁles and, secondly, because we imposed a restriction for the highly implausible
8We drew this sample with the %Mktex macro for SAS from Kuhfeld (2010) using the Modiﬁed
Federov algorithm; seed number: 819179.
9Possible consequences of the violation of this assumption for the estimats of our main eﬀects are
discussed in Czymara and Schmidt-Catran (2018).
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combination of immigrants originating from France and migrating because of politi-
cal persecution. This is no drawback, however, since 'semi-orthogonal' designs can be
more eﬃcient than perfectly orthogonal ones, e.g. in case of asymmetric numbers of
values across attributes (Kuhfeld et al., 1994; Dülmer, 2016)  which is true for our
set. Still, our set comes very close to the ideal of perfect balance and orthogonality.10
Table 4.5 (Supplementary appendix) shows the correlations between the attribute
values and Table 4.2 their descriptive statistics.
To keep the approximate orthogonality, rating all immigrant proﬁles was pro-
grammed as mandatory. In total, 5.1 per cent of the respondents were excluded
from the analysis because they dropped out during this part of the survey in the ﬁrst
wave (69 in total) and 2.57 per cent in the second wave (19 in total). Thus, item
non-response in the main part of our survey is negligible.
We rely only on the data of those respondents who rated all 14 immigrant proﬁles
in both waves for our analysis. This allows the direct comparison of the eﬀect sizes of
each immigrant attribute because the same respondents rated the same outcome on
the same scale for the same set of immigrant proﬁles in both waves. We furthermore
excluded respondents which had missing values on one of the respondent-level vari-
ables controlled in the regression analysis. In total, our ﬁnal sample contained 644
respondents rating 14 immigrant proﬁles at two time points, leaving us with a total
of 18,032 proﬁle ratings.
Treatment: events during the 'Migration Crisis'
Wave 1 of the survey took place in April 2015 and Wave 2 1 month after NYE. To
capture changes between both waves, we generated a dummy variable t (0 = ﬁrst wave,
10The goodness of such a design can be quantiﬁed by its D-eﬃciency, where a value of 100 indicates




1 = second wave). As we rely on intra-individual variation for the estimation, this
time eﬀect is not correlated with unobserved heterogeneity and therefore less prone to
omitted variable bias. Furthermore, since the set of immigrant proﬁles was identical in
both waves, we can estimate how the eﬀects of the immigrant characteristics changed
after the events by accounting for an interaction between the proﬁle characteristics
and t.
Respondents' characteristics
As the immigrant proﬁle attributes are uncorrelated with respondents' characteristics
by design, it is not strictly necessary to control for them to obtain unbiased eﬀects
of the immigrant proﬁles. Nevertheless, we included several characteristics of the
respondents in our analysis out of general interest. These variables are gender, em-
ployment status (full-time, part-time, unemployed, out of labour force), education
(low, medium, high), religious denomination (Christian, other, none), age, living in
East Germany, and number of migrant friends (many, some, few, none). Table 4.2
provides their summary statistics.
Validity and representativeness
Our design is (quasi-)experimental and therefore does not require a representative
sample to yield relevant results. However, as we are dealing with a sample from
an online access pool, the issue of representativeness shall be brieﬂy discussed to
demonstrate that our results are likely to be generalisable. Table 4.3 presents the
distribution of the socio-demographic variables age, gender, and education in the
German population and in our survey. With respect to gender, our sample seems
to be perfectly representative. With respect to age we observe the expected over-
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representation of young and under-representation of older people, but overall this
eﬀect appears not dramatic except for those being older than 74.
We observe a strong over-representation of both low- and high-educated individuals
compared to those with medium education. This is due to the fact that we oversam-
pled low-educated people to compensate their usual under-representation in online
panels.
Based on the weighted multivariate distribution of age, gender, and education in the
German Socio-Economic Panel, we constructed weights for our data set and compared
the results from an unweighted and a weighted analysis. We performed a test proposed
by DuMouchel and Duncan (1983), which indicates that the weighted estimates do
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those in the unweighted models. Therefore, we present the
unweighted analysis in the article. The weighted eﬀects are in general very similar, but
with slightly diﬀerent p-values for a few variables. We report a comparison between
weighted and unweighted models in Supplementary Figures 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10
(Supplementary appendix).
Statistical model
We estimated three-level mixed models with the ratings at level 1, nested in the survey
wave, nested in respondents. This structure accounts for the statistical dependencies
of the multiple ratings by each respondent (via Level 3) and for the additional depen-
dency of the respondents' ratings within one survey wave (via Level 2). We treat the
seven-point Likert scale as quasi-metric and therefore estimate linear random eﬀects
models.11




Table 4.4 presents the results from a series of four models. Model M0 is an empty
model showing that the mean rating across all proﬁles and time is almost exactly
5. Since 7 is the most positive value, respondents rated immigrants rather positively
on average. The model furthermore indicates that most of the variance is located
at the immigrant proﬁle level (2.18), meaning that respondents did indeed react to
the varying immigrant characteristics. However, there is also a considerable amount
of variance between respondents (1.52) and, more important for this study, between
waves (0.61).
Model M1 adds the immigrant characteristics and the wave dummy. Because both
are uncorrelated by design, the coeﬃcient of t indicates that the average acceptance
of immigrants has signiﬁcantly declined in the second wave (-0.241, P < 0.001), sup-
porting H1. This eﬀect represents the general negative eﬀect of the events between
both waves and may thus be understood as an equivalent to the event eﬀects of the
studies discussed above. This negative eﬀect is about as large as the discrimination
against Muslims compared with non-religious immigrants. Since the eﬀects of the
immigrant characteristics in Model M1 are averaged over both waves, and we are pri-
marily interested in the changes between waves, Model M1 is not our main interest.
Nevertheless, we brieﬂy review the estimated parameters. Most interestingly, immi-
grants ﬂeeing persecution are more likely to be accepted than those who come for
economic reasons but have a prospective job, which is by far the strongest eﬀect in
the model, while those who come for a better living without having a job opportunity
are consigned to the lowest rank. This already indicates a strong general willingness
to help refugees in our sample. Moreover, male immigrants are more accepted than
females, and all other eﬀects are in the direction one would assume: immigrants from
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Kenya or Lebanon are less accepted than immigrants from France, immigrants with
high qualiﬁcations and good language skills are more accepted than immigrants with
low ones, and Muslim immigrants are less accepted than non-religious or Christians
(for a more detailed discussion of similar results, see Czymara and Schmidt-Catran,
2016).
Model M2 adds interaction eﬀects between t and all immigrant characteristics,
plotted in Figure 4.3. These interactions test how the eﬀects of immigrant proﬁle
characteristics have changed between both waves. They can thus be understood as a
test for the universality of the t eﬀect estimated in M1 (mind that the main eﬀect of
t in M2 is now conditional for a female, non-religious migrant from France coming for
a better life with low qualiﬁcation and low language skills). An LR-test comparing
Models M1 and M2 indicates that, overall, the eﬀects of immigrant characteristics
have indeed changed between waves (χ2 = 19.09, P < 0.05).
However, looking at the single coeﬃcients of the interactions in M2, we see that
only the changes in the eﬀects of country of origin and reason for immigration are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. The most outstanding eﬀect relates to
immigrants ﬂeeing political prosecution  who were strongly favoured over those who
come for a better living in Wave 1 already (1.542, P<0.001). They are favoured even
more in Wave 2 (eﬀect at t = 2: 1.705, P < 0.001). This indicates that humanitarian
needs can, at least in this hypothetical situation, by far outperform potential threats,
clearly favouring H3a over H3b.
On the other hand, respondents in the ﬁrst wave strongly preferred immigrants from
France over those from Lebanon (-0.230, P < 0.001) or Kenya (-0.263, P < 0.001),
two countries culturally more distant to Germany. In line with our expectations, M2
reveals that these origin-eﬀects became even stronger in the second wave (conditional
eﬀect of Lebanon after event: -0.369, P < 0.001; Kenya: -0.409, P < 0.001). Thus,
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Figure 4.3: Coeﬃcients plot for main and interaction eﬀects
Note: point estimates and 95 percent conﬁdence interval, based on model M2
(Table 4.4 in the Appendix).
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the events, especially NYE, had an additional negative eﬀect on the acceptance of
immigrants from Africa or the Middle East on top of the general negative eﬀect of
cultural distance, providing solid support for the cultural threat H2.
While not statistically signiﬁcant, there are also substantive changes regarding gen-
der: while male immigrants were preferred over females in the ﬁrst wave (0.089, P
= 0.001), this is no longer the case in the second wave (conditional eﬀect of male
immigrant proﬁle in the second wave: 0.038, P = 0.167). The model thus lends some
support to the expectation that the events, and especially NYE, aﬀected the accep-
tance of male immigrants (H2), though the change in the gender eﬀect itself is not
very strong and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Changes in the eﬀects of qualiﬁcation level and language skills are rather small
compared to their main eﬀects and not statistically signiﬁcant. It thus seems that,
as expected, the events hardly aﬀected economic aspects. But interestingly, the same
also applies to religious denomination: while Muslims were the least accepted by a
large degree in Wave 1 (-0.247, P < 0.001), the additional negative eﬀect for Muslims
in wave two is much weaker than expected and also not statistically signiﬁcant (eﬀect
at t = 2: -0.301, P < 0.001). Interestingly, neither the Islamist terror attacks nor
the recent disproportionately high inﬂux of Muslims signiﬁcantly altered the public
acceptance of Muslim migrants in our sample.
Finally, we added three-way interaction terms between the immigrant characteris-
tics, t, and respondents' gender in Model M4 to test whether the changes of eﬀects
over time diﬀer for female and male respondents. Because these parameters are quite
complex, we present them as marginal eﬀects of the immigrant characteristics here,
conditional on respondent's gender and t. Moreover, we show only those eﬀects which
changed signiﬁcantly between the two waves in M2. These marginal eﬀects are shown
in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, and the full model can be found in the Table 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Marginal eﬀect of an immigrant's gender, conditional on respondent's gen-
der and time point
Note: point estimates and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, based on model M4
(Table 4.4 in the Appendix).
Interestingly, Figure 4.4 reveals that the initial preference for male immigrants is
mainly due to female respondents (0.127, P = 0.001), whereas men were largely indif-
ferent in this respect (0.049, P = 0.214). Moreover, the diminishing of the preference
for male migrants in the second wave is also largely due to the statistically signiﬁcant
drop of female approval of males (-0.109, P = 0.046), practically resulting in female
indiﬀerence about gender at t = 2 (0.018, P = 0.648). This lends some support to




Deeper analysis also uncovers that men were the main drivers behind the decrease
of acceptance regarding immigrants from Lebanon or Kenya in Wave 2 reported in
Model M2 (cf. Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5: Marginal eﬀect of an immigrant's origin, conditional on respondent's gen-
der and time point
Note: point estimates and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, based on model M4
(Table 4.4 in the Appendix).
While female respondents exhibit a stable and rather modest negative preference
regarding an immigrant's origin over time, men show a quite strong decline in addition
to their already very negative ratings at Wave 1 (Lebanon: t = 0: -0.384, P < 0.001,
t = 1: -0.634, P < 0.001, change: -0.250, P = 0.002; Kenya: t = 0: -0.406, P < 0.001,
t = 1: -0.673, P < 0.001, change: -0.267, P < 0.001).
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This result is not in line with the expectations from H4 and diﬃcult to explain ad
hoc.
The increasing support for immigrants ﬂeeing prosecution reported before is almost
irrespective of gender (cf. Figure 4.6). However, the change for women (0.180) is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level (P = 0.006), while the eﬀect's increase
for men (0.143) does not reach the 5 per cent level of signiﬁcance (P = 0.072). Finally,
neither men nor women appear to have signiﬁcantly altered their view of Muslim
immigrants between both waves.
Figure 4.6: Marginal eﬀect of an immigrant's reason for migration, conditional on
respondent's gender and time point
Note: point estimates and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, based on model M4
(Table 4.4 in the Appendix).
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4.7 Summary and discussion
Our results indicate that the public acceptance of immigrants in Germany decreased
signiﬁcantly between April 2015 and January 2016. This change can be attributed
to several events: the strong increase of refugees, several fatal attacks of Islamist
terrorism, and the assaults of NYE 2015/2016 happening shortly before our second
survey wave. This decrease, however, does not universally relate to all immigrants in
the same way. It was about twice as large for immigrants from the Middle East and
Africa compared with those from France. Both areas had been speciﬁcally emphasised
in the German media after NYE 2015/2016, although neither of the two countries we
included in our experiment (Kenya and Lebanon) were particularly in the centre of
the current European immigration debate. In fact, avoiding such confounding was
the reason why we opted for these countries in the ﬁrst place. Thus, eﬀects may diﬀer
for immigrants from, for example, Syria or Iraq.
But the most striking ﬁnding in our eyes is that immigrants who ﬂee from per-
secution were not only by far accepted the most from the beginning but that their
initial lead even further increased over time. Given the strong increase in the num-
ber of asylum applications between both waves (cf. Figure 4.1), this clearly refutes
explanations of exclusionary attitudes by rising out-group sizes. Be aware, however,
that the eﬀect is relative to the reference group: immigrants who come for a better
living but without a prospect of a job. This also allows for the interpretation that
these immigrants have become less accepted relative to refugees. Moreover, external
validity may be problematic in case respondents think of actual asylum applicants not
only as those 'ﬂeeing persecution' but also as people who come 'for a better life' under
the legal status of asylum seekers. We did not label either of the groups explicitly as
'refugees' or 'asylum seekers' to avoid being too suggestive.
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In contrast to our expectations, the change in the acceptance of Muslims migrants
between both waves was weak and statistically insigniﬁcant, though the baseline of
the initial acceptance of Muslims was already low. The media coverage in the ﬁrst
days after NYE focused mainly on reports from witnesses, who mostly described the
oﬀenders as originating from Arab or (North-)African countries (cf. Figure 4.1). Reli-
gion was less a manifest characteristic in this context. While not overinterpreting our
ﬁnding, one could derive that this reporting did not set Islam very high on the public
agenda directly after NYE. Looking at men's and women's preferences separately, we
observed that women tended to evaluate immigrants more based on gender than men,
while men tended to discriminate more by country of origin. An obvious explanation
for the ﬁnding that women's initial preference for male immigrants mostly vanished
in the second wave is that women are primarily aﬀected by sexual assaults. They
may thus see male immigrants after NYE not only as a threat to the collective, and
somewhat more abstract, security but also as threatening their concrete individual
safety. It is far less clear why male respondents rejected immigrants from the Mid-
dle East and Africa even more in the second wave, while this pattern was far less
observable for women. Since we are not able to perfectly disentangle individual and
collective safety threats and symbolic threats with our design, a clearer distinction
between these three sources of threat might be helpful to explain this ﬁnding in future
research. Another weakness of our design is that it does not allow the estimation of
interaction eﬀects between immigrant characteristics. In fact, we assume that such
interaction eﬀects are negligible for the estimation of their main eﬀects. This is a
drawback of our within variation design, where all respondents rated the same set of
immigrants in both waves. However, it would be interesting to investigate whether,
for example, refugees were rated less positively in the second wave if they were Mus-
lim, also because such interactions may partly be confounded with main eﬀects (cf.
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Dülmer, 2007: 386). Keep in mind though that our main interest in this study was
not in the main eﬀects but in the changes of eﬀects over time. Finally, we assume
that the eﬀect of salient events gets (partly) reactivated with each new 'similar' event
happening soon after. It may also be possible, however, that the eﬀects wear oﬀ with
each new event, as the public 'gets more used' to such tragic events.
In sum, our ﬁndings point to a paradoxical situation: On the one hand, people are
clearly supportive of migrants in need. On the other hand, however, they seem to
be critical toward those who actually enter their country as refugees. Tackling this




Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of all variables
Variable N Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Immigrant proﬁle characteristics
Gender (male: 1; female: 0) 18,032 0.50 0.50 0 1
Country of origin (ref.: France)
Lebanon 18,032 0.29 0.45 0 1
Kenya 18,032 0.43 0.49 0 1
Reason for immigration (ref.: better life)
pol. persecution 18,032 0.29 0.45 0 1
job 18,032 0.43 0.49 0 1
Qualiﬁcation (high: 1) 18,032 0.50 0.50 0 1
Lang. skills (high: 1) 18,032 0.50 0.50 0 1
Religious denomination (ref.: none)
Christian 18,032 0.29 0.45 0 1
Muslim 18,032 0.43 0.49 0 1
Respondent characteristics at t = 0
Gender (male: 1; female: 0) 644 0.49 0.50 0 1
Employment status (ref.: not in labour force)
full-time employed 644 0.43 0.50 0 1
part-time employed 644 0.23 0.42 0 1
unemployed 644 0.11 0.32 0 1
Education (ref.: low)
medium 644 0.51 0.50 0 1
high 644 0.43 0.50 0 1
Religious denomination (ref.: none)
Christian 644 0.51 0.50 0 1
other 644 0.05 0.21 0 1
Age 644 45.95 15.22 17 80
Region (East : 1, West: 0) (East 0.25 0.43 0 1
Migrant friends (ref.: none)
many 644 0.08 0.28 0 1
some 644 0.31 0.46 0 1
few 644 0.32 0.47 0 1
Note: Immigrant proﬁle-level statistics are based on 28 observations per respondent




Table 4.3: Comparison of our sample's socio-demographic composition with popula-
tion
Variable GSOEP 2015 Our data
(weighted)
Gender
men (per cent) 48.89 49.07
women (per cent) 51.11 50.93
Age
16  29 years (per cent) 17.83 19.88
30  44 years (per cent) 21.67 23.60
45  59 years (per cent) 27.32 35.71
60  74 years (per cent) 20.28 18.94
75 and older (per cent 12.89 1.86
Mean (st. dev.) 50.21 (19.09) 45.95 (15.22)
Education
low (per cent) 16.03 30.75
medium (per cent) 61.38 41.46
high (per cent) 22.59 27.80
Note: Population is deﬁned as persons of 16 years of age and older who are living in
Germany. Representative data are from the cross-national equivalence ﬁle of the
German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) and have been weighted with the
cross-sectional weights for 2015. Low education = low or intermediate secondary
school; medium education = upper secondary school degree and/or apprenticeship
and/or vocational school; high education = tertiary education. Note that the
categorization of educational degrees in the GSOEP diﬀers from the categorization
we use for our analysis. For this comparison with the GSOEP, we adjusted our
categorization to match the one of the GSOEP. This explains why the percentages
of the categories low, medium, and high in Table 4.2 are diﬀerent from the




Table 4.4: Full regression models
Variable M0 M1 M2 M3 M4
t: 1 (ref.: t: 0) -0.241*** -0.156* -0.110 -0.277**
(-5.04) (-2.05) (-1.44) (-2.60)
Immigrant proﬁle characteristics
Male (ref.: female) 0.0634** 0.0885** 0.0885** 0.127**
(3.24) (3.20) (3.20) (3.28)
Country of origin (ref.: France)
Lebanon -0.300*** -0.230*** -0.230*** -0.0811
(-10.67) (-5.79) (-5.79) (-1.46)
Kenya -0.336*** -0.263*** -0.263*** -0.124*
(-13.28) (-7.35) (-7.35) (-2.49)
Reason for immigration (ref.: better life)
pol. persecution 1.624*** 1.542*** 1.542*** 1.537***
(57.80) (38.85) (38.85) (27.74)
job 1.062*** 1.050*** 1.050*** 1.167***
(44.42) (31.08) (31.08) (24.75)
High qualiﬁcation (ref.: low) 0.444*** 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.380***
(22.70) (14.99) (14.99) (9.84)
High lang. skills (ref.: low) 0.443*** 0.464*** 0.464*** 0.471***
(22.64) (16.79) (16.79) (12.21)
Religious denomination (ref.: none)
Christian -0.00873 -0.0109 -0.0109 -0.0198
(-0.34) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.40)
Muslim -0.274*** -0.247*** -0.247*** -0.233***
(-11.59) (-7.39) (-7.39) (-4.99)
Immigrant proﬁle characteristics × t
Male (ref.: female) -0.0503 -0.0503 -0.109*
(-1.29) (-1.29) (-2.00)
Country of origin (ref.: France)
Lebanon -0.139* -0.139* -0.0328
(-2.48) (-2.48) (-0.42)
Kenya -0.146** -0.146** -0.0298
(-2.89) (-2.89) (-0.42)
Reason for immigration (ref.: better life)
pol. persecution 0.162** 0.162** 0.180*
(2.89) (2.89) (2.30)
job 0.0234 0.0234 0.0312
(0.49) (0.49) (0.47)





High lang. skills (ref.: low) -0.0425 -0.0425 -0.0308
(-1.09) (-1.09) (-0.56)
Religious denomination (ref.: none)
Christian 0.00427 0.00427 0.0663
(0.08) (0.08) (0.94)
Muslim -0.0538 -0.0538 -0.0242
(-1.14) (-1.14) (-0.37)
Respondent characteristics
Gender (male: 1; female: 0) 0.00821 0.263
(0.08) (1.85)
Employment status (ref.: not in labour force)
full-time employed 0.0204 0.0204
(0.17) (0.17)
















Region (East : 1, West: 0) -0.106 -0.107
(-0.83) (-0.84)







Immigrant proﬁle characteristics × male respondent















High qualiﬁcation (ref.: low) 0.0710
(1.29)
High lang. skills (ref.: low) -0.0141
(-0.26)





Male respondent × t 0.340*
(2.25)
Immigrant proﬁle characteristics × t × male respondent
Male (ref.: female) 0.120
(1.54)










High qualiﬁcation (ref.: low) -0.0138
(-0.18)
High lang. skills (ref.: low) -0.0238
(-0.31)








Constant 4.997*** 4.073*** 4.030*** 3.798*** 3.678***
Variance components
Respondent 1.524*** 1.539*** 1.539*** 1.310*** 1.312***
T 0.610*** 0.618*** 0.618*** 0.613*** 0.611***
Immigrant proﬁle 2.180*** 1.664*** 1.662*** 1.662***
N (respondents) 644 644 644 644 644
T (T × N) 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288
n (immigrant proﬁles) 18,032 18,032 18,032 18,032 18,032
Log-likelihood -34,153.82 -31,882.27 -31,872.73 -31829.14 -31761.38
LR-tests M1 vs. M0 M2 vs. M1 M3 vs. M2 M4 vs. M3
LR χ2 (df) 4,543.1 (10) 19.09 (9) 87.18 (13) 135.52 (19)
Probability > χ2 < 0.0001 0.0245 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Note: * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001 (two-sided tests).
4.9 Supplementary appendix
A: Construction of immigrant proﬁles
The immigrant proﬁles used in this study are standardised descriptions of immigrants
which all consist of the same six attributes: gender, country of origin, reason for
migration, qualiﬁcation, language skills, and religious denomination. The values of
each attribute where chosen in a way that minimises implausible combinations and
confounding stereotypes of, e. g. certain countries of origin. Each immigrant proﬁle
is a unique combination of the values of these diﬀerent attributes (compare Table 4.1
for an overview of all values). Additionally, each immigrant proﬁle was characterised
by a random letter that indicated the abbreviation of a surname. An example of
an immigrant proﬁle thus reads: 'Mr G. wants to migrate from Kenya to Germany
because he has a prospective job. He has higher education, good skills in the German
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language and is Muslim.' and respondents should, among other things, rate whether
'Mr G. should be allowed to live in Germany' on a 7-point scale (for the original
German phrases and a more detailed discussion of the single attributes and values see
Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2016). Because our design measures the impact of all
attributes simultaneously and on the same outcome and all respondents rated the same
set of immigrant proﬁles in both waves, it is possible to directly compare the eﬀect
sizes of the attributes with each other, under the assumption that interaction eﬀects
between the attributes are negligible. This assumption is necessary because the main
eﬀects and certain higher-order interactions of the attributes are partly confounded.
Since the design is based on this assumption, it does not allow the post hoc estimation
of interaction eﬀects (cf. Dülmer, 2007: 386, Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2018).
Table 4.5 presents the correlations between each of the immigrant attributes. Al-
most all correlations between the diﬀerent dimensions are weak or zero. Note that
the values within each attribute (e. g., France and Kenya) are correlated by design.
Out of all other associations, only ﬁve are higher than 0.2. These correlations are
all between values of the dimension Country of origin and the dimension Reason for
migration  the highest correlation (0.4) is between France and Political persecution,
which is the restriction we built into the design for plausibility reasons. Keep in mind,
however, that we simultaneously include all attributes in our models for the analy-
sis. In this way, even the small to moderate correlations between some attributes are
controlled for and are unbiased under the assumption of negligible interaction eﬀects
between the proﬁle characteristics. Even if this assumption is violated, the bias of the











































































































































































































































































































































































































B: Comparison of weighted and unweighted analyses
Figure 4.7: Weighted and unweighted coeﬃcient estimates from Model M2 compared
Note: Weights have been constructed based on (weighted) SOEP data from the 2015
cross-national equivalence ﬁle. Weights are based on the multivariate distribution in
a three-dimensional table of gender, age and education (compare Table 4.2 for more
details on how age and education has been categorised). Note that the weighted and
unweighted models are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other.
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Figure 4.8: Weighted and unweighted marginal eﬀect of immigrant's gender from
Model M4 compared
Note: point estimates and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, based on weighted and
unweighted versions of model M4. Also see notes of Figure 4.7. Note that weighted
and unweighted models do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from each other.
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Figure 4.9: Weighted and unweighted marginal eﬀect of immigrant's origin from
Model M4 compared
Note: point estimates and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, based on weighted and
unweighted versions of model M4. Also see notes of Figure 4.7. Note that weighted
and unweighted models do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from each other.
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Figure 4.10: Weighted and unweighted marginal eﬀect of immigrant's reason for mi-
gration from Model M4 compared
Note: point estimates and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, based on weighted and
unweighted versions of model M4. Also see notes of Figure 4.7. Note that weighted
and unweighted models do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from each other.
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C: Search strings for Figure 4.1
For articles referring to Immigration and Africa or the Middle East:
(zuwander! OR einwander! OR !migration! OR !migrant!
OR !flücht! OR !flucht! OR !asyl!) AND (arab! OR
!afrika! OR orient OR orientalisch OR syri! OR ((nah! OR
mitt!) w/2 ost!)) AND (deutschland OR bundesrepublik OR
brd)
For articles referring to Immigration and Islam:
(zuwander! OR einwander! OR !migration! OR !migrant!
OR !flücht! OR !flucht! OR !asyl!) AND (islam! OR
muslim! OR moslem! OR !kopftuch! OR moschee OR burka!)
AND (deutschland OR bundesrepublik OR brd)
For articles referring to Immigration and sexual violence:
(zuwander! OR einwander! OR !migration! OR !migrant!
OR !flücht! OR !flucht! OR !asyl!) AND (vergewaltig!
OR ((gewalt OR missbrauch! OR !nötig! OR belästig!) w/2
sex!)) AND (deutschland OR bundesrepublik OR brd)
Source: Spiegel Online, Welt Online and Zeit Online provided by nexis.com (re-




Ethnic resentments and hostile attitudes towards immigrants are not only rooted
in stable ideologies and traits of the individual members of ethnic groups but also
depend on the social contexts of a society. This is indicated by the variation of atti-
tudes between countries with diﬀerent cultures and politics (cf., for example, Hjerm,
2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007, or chapter 3). Moreover, they are also inﬂuenced by
macro-level developments as systematic changes within countries over time show (for
example, Legewie, 2013; Semyonov et al., 2006, or chapters 2 and 4). One of the
most established explanation for the inﬂuence of macro-level conditions on attitudes
towards ethnic out-groups is the group threat paradigm, which is based on the idea
that people harbour images about these groups that are threatening their own group's
social position (Blumer, 1958).
I began my argument in chapter 1 with a critique of one of the most most popular
interpretations of the group threat paradigm, namely that perceptions of threat are
the result of national immigration. This argument goes back to at least the 1950s
(Blalock, 1957) and has become especially prominent since the 1990s (e. g., Quillian,
1995, for overview see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 317 f.). My critique is based
on the fact that most people have highly biased perceptions regarding immigration
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rates and the number of immigrants in their country (Herda, 2015; 2013; 2010; Wong,
2007; Alba et al., 2005, also see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014: 231) as well as of the
composition of its immigrant population (Blinder, 2015). If these numbers are largely
misperceived, however, actual national immigration alone can not be the core driver
of attitudes. In line with a number of previous studies (Hjerm, 2007; Sides and Citrin,
2007; Semyonov et al., 2004), my ﬁndings by and large refute this interpretation of
the group threat paradigm. This is most clearly the case in chapter 4, where the
inﬂow of refugees sharply increased during the time of investigation. At the same
time, however, the public acceptance of refugees actually increased as well according
to the data. This is diametrically opposed to the theoretical predictions of the 'group
size'-argument. In chapters 2 and 3 the eﬀects of national immigration levels are
either only modest or fail to be statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Based on this critique, I developed a theoretical mechanism which connects contex-
tual conditions on the country-level and individual attitudes. Combining the classical
works of Blumer (1958) and Lippmann (1921), I have argued that key events and
their discussions in the prevalent discourses of a society are important prerequisites
for exclusionary attitudes. This is because such discourses are the basis of the pic-
tures of ethnic out-groups people have in their heads (Lippmann, 1921). The more a
discourse contributes to a threatening picture, the more powerful it is in generating
hostility among the members of the majority group (Blumer, 1958). The underlying
theoretical model draws upon the idea that real events and developments matter and
adds the importance of their mediation, and possible distortion, through discursive
framing (Wimmer, 1997: 26 f.). It consists of three main parts: certain key events and
developments which national elites discuss, the resulting discourses shaping certain
images and their impact on individual perceptions and attitudes. The diﬀerent studies
included in the present dissertation examine diﬀerent aspects of this model. Whereas
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chapters 2 and 3 deal with the potential impact of discourses on public opinion in
larger temporal or spatial contexts over heterogeneous sets of discourses, chapter 4
examines also the emergence of a discourse based on a particular example.
The accumulated evidence supports my reasoning. Chapter 2 deals with the conse-
quences of general media reporting on the immigration issue for individual concerns
about this issue. To this end, my colleague Stephan Dochow and I combined a quanti-
tative content analysis of articles in German print newspapers with survey data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel, covering a time span of 15 years. We show that
the number of articles about immigration related issues signiﬁcantly and robustly
increase concerns. The fact that the count variable we employ to measure the me-
dia environment does not diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent kinds or tone of discourses
suggests that mass media have an impact beyond certain idiosyncratic discussions.
While it is reasonable to assume that certain discourses have a stronger eﬀect on pub-
lic opinion than others, we estimate an average eﬀect across a heterogeneous set of
discourses that took place in Germany in the last 15 years including, amongst others,
Islamist terrorism, economic migration, or humanitarianism related to the inﬂow of
people in need. Hence, the relationship reported in chapter 2 tells something about
the general impact of salience.
Chapter 3 adds to this ﬁnding the importance of political elite discourses on at-
titudes towards speciﬁc immigrant groups. The way in which public elites discuss
certain ethnic groups in a given social context is likely to have an impact on the
picture of the particular immigrant subgroup which members of the public have in
their heads (Lippmann, 1921; Meuleman et al., 2018). Accordingly, elite discourses
primarily relate to attitudes towards these immigrant groups. I conﬁrm this hypothe-
sis taking a cross-national perspective and drawing upon the European Social Survey
to measure individual attitudes towards diﬀerent immigrant groups and the Mani-
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festo Research on Political Representation project to measure the stance of political
parties on immigration issues. When political elites are more negative, the individ-
uals in a country are also more negative, especially towards Muslim and ethnically
distant immigrants. These are the groups which were rather prominent in the inves-
tigated historical period. This especially refers to Muslim immigrants, which were in
the focus of this study because they are a clearly deﬁned group associated with po-
tentially threatening traits (Helbling and Traunmüller, 2018). Positive political elite
discourses, in contrast, were associated with less negative attitudes towards all dif-
ferent kinds of immigrants. Hence, whereas the emergence of potentially threatening
images of ethnic out-groups (Blumer, 1958) and related discourses seem to be speciﬁc
to certain social contexts (Meuleman et al., 2018), discourses promoting openness and
tolerance seem to activate more positive sentiments towards various kinds of ethnic
groups.
Finally, chapter 4 deepens this argument by examining changes in public opinion
before and after the key events of New Year's Eve 2015/16 in Germany, where groups
of men that were reported as having Arab and African appearance robbed and sexually
assaulted women in various German cities. To this end, my colleague Alexander W.
Schmidt-Catran and I conducted an online experiment where participants had to
rate a set of hypothetical immigrants which diﬀered in certain characteristics before
and after the event. The results reveal that the events primarily had an impact on
the evaluation of those immigrants which were particularly discussed as the main
threats to society in the prevailing discourses, namely immigrants from Africa or the
Middle East. However, this did not concern Muslim immigrants and refugees. An
explanation for the stability of the initially lower acceptance of Muslims is that the
assaults were actually not really connected to religiosity or religious fundamentalism.
Hence, natives might retain more diﬀerentiated views also after the event. The fact
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that refugees were actually even more welcomed in the second wave of the survey
may be explained by an out-performance of humanitarian discourses over threatening
ones.
So, on the one hand, general salience aﬀects general concerns (cf. chapter 2). On
the other hand, speciﬁc discourses have out-group-speciﬁc eﬀects, depending on the
overall tone (cf. chapter 3) as well as on the particular content (cf. chapter 4). In
the terms of the model of multi-level agenda setting (McCombs and Ghanem, 2001),
the ﬁrst ﬁnding corresponds to the ﬁrst and basic level, dealing with the transfer
of salience of the immigration issue in general (in contrast to other issues) and the
second one can be read as happening on a higher level of agenda-setting, dealing with
the transfer of salience of certain attributes within the immigration issue.
Deeper analyses reveal that, throughout all studies presented in this dissertation,
discourse and salience eﬀects are signiﬁcantly stronger for certain individuals than for
others. Among those whose attitudes are especially aﬀected by the discursive context
are individuals with conservative ideology, lower education, or few daily experiences
with foreigners. Perhaps problematically, these individuals are more likely to be
among the readers of 'alternative' internet news outlets, which more often put forward
opinions with a more radical slant and rumours. Such free online news are steadily
gaining ground as alternatives to the 'classical', proofread media, whose readership is
declining. It is an open question how these developments aﬀect the dissemination of
political information and news. However, it is not unlikely that independent online
outlets report more sensationalistically as there is far less reviewing and it is easier
to reach target groups which demand more radical opinions. Consequently, topics
related to immigration and integration may become increasingly diﬃcult to debate in




But the divergence of societies is not the only problematic consequence of an in-
creasingly hostile immigration discourse. It also re-deﬁnes the semantic space in which
future discussions take place. This, in turn, can inﬂuence on policy evaluations and
political practice (Flores, 2017). In this way, the discursive context is more than
a soft characteristic. It has real and profound consequences for the individuals at
whom certain policies are targeted and can result, for example, in criminalisation or
deportation. Tighter borders and stricter asylum policies are among the key demands
put forward in anti-immigration discourses. From a strictly economic point of view,
such policies seem irrational as evidence suggests that, on the long run, the inﬂow
of asylum seekers is likely to pay oﬀ for Western countries (D'Albis et al., 2018, also
see Marbach et al., 2018). Moreover, since empirical evidence suggests that total im-
migration actually decreases the risk of terrorist attacks (Bove and Böhmelt, 2016),
general restrictions is also unlikely to have the desired impact regarding public safety.
However, one must also note that, globally, things look diﬀerent regarding immigra-
tion from terrorist-prone countries of origin (ibid.). Avoiding border control is hence
also no panacea.
5.2 Shoot the messenger? Chances and limitations
of tackling the misperceptions causing ethnic
prejudice
Freedom of the press and of speech are fundamental parts of democracy. Moreover,
ignoring certain developments and events would not be a solution to the underlying
social problems. However, there are aspects in the way the media, public speakers
and political elites portray reality that can be regarded problematic. First, there is
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a clear preference for novelty over regularity (Patterson, 2008). As indicated by the
term itself, news concentrate on fresh stories, breaking developments and events. The
problem is that many social issues are rather static and slow. Put diﬀerently, [m]ost
of society's problems look the same today as they did yesterday  a monotonous same-
ness that reduces their news value. (Patterson, 2008: 37) For example, immigrants
may take many years, sometimes generations, to integrate fully into the host society.
This means that social inequality may persist over decades. Selectively focussing on
'newsworthy' developments is thus likely to underestimate the importance of chronic
conditions. This, in turn, can result in a severely distorted picture of reality. More-
over, the special focus on certain key events like New Year's Eve 2015/16 further
increases such disparities between 'social reality' and 'news reality.' This is because
such key events are rather anecdotes than systematic observations (Patterson, 2008).
Even more problematically is that most abrupt events are of negative nature, such as
terror attacks, whereas positive aspects often unfold over longer periods of time, such
as successful integration. In the logic of the media market, positive matters are thus
less newsworthy compared to negative ones (also see Soroka, 2014). With the focus
of mass media reporting on salient (and negative) events, it does no longer apply that
what is perceived more often also actually happens more often.
This leads to a second important point: The demand side the media's negativity
bias (cf. Trussler and Soroka, 2014; Hrbková et al., 2017). Not only are negative events
considered as more newsworthy, but negative news also often sell better and receive
more public attention (cf., e. g., Soroka and McAdams, 2015; Soroka, 2014; Lengauer
et al., 2012). There is strong evidence coming from cognition psychology that hu-
mans in general react more to negative than to positive information (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1973), which also holds true regarding negative political news (Soroka,
2006; Ito et al., 1998). This 'bad news are good news' logic can lead to general pes-
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simism and fatalism  with unintended negative consequences. For example, critical
reporting on political elites is certainly an important aspect of a well-functioning
democracy. However, focussing on negative aspects only can lead to the erosion of
trust in political institutions in the general public. This, in turn, is a fruitful ground
for 'anti-establishment' populists with easy answers to complex questions, as many of
the recent elections in Western countries, most prominently in the US, have shown.1
Again, this does not mean that critical reporting should be abandoned nor that
dramatic events should be neglected. But so-called constructive journalism might be
able to counteract negative attitudes as well as biased perceptions of social problems
and / or marginalised groups. Such kind of journalism focuses more on solutions than
on conﬂicts. Moreover, it oﬀers a contextualization of social situations and additional
background information (McIntyre and Gyldensted, 2017). Ultimately, the idea is to
give a more realistic view of the world based on information that does not only cover
its negative aspects.
Political elites also have a responsibility since they have the power to create impor-
tant events themselves which then become news. A recent example for this can be
found in the 2016 US Presidential Election, when Donald Trump referred to Mexican
immigrants as 'rapists' and 'criminals' which led to major debates. Flores (2018)
shows that these statements negatively aﬀected the public's view of migrants, es-
pecially among those who already harboured resentments. In this way, right-wing
populist parties and elites are actually fuelling the ﬁres of ethnic prejudice.
But even if news did reﬂect social reality perfectly, there is reason to assume that
individual misperceptions would persist, at least to a certain extent. This is because
such misperceptions in many cases are more than random ignorance, as indicated,
1Similarly, there is evidence that viewers of political comedy in the US exhibit higher levels of po-
litical cynicism while simultaneously reporting higher self-rated levels of political sophistication,
also known as The Daily Show Eﬀect (Baumgartner and Morris, 2006).
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for example, by the fact that they correlate with the perception of immigration as
culturally threatening (Herda, 2015).
Herda (2010) distinguishes two diﬀerent reasons for such misperceptions which both
seem to correlate with biased perceptions independently from one another: Firstly,
there are neutral cognitive mistakes which are caused by faulty generalisations of
information coming from personal experience but also from mass media. Such mis-
takes generally lack an aﬀective component. This cognitive aspect, which relates to
the media's selective focus on news and events, could potentially be tackled by the
provision of additional information. This is where constructive journalism can oper-
ate. However, the second reason for misperceptions according to Herda (2010) has an
emotional component and includes negative judgements about an ethnic out-group.
These emotional responses constitute perception biases which have very little to do
with any actual prior evidence. Thus, these emotional aspects are much more resis-
tant to change. They are rather rooted in established, internalised prejudice (also see
Flynn et al., 2017).
The stability of individual prejudice is corroborated by scholars who suggest that
changes in the discursive social climate after key events are less caused by attitudinal
changes of the public's majority at large but rather by the changed behaviour of
certain individuals. That is, those with a priori hostile attitudes towards immigrants
become more active and thereby shift public discourse on the macro-level in their
direction (Flores, 2017). While the evidence presented in the present dissertation
suggests that attitudes can become more negative due to prevailing discourses, it does
not deny stable forms of prejudice and it certainly does not reject the possibility that,
additionally, individuals with more initial resentment become more active in public
discussions after dramatic events related to immigration. Reaching these individuals
could become a very diﬃcult task.
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5.3 Suggestions for future research
In the present dissertation, I analysed discourses as contextual sources of hostile
attitudes towards immigrants in a quantitative manner. But measuring discourses is
neither trivial nor easy. First and foremost, this is because of the latent character
of the concept of discourse. Moreover, there is also no consensus or clear deﬁnition
of what should be included in a discourse measure and what should not (cf. the
discussion in section 2.8).
To account for the heterogeneous nature of the discourse concept, as well as for
the variety of potential sources and messengers, I employed diﬀerent operationalisa-
tions throughout the studies presented in this dissertation. However, none of these
is perfect. In fact, the main explanatory variable in chapter 2 is not a measure of
discourse but of salience, using a count variable of the number of articles each day
which address immigration related issues. Our goal with this study was to provide a
general eﬀect of media salience, averaged over a large set of discourses, precisely to
be independent of idiosyncratic debates. This operationalisation is well suited for our
propose. Other more diﬀerentiated approaches, however, would be highly interest-
ing, too. The discourse variables employed in chapter 3 are quantiﬁcations of party
manifestos in various European countries. These quantiﬁcations are based on manual
coding conducted by a large number of people which is not only highly cost and labour
intensive but might potentially be prone to subjective decisions of individual coders
(although the Manifesto Research on Political Representation project puts much ef-
fort into maximising the quality of data, Klingemann et al., 2006). Clearly, such a
procedure is not feasible for single researchers or small research groups. Moreover, the
data are by design restricted to times of elections. In chapter 4 the quantitative and
qualitative indicators of discourse actually do not enter the ﬁnal model due to the fact
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that, in this research design, there is no one who is not receiving the treatment (who
is not exposed to the national discourses of the event). Still, I am convinced that
all three studies have socially and politically relevant ﬁndings and also ﬁll important
gaps in the existing body of literature.
But of course, these approaches could be improved further. As the amount of
digitally available media data has increased sharply in recent years, machine-based
methods could ideally complement my approaches (for overviews of such methods
see, for example, Boumans and Trilling, 2016; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). McLaren
et al. (2018) and Flores (2017) are examples of diﬀerent steps towards this direction.
Developments and achievements in communication sciences, and the rapidly growing
ﬁelds of computational social sciences and digital humanities are perfectly suited to
extending the methodology of established quantitative social science research. The
canonical paradigms that the past decades of survey research have established are
likely to gain important additional facets by the application of the rapidly advancing
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